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African truth commission, until F.W. De Klerk, who on behalf of the National Party (NP) said his 
constituency would be more comfortable if the commission can be called the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The worrying factor was not the introduction of reconciliation, but 
the interpretation and understanding thereof. This is because, for a long time the bible in the 
South African politics has been made a servant of ideology- that is, to domesticate it for the 
purposes of subjection and control. As such, it was very clear that, the inclusion of reconciliation 
was not to allow it to confront the country with the demands of the gospel, but to blunt the 
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be introduced, among other things to theological ethics and ancient languages- particularly Greek 
which challenged me to look at words in their original meaning. As a result, I was introduced to 
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4  
assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace peace, a unity without cost, and maintaining power 
with only cosmetic changes. Thus, in my attempt to deal with the subject of reconciliation, I have 
found out that, often reconciliation is used merely to reach some political accommodation that 
did not address the critical questions of justice, equality, and dignity that are so prominent in the 
biblical understanding of reconciliation. But through the course of this study I was introduced to 
two notions- namely Political Pietism and Christian Quietism which formed a central approach 
in my critique of the work of the South African TRC. Political Pietism is when reconciliation is 
used to reach some political arrangements which invariably favour the rich and powerful but 
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therefore know better, discover that what is happening is in fact not reconciliation, but for 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This study is an attempt to critique the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 
a theological ethical perspective. The central critique and argument of this study will be that, it is 
impossible to reconcile the dispossessor and the dispossessed or the oppressor and oppressed in 
the way the South African TRC did. As such, it will be befitting to start off this study which 
explores some of the noticeable lessons and challenges emerging from the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter, the TRC) by elucidating that this study is an attempt 
to contribute to the on-going discussions on reconciliation. It is also vital to mention up front that 
this study attempts to contribute to the discussion on reconciliation which seeks to remove 
injustice at the root. It contributes to a discussion of the weeds of alienation and fragmentation, 
and it stands in contrast to the frequent use of reconciliation merely to reach some political 
accommodation and not to address the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity (Boesak 
& DeYoung 2012). It is also befitting to point out that two central themes – political pietism and 
Christian quietism – form the backdrop to this study (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). The study 
contends that reconciliation in South Africa was used merely to reach some political 
accommodation and did not address the three critical questions of justice, equality and dignity. 
These arrangements perpetually favour the rich and powerful but deprive the powerless of justice 
and dignity. Hitherto, this reconciliation is presented as if it does respond to the need for genuine 
reconciliation and employs a language that sounds like the truth, but it is in fact deceitful – and 
this we call political pietism. It is also vital to mention that “reconciliation” is a Christian 
concept, and as such, Christians’ measure matters of reconciliation with the yardstick of the 
gospel and therefore should know better. However, as it will be shown in this study, when 
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Christians in South Africa discovered that the TRC was not really promoting reconciliation, they 
became complicit in a deceitful reconciliation. This may have been for reasons of self-protection, 
fear or a desire for acceptance by the powers that govern the world. Whichever way one looks at 
it, they tried to seek to accommodate the situation, to justify it and to refuse to run the risk of 
challenge and prophetic truth telling. As a result, they denied the demands of the gospel and 
refused solidarity with the powerless and oppressed. This is called Christian quietism (Boesak & 
DeYoung 2012:1). 
This study in its attempt to critique the South Africa TRC from a theological ethical perspective 
will point out that, the TRC which was obviously the product of the negotiated settlement needs 
to be understood against the background of the global struggle of particularly Third-World 
countries which were resisting authoritarian regimes put in place by the West for the benefit of 
the West. As such, this study will point out how the West, in their attempt to keep a grip on the 
Third-World countries – particularly on their resources – had to recommend and promote their 
notion of democracy. Democracy became the only option for Third-World countries as a result 
of the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union.  It must,  however,  be  mentioned  that  the  problem  is  not 
democracy but the manifestation thereof under capitalism. This is because the notion of 
democracy was recommended to Third-World countries when capitalism was becoming global. 
As such, this presented some contradictions because democracy emphasizes joint interests, 
equality and common loyalties whilst capitalism is based on self-seeking inequality and 
conflicting individual and group interest (Terriblanche 2002). This means that a transition to 
democracy (especially constitutional democracy) means that the former oppressor or dispossessor 
will hold on to economic power. As such, the sudden interest of both the NP and the corporate 
sector in South Africa to a transition to democracy needs to be understood against this 
background. This study 
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will argue and demonstrate how the ANC was outsmarted during the negotiations in that, at the 
formal negotiations, the ANC won political power whilst the NP/corporate sector in South Africa 
won economic power. This is mentioned to here to point out that both the elite compromise 
reached at the formal and informal negotiations and the influence of the Latin-American truth 
commissions led to the inability or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about systemic 
exploitation. As such, this study will argue and demonstrate that, on the one hand, reconciliation 
was not added to the truth commission for the purpose of confronting the country with the 
demands of the gospel and, on the other hand, the TRC was set up (from its inception) for 
failure. 
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Summary of the Study 
 
Chapter 1 of this  study  sets  out the  parameters  of the research. It looks  into the  problem 
statement which has led to this study, namely that it is impossible to reconcile the dispossessors 
and the dispossessed or the oppressor and the oppressed in the way the TRC tried to do. This is 
because, as is shown in the course of this study, reconciliation as a Christian concept attempts to 
remove injustice at the root and addresses questions of justice, equality and dignity. As such, 
what the TRC did – using reconciliation merely to reach some political accommodation – was 
not reconciliation but a mere political arrangement which favours the rich and powerful but 
deprives the powerless of justice and dignity. This chapter touches on two notions, namely 
political pietism and Christian quietism. These two 
 notions must be understood against the background of the following: (1) the rise of resistance in 
Third-World countries against authoritarian regimes, (2) the move towards democracy when 
capitalism was becoming global in character, (3) the fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1991), (4) the 
elite compromise reached at the formal and informal negotiations, (5) the influence of Latin-
American and African truth commissions and (6) the inability or unwillingness of the TRC 
to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 of this study deals with the “anatomy of apartheid”. It points out that apartheid needs 
to be understood in its relationship to colonization. I approach this analysis from a theological 
background and acknowledge the many contributions on this subject from other fields. It is 
pointed out in the course of this chapter that it was the whole purpose of colonization and later 
the apartheid system to distort the “being” of both Black people and White people in South 
Africa. This is based on the idea that “being”, that is, the entity which encompasses features of 
reality and existence, in South Africa has been distorted through the ontology of domination. 
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This ontology has divided the world into two, namely between the center (which is occupied by 
Europeans) and the periphery (which is occupied by Non-Europeans). This ontological division 
resulted, on the one hand, in the center imposing itself on the periphery, and on the other hand, it 
has resulted in the being of the center (i.e. the being of Europeans) becoming the “Being” (with a 
capital B; that is, the yardstick of what it means to be a Being). Throughout the process of 
colonization and later through the system of apartheid, the “being” of White people in South 
African became the thesis of what it meant to be a “Being”, and in turn, Black people in South 
Africa became the synthesis of this being. As a result of this logic, White people in South Africa 
felt justified to act as guardians over Black people in South Africa. The anatomy of apartheid 
must be understood against this backdrop. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 of this study deals with the Neo-liberal transition to democracy in South Africa and 
focuses on compromises and a political solution for a new South Africa. This chapter looks into 
the notion of a negotiated transition which gave birth to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the constitutional democracy. This chapter contends that the NP 
and the corporate sector in South Africa (at that time) opted for the negotiations not because of 
their personal convictions but because of circumstances. It will be argued that the move by the 
NP and the corporate sector in South Africa for negotiations was a calculated move on their part. 
FW de Klerk and his NP entered these negotiations with the aim of safeguarding the interests, 
that is, the assets they have accumulated, of the White people in South Africa. These interests 
were later invented under the pretext of so-called minority rights. The TRC was established to 
avoid an international tribunal similar to that of the Nuremberg tribunal, which used a judicial 
approach as solution. Special attention will be given in this chapter to a series of events that 
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happened around the period 1989–1991, the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union. All 
the events that occurred in this period were not accidental. These events include the following: 
the release of political prisoners (specifically the release of Nelson Mandela and the core of the 
leadership of the ANC), the debate about sanctions, the debate about negotiations and, 
specifically, the debate about the idea of shared power. The transition to democracy, especially 
under the capitalist system, was the only viable option for the NP and the corporate sector of 
South Africa to continue to maintain their grip on the economy of South Africa. This is because 
the association between democracy and capitalism results in conflicting logics which boil down 
to privileges being maintained. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 of this study deals with the TRC and the ratification of the elite compromise reached at 
the informal and formal negotiations. It points out that the TRC ratified the elite compromises 
reached at both the informal and formal negotiations as a result of the following: (1) the rise of 
resistance in Third-World countries towards authoritarian regimes, (2) the move towards 
democracy when capitalism was becoming global in character, (3) the fall of the Soviet Union 
(1989–1991), (4) the elite compromise reached at the formal and informal negotiations, (5) the 
influence   of   Latin-American   and   African   truth   commissions   and   (6)   the   inability   or 
unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation. It is vital to note 
that the South-African Truth and (Reconciliation) Commission, which was initially called the 
Truth Commission, was formed against the background of pronouncements of the international 
human-rights community that “apartheid was a crime against humanity” and the negotiated 
settlement. This chapter contends that the TRC was established, on the one hand, to please the 
international human-rights community and, on the other hand, to ratify the elite compromise 
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reached at the informal and formal negotiations. One should note that this claim is based on how 
the commission accidentally and/or intentionally narrowed down a wide mandate given to it for, 
on the one hand, pleasing the international human-rights community and, on the other hand, 
pleasing the corporate sector in South Africa. It did this by obscuring the systemic character of 
apartheid and thus offered the corporate sector in South Africa an underserved opportunity to 
clear themselves and their corporations of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy 
of apartheid. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the consequences of de-historicizing the story of apartheid through the 
inability or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. This 
chapter points out how the TRC, as result of its inability or unwillingness of uncover the truth 
about systemic exploitation, lost a golden opportunity to educate the individual and corporate 
beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct responsibility for the disrupted social structures and 
abject poverty of the majority of Black people. The chapter also shows how the TRC found itself 
in a cul-de-sac which resulted in the dis-historicizing and de-contextualizing of the story of 
apartheid. This cul-de-sac was a result of the historical and ideological influence of the Latin- 
American and African truth commissions – particularly the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile – the adoption of the tamed biblical concept of “reconciliation”, the 
employment of an individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations and how the 
TRC was used to ratify the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. 
This chapter shows how, as a result of the inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover 
the truth about the systematic exploitation of the apartheid system, the TRC de-historicized and 
de-contextualised the story of apartheid. 
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The consequences of de-historicizing and de-contextualizing the story of apartheid needs to be 
understood against the background of three key limitations of the TRC, which also need to be 
understood against the affirmation of the international human-rights community that apartheid 
was  a  crime  against  humanity.  Firstly, the  TRC  individualized  the  victims  of  apartheid. 
Secondly, by focusing on individuals and obscuring the victimization of communities, the TRC 
was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed 
natives differently from non-natives. Finally, the TRC extended impunity to most perpetrators of 
apartheid. It is thus because of these three key limitations of the TRC that it lost a golden 
opportunity to educate the individual and corporate beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct 
responsibility for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority of Black 
people. If the beneficiaries had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, for 
instance, they would certainly have been less arrogant and possibly more compassionate and 
generous in understanding. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 entails the conclusion to the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  its  eagerness  to  reinforce  the  new  order  …  the  TRC  wrote  the  vast 
majority   of   apartheid’s   victims   [that   is,   the   victims   of   systematic 
exploitation]  out  of  its  version  of  history].  (Amadiume  &  Abdullahi 
2000:179) 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
It is befitting to start off this study which explores some of the noticeable lessons and challenges 
emerging from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter, the TRC) by 
elucidating  that  this  study  is  an  attempt  to  contribute  to  the  on-going  discussions  on 
reconciliation.  It  is  vital  to  mention  up  front  that  this  study  attempts  to  contribute  to  the 
discussion on reconciliation which seeks to remove injustice at the root. It contributes to a 
discussion of the weeds of alienation and fragmentation, and it stands in contrast to the frequent 
use of reconciliation merely to reach some political accommodation and not to address the 
critical questions of justice, equality and dignity (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). It is also befitting 
to point out that two central themes – political pietism and Christian quietism – form the 
backdrop to this study (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). The study contends that reconciliation in 
South Africa was used merely to reach some political accommodation and did not address the 
three critical questions of justice, equality and dignity. These arrangements perpetually favour 
the  rich  and  powerful  but  deprive  the  powerless  of  justice  and  dignity.  Hitherto, t h i s  
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reconciliation is presented as if it does respond to the need for genuine reconciliation and 
employs a language that sounds like the truth, but it is in fact deceitful – and this we call political 
pietism. It is also vital to mention that “reconciliation” is a Christian concept, and as such, 
Christians measure matters of reconciliation with the yardstick of the gospel and therefore should 
know better. However, as it will be shown in this study, when Christians in South Africa 
discovered that the TRC was not really promoting reconciliation, they became complicit in a 
deceitful reconciliation. This may have been for reasons of self-protection, fear or a desire for 
acceptance by the powers that govern the world. Whichever way one looks at it, they tried to 
seek to accommodate the situation, to justify it and to refuse to run the risk of challenge and 
prophetic truth telling. As a result, they denied the demands of the gospel and refused solidarity 
with the  powerless  and  oppressed.  This is  called  Christian  quietism  (Boesak  &  DeYoung 
2012:1). 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
 
It is the argument of this study that it is impossible to reconcile the dispossessor and the 
dispossessed or the oppressor and oppressed in the way in which the South African TRC did.1 
 
1This view is also held by Letlapa Mphahlele in the following extract of the his evidence to the TRC: “We did not 
attack white civilians, but we destroyed European invaders, dispossessors, criminals, because here you want to 
create a situation whereby our struggle is as recent as the PAC and that is not the case. Our struggle against 
colonialism is as old as when the colonialist set their foot here and shown their sinister motives of dispossessing our 
forefathers of the land and the whole armed struggle was the continuation of that. And actually we draw the ancient 
wisdom from our forefathers. When Dingaan said to the Zulu warriors ‘Bulala abathakathi’ what did he mean? He 
meant  that  those  dispossessors  ‘abathakathi’  the  Zulu  warriors  did  not  ask  among  themselves  who  were  the 
‘abathakathi’? Who were the wizards? But they knew who were the wizards were and they were White people. And 
when King Moshoeshoe of Basotho in his wisdom ‘ditshweu ha di tswane’ meaning that the White people will 
always have solidarity in oppressing the Africans he drew that from experience, from the practical experience that 
was going on. And I dare say the TRC is more concerned with the white life because even the questions are being 
asked by the man who benefited hugely from the dispossession of our people because as far as I am concerned ‘He 
who benefits by crime is guilty of that crime’ and every white person in this country benefited from the crime of 
dispossession, benefited from the crime of colonialism and benefited from the crime of apartheid but now you want 
to extract yourself from this crime. And it is so displeasing that the grandsons and granddaughters of Moshoeshoe, 
of Shaka, of Sekhukhune are now bearing the burden of their abusers because you abused us all in all. The TRC 
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This is so because reconciliation as a Christian concept addresses the vital questions of justice, 
equality and dignity (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:1). It is imperative to mention that reconciliation 
in South Africa was not allowed to address these issues. However, it must be mentioned that the 
problem is not reconciliation but the interpretation and understanding thereof. This is because, 
from our experience of the church and politics in South Africa, we know how the Bible was used 
in Afrikaner politics and how the radical message of the Bible was made servant to ideology,2 
 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). As such, it 
was expected that, with the inclusion of “reconciliation” in the truth commission, the aim was 
not to allow reconciliation to confront the country with the demands of the gospel but to blunt 
the progress of radical change and transformation (ibid:9). 
 
 
 
1.3     Background to the problem statement 
 
 
It is imperative to point out that numerous studies and scholars (e.g. Tatum 2003) are unanimous 
in illustrating that the past socialization of Black people in particular is a direct result of some of 
the many social challenges with which this group is faced (Tatum 2003). This research is focused 
essentially on this group of people but will indicate how its current challenges relate to its past. 
This study will show particularly how Black people in South African need to be reconciled to 
themselves first and foremost in order to change the status quo of present-day South Africa. 
Talking about reconciliation here refers to the negotiated settlement which, amongst others, 
guaranteed the TRC commission (Maharaj 2008). This study is of the view that the reconciliation 
does not encourage people to speak truth and I dare say this whole fuss, this whole circus is doomed for failure. It is 
doomed for failure for obvious reasons because you cannot reconcile the dispossessors and the dispossessed, you 
cannot reconcile the oppressor and the oppressed…” (TRC Episode 69, Part 02 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXuZofA5wbg). 
2The idea behind the notion of the Bible being made servant to ideology was that the gospel message was de- 
radicalized and made for instance to give theological justification to apartheid. Although it must also be mentioned 
as Boesak and DeYoung (2012:10) note that ‘… the scriptures will not be ideologized, manipulated or managed to 
suit our political endeavors, processes or desires’. 
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that  was  attained  in  South  Africa  after  particularly  the  proceedings  of  the  Truth  and 
Reconciliation  Commission  was  cheap  reconciliation  (cheap  reconciliation  refers  to 
reconciliation which is not centered on Restitutive justice. This reconciliation is political 
reconciliation because it is centered on a political compromise which is aimed at reaching 
political stability within the society) and did not deal with the real challenges of the lasting effects 
of systemic and structural racism. It is for this reason that we believe that the Chairman of the 
TRC (that is, Archbishop Desmond Tutu) is correct when he argues as follows (Tutu 1999:270-
271): 
True reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the hurt, the truth. It could even sometimes make 
things worse. It is a risky undertaking, but in the end it is worthwhile, because in the end only an honest 
confrontation with reality can bring real healing. Superficial reconciliation can bring only superficial 
healing. 
 
 
 
It is, therefore, vital to mention that this study will argue that the reconciliation that was attained 
in South Africa was far removed from justice (that is, Restitutive justice). For me, justice 
particularly has to do with the psychological and spiritual effects on the personhood of Black 
people. I shall argue that (Boesak& DeYoung 2012), the fact that it was merely a political 
solution has resulted in the many cries for economic liberation et cetera. Black people who were 
victims of apartheid atrocities are still victimized in that they still find themselves on the margins 
of society. This point was poignantly made by Stellenbosch economist Sampie Terreblanche, and 
it is a point that must be taken seriously in theological-discourse circles (Terreblanche 2012). 
Black people, it will be asserted, have become victims of the past and the present because the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission took away their constitutional right to take perpetrators of 
the past to court in order to attain justice and not only cheap reconciliation (Mamdani 2002:33). 
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It will particularly become clear from this study that the apartheid system has damaged the 
personhood of Black people in South Africa. Reference will be made to the epochal sentiments of 
Steve Biko concerning the modern Black person (Biko 2004). In order to return to the position of 
personhood, my research will suggest ways of how Black people need to be infused with pride 
and dignity and also reclaim the image of God which was stolen from them by the apartheid 
system when it infused in them a sense of inferiority. It was under these conditions that Black 
South Africans were dehumanized, oppressed and exploited. And when they had internalized 
inferiority, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was established with the 
aim of healing South Africa. The TRC, with its noble aim of bringing together those who were 
once racially set apart, failed to bring humanity upon Black people in South African who, for 
years, had been de-humanized up to a point where they have become empty shells who accepted 
everything coming their way (Biko 2004). Hence, it makes sense for Biko (2004:22) to argue that 
“... as long as blacks are suffering from inferiority complex – a result of 300 years of deliberate 
oppression, denigration and derision – they will be useless as co-architects of a normal society 
where man is nothing else but man for his own sake”. As it will be shown in this study, the 
failure by the TRC was a result of a political compromise (Boesak & DeYoung 2012) reached at 
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) (Mamdani 2010). This political 
compromise resulted in what this study terms a cheap reconciliation. Consequently, this study 
argues that South Africans will only be truly reconciled when they are equal. Having stated the 
problem,  I  shall  argue  that  a  possible  solution  is  an  Economic  Truth  and  Reconciliation 
Commission for South Africa which will highlight the essence of Restitutive justice3  It is the 
 
 
 
 
3Randy Barnett (1980:17) notes: “A Restitutive theory of justice is a rights-based approach to criminal sanctions that 
views a crime as an offense by one individual against the rights of another calling for forced reparations by the 
criminal to the victim. This is a sharp departure from the two predominant sanctioning theories – retribution and 
crime prevention. Rights-based analysts have criticized this approach for fighting to include mens rea, or criminal 
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argument of this study that apartheid has been clothed with new clothes and has been preserved 
through structures and institutions that perpetuate racism in its current transactions. 
 
 
 
As it will be shown in the course of this study, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa was set up to heal the wounded South-African nation (Maluleke 1997:324–343). 
The TRC was tasked with investigating gross crimes against humanity which were committed 
under the apartheid regime (Mamdani 2002). The TRC was a court-like institution where victims 
and perpetrators were called either to testify or to hear what happened to their families or friends 
and community members. The process was aimed at healing the people of South Africa, and this 
was going to be done through the following: Victims who agreed to the TRC guidelines would 
give up the right after the TRC proceedings to take the perpetrator(s) to court, and perpetrators 
who told the truth would be given a blanket amnesty. This study found that victims of the gross 
crimes against humanity were actually robbed of what was due to them, that is, justice. 
Furthermore, after they have been robbed of what was due to them, they were also robbed of the 
right to take the perpetrators to court. In contrast, the perpetrators received blanket amnesty 
(group forgiveness) (Du Bois-Pedain 2007). It is for this reason that Jeremiah 6:14 says: “They 
act as if my people’s wounds were only scratches. ‘All is well,’ they say, when all is not well.” 
 
 
 
The above scripture attest to the fact that, in the context of Israel as in the context of South 
 
Africa, wounds which were deep were treated as scratches. In the context of South Africa, 
 
 
intent into the calculation of sanctions, thereby ignoring the traditional distinction between crime and tort. Such a 
distinction is problematic, however, since punishment for an evil mind cannot be made compatible with a coherent 
individual rights framework. To do so would require the existence of a right to certain thoughts of others, a morally 
and theoretically objectionable position. To understand the argument for a restitutive remedy for rights violations 
one must posit what a crime is: an unjust redistribution of entitlements by force that requires for its rectification a 
redistribution of entitlements by force if necessary from the offender to the victim. Certain common objections to 
such an approach are considered, including the difficulty of measuring damages, the impossibility of reparation and 
the problem of criminal attempts”. 
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wounds which had terrible psychological, spiritual, economical and physical impact were treated 
as scratches, meaning that they were not taken seriously during the TRC proceedings. It is for 
this reason that this study will argue that reconciliation and justice (Boesak 2008) which were 
two important cardinal points of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
became two separate entities during and after the proceedings of the TRC. The commission, 
which had been formed after a long history of oppression, exploitation and enslavement which 
affected communities and individuals (Terreblanche 2002), was aimed at healing broken 
relationships. Whilst this commission understood and acknowledged that apartheid (Smith 2979) 
was a crime against humanity, they further contributed to the pain of the victims of the gross 
crimes against humanity. They opened up the wounds of the victims and at the same time 
stripped them of justice and also took away their constitutional right to take the perpetrators to 
court (Mamdani 2002). Hence the critique of this study is that the reconciliation which was 
attained through the proceedings of the TRC was a cheap reconciliation which was not 
centercentered on justice (that is, Restitutive justice) (Volf 1996). This criticism is held by many 
scholars, amongst them the likes of Allan Boesak, Tinyiko Maluleke, Mahmood Mamdani and 
Sampie Terreblanche. 
 
 
 
As will be shown in the course of this study, it is important to point out that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was deeply influenced by the Convention for Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) (Ottoway 1993). This was a convention to end apartheid in South Africa and 
lay a foundation for a transition from apartheid to a democratic South Africa (Alexander 2002). 
This convention was between the governing NP and the ANC, including all other political parties 
in South Africa. The consensus that was reached in these negotiations had a great influence upon 
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the TRC that was set up after the CODESA negotiations. The TRC was set up after the CODESA 
(Convention for Democratic South Africa) had reached a political compromise for a transition 
from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. 
 
 
 
It is for this reason, then, that this study will argue that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa was unsuccessful in defining who was the victim and who was the perpetrator of 
gross crimes against humanity, and it thus started on a wrong footing (Lattimer 2003). Both the 
victims and perpetrators were regarded as victims of the past, meaning victims of history. The 
focus was moved from those who did painful things to others to perpetrators also being the 
victims of the past. This shift had a negative impact upon the relationship between reconciliation 
and  justice.  Because  of  this  shift,  reconciliation  was  divorced  from  restitution  and  justice 
(Boesak 2008). Both victims of gross crimes against humanity and perpetrators who were now 
victims of history had to be dealt with equally, meaning that they had to be treated as victims and 
that they thus both needed justice. Hence the final proceedings of the commission was a political 
compromise which is haunting South Africa to this day. It is evident that South Africa is still 
divided along racial and economic lines (Gibson 2004). This frustrates especially Black people 
because they feel that they were sold out by the system. 
 
 
 
It is the view of this study that the TRC failed to see the impossibility of reconciling unequal 
people (Villa-Vicencio & Du Toit 2007). It is difficult for people who are unequal to reconcile, 
especially when the order of things even in present-day South Africa reminds them of the 
apartheid regime (Boesak 2012). For people to embrace each other, they need to be on the equal 
footing. This is the motivation behind the call of this research for the urgent need for an 
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economic TRC in South Africa in order to attain a costly reconciliation or what Boesak and 
DeYoung (2012) terms “radical reconciliation”. The distinction between cheap and costly 
reconciliation was influenced particularly by the German Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
who made a distinction between cheap and costly grace. These concepts are crucial for our 
discussion on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Borrowing from the 
German theologian’s distinction between cheap and costly grace, this study appropriates that 
distinction for cheap and costly reconciliation. Bonhoeffer (1959:43-44) phrases it as follows: 
Cheap grace means the justification of sin without the justification of the sinner. Grace alone does 
everything they say, and so everything can remain as it was before…Cheap grace is the grace we bestow on 
ourselves. Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring repentance, baptism without 
church discipline, Communion without confession… Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace 
without the cross, and grace without Jesus Christ; living and incarnate … Costly grace is the gospel which 
must be sought again and again and again, the gift which must be asked for, the door at which a man must 
knock. Such grace is costly because it calls us to follow, and it is grace because it calls us to follow Jesus 
Christ. It is costly because it costs a man his life, and it is grace because it gives a man the only true life. It 
is costly because it condemns sin and grace because it justifies the sinner. Above all, it is costly because it 
cost God the life of his Son: “ye were bought at a price,” and what has cost God much cannot be cheap for 
us. Above all, it is grace because God did not reckon his Son too dear a price to pay for our life, but 
delivered him up for us. Costly grace is the Incarnation of God. 
 
 
 
For  the purpose  of this study, cheap  reconciliation is reconciliation without restitution  and 
justice, and costly reconciliation is reconciliation which understands that, for people to be 
reconciled, they need to be on equal footing, hence costly reconciliation gives special attention to 
restitution and justice. 
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It is for this reason that this study will argue that reconciliation is at the heart of the Old and New 
Testament (Van der Walt, Human & Steyn 2005) and in the teaching of prominent reformed 
scholars such as Allan Boesak (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). In the Old and New Testament and in 
the teaching of prominent reformed scholars, reconciliation is always coupled with restitution 
(Doxtader 2004). The reason is for this link is the realization that relationships were broken 
either between God and people or between people and people. Hence the need to mend those 
broken relationships as they have shifted from their original state. Therefore, to mend the broken 
relationships between White and Black South Africans, there is a need for restitution in a form of 
either a sacrifice or something being paid to the one who suffered or was a victim of what led to 
the destruction of relationships. It is for this reason that De Gruchy argue that reconciliation is a 
perennial test to the faith of Christians (De Gruchy 2002:258). This explains the emphasis on 
restitution in the Old and New Testament and in the teaching of prominent reformed theologians 
such as Allan Boesak. 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that this study will attempt to show that reconciliation is liberation in the 
context of South Africa where Apartheid had made people slaves of segregation (Biko 2004:29). 
Victims of apartheid became slaves of victimization and perpetrators became slaves of 
victimizing, hence reconciliation is needed to liberate both the victims and the perpetrators. 
However, this can only be done when victims can be elevated to their original state, meaning that 
they need to be reconciled with their humanity. This will move them out of their status as slaves 
of victimization. Perpetrators can be liberated when they are brought on an equal footing with 
victims. In this way, victims and perpetrators can be equal and can thus reconcile. This 
reconciliation is costly because it requires restitution to the victim. Reconciliation in this way is 
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necessary, which is why Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999) asserts that there is “… no future 
without forgiveness”. 
 
 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
 
 
For the possibility of reconciling the dispossessors and the dispossessed or the oppressor and the 
oppressed, reconciliation as a Christian concept must be allowed to remove injustice at the roots. 
This means that it must be allowed to address the critical questions of justice, equality and 
dignity which are so prominent in the biblical understanding of reconciliation. Also, it has to be 
allowed to confront the country with the demands of the gospel. This will dispel the notion that 
reconciliation   can   only   be   used   to   reach   some   political   accommodation,   and   it   will 
simultaneously dispel false meanings which have come to be associated with reconciliation – 
such as assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost and maintaining power 
with only cosmetic changes. 
 
 
 
1.5 Value of the study 
 
 
This study attempts, from a theological approach, to contribute to discussions on some of the 
salient lessons and challenges emerging from the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. This contribution will be made in a critical format. The contribution of this study 
must be understood against the following background: (1) the rise of resistance in Third-World 
countries towards authoritarian regimes, (2) the move towards democracy when capitalism was 
becoming global in character, (3) the fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1991), (4) the elite 
compromise reached at formal and informal negotiations, (5) the influence of Latin-American 
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truth commissions and (6) the inability or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about 
systemic exploitation. 
 
 
 
As it will be shown in the course of this study, the TRC which was obviously the product of the 
negotiated settlement needs to be understood against the background of the global struggle of 
particularly Third-World countries which were resisting authoritarian regimes put in place by the 
West for the benefit of the West. As such, this study will point out how the West, in their attempt 
to keep a grip on the Third-World countries – particularly on their resources – had to recommend 
and promote the notion of democracy. Democracy became the only option for Third-World 
countries as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. It must, however, be mentioned that the 
problem is not democracy but the manifestation thereof under capitalism. This is because the 
notion  of  democracy  was  recommended  to  Third-World  countries  when  capitalism  was 
becoming global. As such, this presented some contradictions because democracy emphasises 
joint  interests,  equality  and  common  loyalties  whilst  capitalism  is  based  on  self-seeking 
inequality  and  conflicting  individual  and  group  interest.  This  means  that  a  transition  to 
democracy   (especially   constitutional   democracy)   means   that   the   former   oppressor   or 
dispossessor will hold on to economic power. As such, the sudden interest of both the NP and the 
corporate sector in South Africa to a transition to democracy needs to be understood against this 
background. This study will argue and demonstrate how the ANC was outsmarted during the 
negotiations in that, at the formal negotiations, the ANC won political power whilst the 
NP/corporate sector in South Africa won economic power. This is mentioned to here to point out 
that both the elite compromise reached at the formal and informal negotiations and the influence 
of the Latin-American truth commissions led to the inability or unwillingness of the TRC to 
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uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. As such, this study will argue and demonstrate 
that, on the one hand, reconciliation was not added to the truth commission for the purpose of 
confronting the country with the demands of the gospel and, on the other hand, the TRC was set 
up (from its inception) for failure. 
 
 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
 
This study will largely be a theoretical study, which will be analysing various primary texts as 
well as secondary written material such as books and articles. This study attempts (in a form of 
criticism) to contribute to the discussions on some of the salient lessons and challenges emerging 
from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but it is also vital to mention that 
many sources (both primary and secondary sources) sing the praises for the work done by the 
South African TRC. This is mentioned here to point out that I struggled to obtain enough sources 
which dealt with the TRC against the backdrop of the global matrix of power. This is 
because most sources depart from the premise that the TRC was a unique body and was the only 
option out. As such, they miss the point of seeing that the sudden interest of the NP, the 
corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC for a transition to democracy was not accidental. 
It is the contention of this study (which will be pointed out in the course of this study) that the 
sudden promotion of democratization amongst Third-World1 countries during the period 1989–
                                                          
1 The usage of the term third-world countries in this study, follows Dussel’s notion of geo-politics of space. Under this 
notion- that is Geo-politics of space Dussel argues that, the world has been divided into two- that is, the Center which is 
occupied by Japan, USA, Europe, USSR etc and the Periphery which is occupied by Latin America, Arab world, black 
Africa, India and Southern Asia etc (1985:1-5). It is also vital to note that, this division of the world occurred under two 
opposing prominent systems- namely capitalism and socialism (Dussel 1985:1-5). It is thus against this backdrop that, 
countries in the Center using capitalism became known as the First World countries and former Communist-socialist 
states became known as the Second World countries. While those countries in the periphery that for long time have 
suffered imposition from the center became known as the Third world countries. So the usage of the term third-world 
countries in this study refers to those countries in the Periphery under which the center countries have imposed 
themselves through colonization and eventually democracy under capitalism. 
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1990 was a calculated move from the side of the West. This notion of democracy was 
promoted to help the West to keep control of its former colonies. Prior to the period of 1989–
1990, there was a growing resistance from Third-World countries against the authoritarian 
regimes of the West and as such, this resistance was a threat to the powers that were – that is, the 
West. Thus, as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the victory of democracy over 
socialism, democracy became the only 
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option available to Third-World countries. This notion was promoted at the same time when 
capitalism became global in nature. As such, the contradiction of moving from authoritarianism 
to democracy meant that whilst democracy emphasizes joint interests, equality and common 
loyalties, capitalism is based on self-seeking inequality and conflicting individual and group 
interest (Terreblanche 2002). A transition to democracy (especially constitutional democracy) 
would mean that the former oppressor or dispossessor will hold on to economic power. As such, 
this study point out that it is against this backdrop that the sudden interest from the NP and the 
corporate sector in South Africa to favour a transition to democracy needs to be understood. This is 
because the fall of the Soviet Union meant victory to the West, but it meant loss to Third-World 
countries. The 
fall of the Soviet Union left the ANC in disarray.4  As such, they were forced to depend upon 
 
their oppressor for solutions. It is thus against this backdrop that the TRC was born. Hence this 
study will point out how the TRC was compromised and prepared for failure from its inception. 
 
 
 
1.6 Outline of the study 
 
 
Chapter 1 of this study  sets  out the  parameters  of the research. It looks  into the  problem 
statement which has led to this study, namely that it is impossible to reconcile the dispossessors 
and the dispossessed or the oppressor and the oppressed in the way the TRC tried to do. This is 
because, as is shown in the course of this study, reconciliation as a Christian concept attempts to 
remove injustice at the root and addresses questions of justice, equality and dignity. As such, 
what the TRC did – using reconciliation merely to reach some political accommodation – was 
 
4As a result, for instance, of the close ties between the Soviet Union and the liberation movements of the Third- 
World countries in general and with the ANC in particular, the fall of communism left these movements in disarray. 
This is because their economic policies and system of governance was heavily influenced by socialism as espoused 
by the Soviet Union. As such, the fall of the Soviet Union meant that socialism had failed, and as such, democracy 
was the only option left. This left the ANC in particular in a vulnerable position because they had no other policies 
32  
except those aligned to socialism, and as a result, they had to depend upon the NP and the corporate sector in South 
Africa for policy direction. 
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not reconciliation but a mere political arrangement which favours the rich and powerful but 
deprives the powerless of justice and dignity. This chapter touches on two notions, namely 
political pietism and Christian quietism. These two notions must be understood against the 
background of the following: (1) the rise of resistance in Third-World countries against 
authoritarian regimes, (2) the move towards democracy when capitalism was becoming global in 
character, (3) the fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1991), (4) the elite compromise reached at the 
formal and informal negotiations, (5) the influence of Latin-American and African truth 
commissions and (6) the inability or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about 
systemic exploitation. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 of this study deals with the “anatomy of apartheid”. It points out that apartheid needs 
to be understood in its relationship to colonization. I approach this analysis from a theological 
background and acknowledge the many contributions on this subject from other fields. It is 
pointed out in the course of this chapter that it was the whole purpose of colonization and later 
the apartheid system to distort the “being” of both Black people and White people in South 
Africa. This is based on the idea that “being”, that is, the entity which encompasses features of 
reality and existence, in South Africa has been distorted through the ontology of domination. 
This ontology has divided the world into two, namely between the center (which is occupied by 
Europeans) and the periphery (which is occupied by Non-Europeans). This ontological division 
resulted, on the one hand, in the center imposing itself on the periphery, and on the other hand, it 
has resulted in the being of the center (i.e. the being of Europeans) becoming the “Being” (with a 
capital B; that is, the yardstick of what it means to be a Being). Throughout the process of 
colonization and later through the system of apartheid, the “being” of White people in South 
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Africans became the thesis of what it meant to be a “Being”, and in turn, Black people in South 
Africa became the synthesis of this being. As a result of this logic, White people in South Africa 
felt justified to act as guardians over Black people in South Africa. The anatomy of apartheid 
must be understood against this backdrop. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 of this study deals with the Neo-liberal transition to democracy in South Africa and 
focuses on compromises and a political solution for a new South Africa. This chapter looks into 
the notion of a negotiated transition which gave birth to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the constitutional democracy. This chapter contends that the NP 
and the corporate sector in South Africa (at that time) opted for the negotiations not because of 
their personal convictions but because of circumstances. It will be argued that the move by the 
NP and the corporate sector in South Africa for negotiations was a calculated move on their part. 
FW de Klerk and his NP entered these negotiations with the aim of safeguarding the interests, 
that is, the assets they have accumulated, of the White people in South Africa. These interests 
were later invented under the pretext of so-called minority rights. The TRC was established to 
avoid an international tribunal similar to that of the Nuremberg tribunal, which used a judicial 
approach as a solution. Special attention will be given in this chapter to a series of events that 
happened around the period 1989–1991, the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union. All 
the events that occurred in this period were not accidental. These events include the following: 
the release of political prisoners (specifically the release of Nelson Mandela and the core of the 
leadership of the ANC), the debate about sanctions, the debate about negotiations and, 
specifically, the debate about the idea of shared power. The transition to democracy, especially 
under the capitalist system, was the only viable option for the NP and the corporate sector of 
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South Africa to continue to maintain their grip on the economy of South Africa. This is because 
the association between democracy and capitalism results in conflicting logics which boil down 
to privileges being maintained. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 of this study deals with the TRC and the ratification of the elite compromise reached at 
the informal and formal negotiations. It points out that the TRC ratified the elite compromises 
reached at both the informal and formal negotiations as a result of the following: (1) the rise of 
resistance in Third-World countries towards authoritarian regimes, (2) the move towards 
democracy when capitalism was becoming global in character, (3) the fall of the Soviet Union 
(1989–1991), (4) the elite compromise reached at the formal and informal negotiations, (5) the 
influence   of   Latin-American   and   African   truth   commissions   and   (6)   the   inability   or 
unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation. It is vital to note 
that the South-African Truth and (Reconciliation) Commission, which was initially called the 
Truth Commission, was formed against the background of pronouncements of the international 
human-rights community that “apartheid was a crime against humanity” and the negotiated 
settlement. This chapter contends that the TRC was established, on the one hand, to please the 
international human-rights community and, on the other hand, to ratify the elite compromise 
reached at the informal and formal negotiations. One should note that this claim is based on how 
the commission accidentally and/or intentionally narrowed down a wide mandate given to it for, 
on the one hand, pleasing the international human-rights community and, on the other hand, 
pleasing the corporate sector in South Africa. It did this by obscuring the systemic character of 
apartheid and thus offered the corporate sector in South Africa an underserved opportunity to 
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clear themselves and their corporations of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy 
of apartheid. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the consequences of de-historicising the story of apartheid through the 
inability or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. This 
chapter points out how the TRC, as result of its inability or unwillingness of uncover the truth 
about systemic exploitation, lost a golden opportunity to educate the individual and corporate 
beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct responsibility for the disrupted social structures and 
abject poverty of the majority of Black people. The chapter also shows how the TRC found itself 
in a cul-de-sac which resulted in the dis-historicising and de-contextualising of the story of 
apartheid. This cul-de-sac was a result of the historical and ideological influence of the Latin- 
American and African truth commissions – particularly the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile – the adoption of the tamed biblical concept of “reconciliation”, the 
employment of an individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations and how the 
TRC was used to ratify the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. 
This chapter shows how, as a result of the inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover 
the truth about the systematic exploitation of the apartheid system, the TRC dis-historicised and 
de-contextualised the story of apartheid. 
 
 
 
The consequences of de-historicising and de-contextualising the story of apartheid needs to be 
understood against the background of three key limitations of the TRC, which also need to be 
understood against the affirmation of the international human-rights community that apartheid 
was  a  crime  against  humanity.  Firstly,  the  TRC  individualized  the  victims  of  apartheid. 
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Secondly, by focussing on individuals and obscuring the victimization of communities, the TRC 
was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed 
natives differently from non-natives. Finally, the TRC extended impunity to most perpetrators of 
apartheid. It is thus because of these three key limitations of the TRC that it lost a golden 
opportunity to educate the individual and corporate beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct 
responsibility for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority of Black 
people. If the beneficiaries had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, for 
instance, they would certainly have been less arrogant and possibly more compassionate and 
generous in understanding. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 entails the conclusion to the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
AN ANATOMY OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
God chose His People (volk)…and brought them out into the wilderness. 
There He chastised them, so that they would ask help and strength from Him, 
for it was necessary that the vine be pruned down to the stem so that it could 
bear good fruit. God, then covenanted with the chastised People, and the 
enemies were defeated and the trekkers inhabited the land which God had 
given them in this rightful manner. (Paul Kruger in Moodie 1975:26) 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the on-going discussion on reconciliation, which seeks 
to remove injustice at the roots, at the weeds of alienation and fragmentation. The views in this 
chapter are critical of how reconciliation is often used merely to reach some political 
accommodation and not to address the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity (Boesak 
& DeYoung 2012). It is also befitting to point out that two central themes, namely, political 
pietism and Christian quietism, forms the backdrop to this study (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). 
This is because it is the contention of this study that reconciliation in South Africa was used 
merely to reach some political accommodation which did not address the three critical questions 
of justice, equality and dignity. These arrangements perpetually favour the rich and powerful but 
deprive the powerless of justice and dignity. Hitherto, this reconciliation (that is, tamed 
reconciliation) is presented as if it does respond to the needs for genuine reconciliation and 
employs a language that sounds like the truth, but it is, in fact, deceitful, a position I call political 
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pietism. “Reconciliation” is also a Christian concept and as such Christian’s measure matters of 
reconciliation with the yardstick of the gospel and should therefore know better. However, when 
Christians in South Africa discovered that what was happening in South Africa through the TRC 
was not reconciliation, for reasons of self-protection, fear or a desire for acceptance by the 
powers that govern the world, they sought to accommodate this situation, to justify it, refusing to 
run the risk of challenge and prophetic truth telling. With these actions, they became complicit in 
deceitful reconciliation. As a result, they denied the demands of the gospel and refused solidarity 
with the powerless and oppressed. This is called Christian quietism (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). 
 
 
 
It is thus imperative to note that the researcher approaches this analysis from a theological 
background and acknowledges the many contributions on this subject from other fields. It is the 
contention of the chapter that it was the whole purpose of colonization and later the apartheid 
system to distort the “being”5  of both Black people and White people in South Africa. This is 
based on the idea that “being” (that is, the entity which encompasses features of reality and 
existence) in South Africa has been distorted through the ontology of domination. This ontology 
has divided the world into two, which is, between the center (which is occupied by Europeans) 
and the periphery (which is occupied by Non-Europeans). This ontological division has resulted, 
on the one hand, in the center imposing itself on the periphery, and on the other hand, it has 
resulted 
on the being of the center (i.e. the being of Europeans) becoming the “Being” (with a capital B, 
 
 
 
5It is vital to acknowledge that the concept ‘Being’ is a broad concept which encompasses features of reality and 
existence (see Heidegger 2010). The concept ‘being’ is used to refer to idea of being – that is, existing in the world. 
As Dussel (1985:4) notes, being is the very foundation of the system. Permenides posited that being ‘is’ – that is, it 
cannot be added to something or outside of itself nothing ‘is’ – meaning that it is a motionless entity (see Copleston 
1993). However, it must be noted that, as a result of the system which defines what ‘is’ being, anything which does 
not meet the criteria for what ‘is’ being then ‘is not’ being. Dussel (1985) notes that the world is divided between the 
center (which is occupied by Europeans or Beings) and the periphery (which is occupied by Non-Europeans or Non- 
40  
Beings), and as such, it is claimed that anything outside of the center is non-being. This is mentioned to point out the 
ontology of domination which decides what is being and what is not being. 
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that is, the yardstick of what it means to be a Being). This is mentioned here to point out that, 
throughout the process of colonization and later through the system of apartheid, the “being” of 
White people in South Africans became the thesis of what it means to be a “Being”, and in turn, 
Black people in South Africa became the synthesis of this being. As a result of this logic, the 
White people in South Africa felt justified to act as guardians for Black people in South Africa. 
 
 
 
It is the distorting of “being” (that is, African being) that makes the conquest project successful 
or unsuccessful. This is because, for the notion of a “special being” to exist, there must be lesser 
beings in place. So the process of distorting the notion of Being include, amongst other things, 
the following: (1) Some must assume a position higher than others through putting in place a 
yardstick that will be used to affirm or deny the humanity of people. (2) Violence which is 
encapsulated in the notion of conquering is needed. Conquest itself is a violent phenomenon. 
This  is  because  conquest  as  a  phenomenon  includes,  amongst  other  things,  the  idea  of 
subjugating the other through force (which may include manipulation). (3) The history of the 
other should be questioned and distorted. This includes making those in the process of being 
conquered loose knowledge of themselves. (4) Those who are being conquered are made to 
partake in their conquering. This includes, amongst other things, applying the principle of divide 
and rule. 
 
 
 
This chapter will begin by invoking the idea of the ontology of domination and division of the 
center, which is occupied by Europeans, vis-à-vis the periphery, which is occupied by Non- 
Europeans.  Following  the  Dusselian  geopolitics  of  space,  it  is  imperative  to  note  that  the 
ontology of domination developed as a result of the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the 
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sovereign” (Ramose 2003). One should thus understand the notion of the “scramble for Africa” 
against this backdrop. This chapter is of the view that, for one to understand the conqueror (that 
is, someone who has assumed a position of being human as being contrary to those who can 
never assume being human without the guardianship of the conqueror), one needs to understand 
how the conqueror assumed the position of being a conqueror. Therefore, this chapter is of the 
view that reason or rationality was used as a factor to determine who was human and who was 
not. This was largely influenced by the setting in ancient Greek society which was constituted by 
the following “people”: the freemen (those whose intellect can overpower their emotions), slaves 
(those whose intellect cannot overpower their emotions), children (whose intellect is still 
developing) and women (whose intellect is the same as that of slaves and children). 
 
 
 
The logic behind this was to say that the free men must be the guardians of slaves, children and 
women solely because of their reasoning capacity. So reason throughout history became a 
determining factor in the definition of who is a human being and who is not. Therefore, those 
who assumed a position of being rational beings are human beings, and those who fail to assume 
this position are under the mercy of rational beings. This logic gave moral justification for how 
those who fail to assume a position of being rational beings are to be treated. The logic behind 
this moral justification was the following: It would not be unnatural for the freemen (those who 
are human beings) not to treat those who are not freemen (slaves and obviously Black people) as 
slaves or inferiors. Following this logic, it would mean that it would not be wrong to create an 
ideology such as apartheid. 
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The arrival of the Europeans on the shores of South Africa thus needs to be understood against 
this backdrop. The Dutch came from a position and with a background of people who assumed a 
position of being “special human beings” (those who are heirs of reason and a soul ordained by 
God). They thus contributed to the molding of this notion of being “special beings”, which was 
worsened by the pseudo reading of specialness into Calvinism and the Bible (that is, the Old 
Testament), which on its part gave rise to the doctrine of apartheid and everything that followed. 
The ideology of apartheid, which was principled on the separation of people on the basis of race 
and colour, thus originated against this background. 
 
 
 
2.2 The ontology of domination: Center vis-à-vis periphery 
 
 
 
The idea of the ontology of domination needs to be understood against the Dusselian notion of 
geopolitics of space. This is notion is based on the understanding that the world has been divided 
into two geopolitical spaces, that is, the center (which is occupied by Europeans or Beings) and 
the periphery (which is occupied by Non-Europeans or Non-beings) (Dussel 1985:1–3). This 
division of the world came about as a result of the context within which the conqueror was 
nurtured, namely the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign” (Ramose 2003:543). It 
is thus against this background that Europeans assumed the status of being the “Beings” and as 
such felt justified in their quest to colonize those on the periphery, that is, those who are non- 
beings. Thus Dussel rightly notes that, as the result of the both the adage of “I conquer, therefore 
I am the sovereign” and the geopolitics of space, which resulted in the ontology of domination, 
the following question (which justified domination) arose concerning Non-Europeans: “Are the 
Amerindians human beings? That is, are they Europeans, therefore rational animals?” (Dussel 
1985:3). 
44  
Following the ontology of domination, there was another development, namely the colonization 
of  Africa  or  what  Mudimbe  refers  to  as  the  scramble  for  Africa  (Mudimbe  1988:1).  The 
“scramble  for  Africa”  is  a  popular  name  for  the  invasion,  occupation,  colonization  and 
annexation of African territory by Europeans powers. The scramble for Africa is also called the 
partition of Africa and the conquest of Africa. The invasion, occupation, colonization and 
annexation of Africa in general and South Africa in particular need to be understood against the 
background of the Dusselian notion of geopolitics of space. The division of the world into two, 
the center which is occupied by Europeans and the periphery which is occupied by Non- 
Europeans, and the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign” thus forms the 
background to colonization. These thoughts contributed to the construction of the Being of 
Europeans in general and Afrikaners in particular. 
 
 
 
Amongst Europeans, the notion of “Being” (that is, the idea of existing in the world) was heavily 
influenced by their conviction of being “special beings” in contrast to those whom they had to 
conquer because of the questions hanging over the “being” human of the latter. This was 
obviously influenced by their long European history of being rational beings and beings whose 
soul had been ordained by God. This idea was based on their pseudo-understanding that those 
who possess reason or rationality are special beings chosen by God to be the guardians of those 
who unfortunately lacked the capacity to possess rationality or reason and thus lacked the soul 
that was ordained by God. These non-rational being therefore looked like human beings but were 
not human beings. This logic thus gave Europeans a moral indication (and justification) on how 
to treat those who lack rationality or reason and who had no soul that is ordained by God. It must 
be noted 
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that the Europeans are self-appointed heirs to the right to reason (Ramose 2005) and the right to 
possess a soul ordained by God (Maldonado-Torres 2007:240–270). 
 
 
 
The thought behind this logic was mainly to render an opinion that some groups of people 
possess a certain special status (of being human) contrary to others (who looked like human 
beings but were not full human beings). This logic was mainly popular in the ancient Greek 
society where they had free men (those whose intellect overpowered their body or and emotions) 
and slaves (those whose intellect, if they had any, cannot overpower their body or and emotions). 
Hence the freemen in a Greek society were expected to be guardians of the slaves (who are 
supposedly irrational “beings”) and this meant that the freemen enjoyed special status (Sinclair 
1962). Thus Aristotle once said that “… the slave is a slave by nature” (Dussel 1985:6). This 
must be understood against the backdrop of the ontology of domination which has resulted in the 
“being” of Greeks which comes from the center (vis-à-vis the periphery) and which has assumed 
itself as the “Being”. Thus Dussel (1985:5) notes that“[b]eing is that which is Greek, the light of 
Greek culture. Being extends as far as the frontiers of Hellenism. Over horizon is non-Being, 
uncivilization”. 
 
 
 
One thus has to understand the logic of rationality as a distinctive factor in the definition of who 
was human and who was not. This distinction was based predominantly on the construction of 
the ancient Greek society which included the following beings: (1) free men, (2) slaves, (3) 
children and (4) women. Slaves, children and women were put on the same footing in terms of 
development  stages  (these  stages  were  based  on  the  development  of  rationality  in  beings) 
(Sinclair 1962). There was a possibility for children to graduate in this developmental stage in 
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contrast to both women and slaves who, in terms of their development, did not have in their 
capacity a chance to graduate through some stage in the developmental processes. Hence their 
status (in terms of rationality or reason) remained the same for all time. Ramose (2005:5) thus 
argues that the “… Aristotelian belief that man is a rational animal did not include the Africans 
and women for that matter”. 
 
 
 
As a result of this so-called status of being rational beings (beings who can think contrary to 
those who cannot think) and beings whose soul had been ordained, the free men had the right to 
conquer those who are irrational and who had no soul due to their wrong religious beliefs. It is 
for this reason that Ramose (2005:13) noted that “… since Aristotle, the finger pointed to reason 
as the distinctive and the decisive criterion of the definition of human being”. The notion of 
reason or rationality as a criterion of the definition of humanity, however, has deep philosophical 
and religious underpinnings. Though it must be noted that Asante and Hall refer to the process 
which led to the enslavement of Africans which this chapter equates to conquering, they (Asante 
& Hall 2011) make the following argument: 
 
The effort to influence the African – that is, to make the African a slave and to groom the house negro – 
had philosophical antecedents in Europe; it was something grounded in the religion and literature of a great 
deal of European thought. (p. 3) 
 
 
 
It must also be noted that the idea behind reason or rationalization as the distinctive and decisive 
criterion of the definition of being human was based on the pseudo-idea that reason or 
rationalization   can   universalized.   This   meant   that   sameness   with   regard   to   reason   or 
rationalization was the definite pointer to one being a human being or not. Underlying this 
pseudo-universalization of reason or rationality is the idea of one human race, based on this 
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universalization or sameness of reason or rationality. It was, however, always understood that 
there would be cultural differences. The point here is to show how the pseudo-idea of the 
universalization or sameness of reason or rationality gave moral justification for the conquering 
of  some  by  others  (Ramose  2005:13).  Equally,  the  adage  “I  conquer,  therefore  I  am  the 
sovereign” and the Cartesian ego cogito sum (I think, therefor I am) underlies this kind of 
thinking (Maldonado-Torres 2007:240–270). 
 
 
 
Concerning conquering, being and reason, those who have assumed a position of being the heirs 
of reason make it difficult for others to possess reason or rationality. This is why Gordon 
(2011:8) notes for instance that W.E.B du Bois argues in relation to being and reason that Negro 
people  are  always  a  problem  because  the  criterion  of  reason  or  rationality  renders  them 
negatively. Gordon further notes in reference to Fanon that Negro or Black people who 
supposedly acquired positions of being rational beings are always rendered negatively by reason 
because those who are supposedly the heirs of reason always move the goalposts of reason every 
time a Negro or Black person comes close to being a rational being according to their standards. 
Concerning Fanon, Gordon (2011) writes as follows: 
… if reason continues to refuse him, he faces the contradictions of reason being in a word unreasonable. If 
he attempts to force reason’s submission, he will be subordinating reason, which would make him, in effect 
unreasonable. He faces, then the task of struggling with reason reasonably. (p. 82) 
 
 
 
It is therefore befitting to note that reason or rationality or/and sameness in reason or rationality 
was used as a powerful tool to provide moral justification for conquering and using what 
Maldonado Torres (2007:247) calls the “non-ethics of war”. Thus Asante and Hall (2011) make 
a very interesting assertion when they argue the following: 
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… without apparent reason, blackness itself was viewed as denigration in all facets of Western Civilization. 
Leading  European  intellectuals  such  as  Hegel  and  Voltaire  expressed  their  negative  opinions  about 
Africans and blackness without critique from their peers. (p. 3) 
 
 
 
In the same vein, Gordon (2011) notes in relationship to reason or rationality as being a tool for 
conquering: 
The ancestors of the people who today we call Africans had no reason to think of themselves as either 
African or black prior to the emergence of a series of historical events that fell upon them as if out of the 
sky. (p. 82) 
 
 
 
Within the pseudo-notion of sameness of reason or rationality, cultural differences were tolerated 
but only as far as they were not in conflict with the intent of colonization and Christianization. 
Whenever cultural differences indeed were in conflict with the intent of colonization and 
Christianization, they would be eliminated. The idea of conquering and dominating was thus 
based on the notions of sameness of reason or rationality. It is for this reason that Ramose 
(2005:13) argues that “… Christianity justified its domination and elimination of indigenous 
African  religions  by  appeal  to  Jesus  Christ’s  instruction:  go  ye  and  teach  all  nations”. 
Christianity or the pseudo-usage of Christianity became a powerful tool for colonization which is 
why Ramose (2005) further asserts the following: 
So it is that colonization and Christianity assumed epistemological dominance crystallizing in their 
unilaterally conferred, though no less questionable right to determine and define the meaning of experience, 
knowledge and truth on behalf of the indigenous African. (p. 13) 
 
 
 
The pseudo-notion of sameness or universalization is also relevant with regard to the notion of 
reason or rationality because it is against this backdrop that all voyagers who happened to be 
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conquerors and who used pseudo-Christianity to give moral justification to whatever they were 
doing in the parts of the world they were planning to conquer. The idea behind the pseudo-notion 
of sameness concerning reason or rationality was either part of their ignorance or an intentional 
tool to be used for conquering (Ramose 2005:13). The idea of conquering is informed by the 
understanding that the supremacy of reason or rationality defines who is human and who is not 
human. In light of this then, conquerors argued that those who were supposedly irrational or 
lacked reason had to be under the guardianship of those who were rational or those who could 
reason (Sinclair 1962:66). 
 
 
 
The mission behind the voyages that were undertaken throughout the world by colonialists, who 
used reason and biology under the guise of Christianization, was colonization-conquering. Their  
primary  task  was  to  conquer  different  parts  of  the  world  under  the  pre-text  of 
Christianizing the whole world. The Cartesian philosophy captures this notion of conquering 
accurately.  Rene  Descartes  declared  that  “I  think,  therefore  I  am”,  of  which  the  negative 
corollary is “I cannot think, therefore I am not”. The latter was one step away from the notion of 
“I conquer therefore I am.” The idea behind the Cartesian philosophy concerned conquering, 
which was based on the notion of reasoning or rationality which was the determining factor of 
who was human and who was not human. So according to this Cartesian philosophy, those who 
can think have right to conquer those who cannot think due to the questionability of their 
humanity (Madonaldo-Torres 2007:240–270). 
 
 
 
Thus, reason or rationality determined who was human and who was not. In this regard, Ramose 
notes that difference in rationality was regarded as just mere irrationality which meant that only 
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one certain people exist as humans. Others look like human beings but they are not (Ramose 
 
2005). So in their encounter with other beings in their voyages, Europeans encountered different 
beings. These beings looked like human beings in their appearance. Some of their actions, 
however, distinguished them from real human beings though they walked like human beings and 
though they had the same reproductive systems or desires. The distinguishing factor was that 
their reason or intellect appeared not to have the power to control their emotions or actions, and 
they had no reasoning capacity (Sinclair 1962:66). 
 
 
 
The difference of rationality between the voyagers and the encountered thus proved to the 
voyagers that the beings which they encountered appeared to be human beings but they were not 
full human beings. Thus the notion of otherness was used to refer to them (Ramose 2005:13). It 
is for this reason that a novelist by the name of JM Coetzee refers to a series of disturbing 
depictions of racial otherness which says: “The local natives have everything in common with 
the dumb cattle, barring their human nature … [they] are handicapped in their speech, clucking 
like turkey-cocks” (Stevens et al. 2006:205). 
 
 
 
In the voyagers’ encounter with the beings which they declared to be other beings or in fact sub- 
humans, biology and spirituality played a crucial role in the affirmation or denial of the being 
human of the human beings. It is concerning this matter that Ramose wrote about Isaac La 
Peyrere, a French writer, a Calvinist and a Catholic convert who lived in the Netherlands. 
Ramose regards La Peyrere as one of the founders of religious racism. La Peyrere denied that 
those they referred to as the “other” was created by the same “God” who created the voyagers 
(Ramose 2005:17). 
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The denial of the human beingness of the “other” is based both on spirituality and rationality, 
hence La Peyrere (see Ramose 2005:17) argues that “… the God who created Adam and Eve 
could not have been and was not the creator of the Africans”. La Peyrere (ibid) further questions 
the souls of the “other” or sub-human when he argues that “… if these other creatures had any 
soul at all, it certainly could not be the same as that of the descendants of Adam and Eve”. Thus 
Ramose (ibid) argues that “[i]n this way not only biology but spirituality which [sic] affirmed the 
myth that “Man is a rational animal” was not spoken of the African ...” It is then important to 
note that the pre-Adamist doctrine of La Peyrere made the boundary between the rational and 
sub-human animals much more lucid (Ramose 2005:17). 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that JM Coetzee (Stevens et al. 2006) further refers to a series of disturbing 
depictions of racial other-ness, which he phrases as follows with regard to the Khoi-San: 
… their eating of unwashed intentions, their use of animal fat to smear their bodies, their habit of wrapping 
dried entrails around their neck … their inability to conceive of God … many of these items … constitute 
some more obvious differences between the Hottentot and the [West] European. (pp. 205–206) 
 
 
 
Therefore the idea of difference as mentioned by JM Coetzee gave the voyagers or colonisers (in 
the case of South Africa, Jan van Riebeeck and this crew) the moral justification to conquer as a 
sign of becoming the guardians of those they encountered on their conquest expeditions of 
Africa. This meant that people with a different rationality or reason would exist under the 
benevolence of those who viewed themselves as able to reason or rationalize. 
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2.3 The ontology of domination and rise of the civil religion 
 
 
 
The colonization of Africa in general and of South Africa in particular was informed by the 
ontology of domination. This ontology needs to be understood against the backdrop of the notion 
of “space”. Dussel (1985:1–2) claims that, for the purpose of domination, the world was divided 
into two – a center (which is occupied by Europeans or Being) and a periphery (which is 
occupied by Non-Europeans). For a long time, the center, which is occupied by Europeans and 
Beings, has not only imposed itself on the periphery, which is occupied by Non-Europeans or 
non-beings, but it has also developed a logic which justifies why the center needs to impose itself 
on the periphery and act as guardians of those on the periphery. Colonization came to its peak 
through the conquering of the Being of its subjects (that is, Africans in this case). This is based 
on what Mudimbe refers to as the colonial structure, which embraces the physical, human and 
spiritual aspects of the colonizing experience (Mudimbe 1988). This colonial structure developed 
three complementary hypotheses and actions, namely (1) the domination of the physical space, 
(2) the reformation of natives’ minds and (3) the integration of local economic histories into the 
Western perspective (ibid:15). The colonization of Africa further needs to be understood within 
the context where conquering was nurtured, that is, under the adage that “I conquer, therefore I 
am the sovereign.” 
 
 
 
It is thus against this backdrop that the notion of Being (that is, existence or being human) 
 
amongst Europeans in general and Afrikaners6in particular needs to be understood. It is as a 
 
 
 
6“The Europeans who immigrated to the Cape during the seventh and eighteenth centuries derived from several 
countries. They came primarily from the Lowlands where national boundaries were less clearly defined than 
elsewhere. Nonetheless these settlers shared certain characteristics. Although French and especially German were 
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result of the construction of this Being of Europeans in general and Afrikaners in particular, 
which was backed up with Calvinistic traditions, that the idea of the inferior and superior beings 
were further developed. This Being which resulted in the profound relationship between politics 
and religion (theology) in South Africa can be traced back to the influence of the Kuyperian, so- 
called Neo-Calvinism, Scottish evangelicalism and romantic nationalism which helped to form 
and strengthen the Afrikaner civil religion (Moodie 1975). This Afrikaner civil religion was an 
attempt by Afrikaners, who after the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape in 1652 and other groups of 
Europeans later merged into a group with an own identity, to establish themselves as a unique 
people before God, with their own civil liturgy, sacred days and leaders. The Dutch came to 
South Africa as colonists and then later blended into the Afrikaner people, who developed their 
own history, language and culture. One thing that must be noted is that the colonists who arrived 
in South Africa were largely shaped by their link to the European heritage and the economic 
situation of their respective native countries.7 
 
 
 
 
It is as a result of the influence of their European heritage and their link to material forces that 
the colonists became a copy of their European society (a society of conquerors). They were 
heavily influenced by their social links which formed the cornerstone of their moral formation 
 
 
 
 
 
widely spoken at the early stages of settlement, Dutch was the common language. The settlers had the Christian faith 
in common and, while they belonged to different denominations, they were all Protestants. Lastly, they were all 
white …” (Giliomee & Adam 1979:84). 
7It is for this reason that Giliomee and Adam (1979:85) made the following argument: “During the first two 
centuries of settlement, the colonists’ sense of their identity was shaped by their European heritage (culture, ideas 
about race, and such) and material forces (economic conditions and demographic ratios) that reinforced each other. 
Generally speaking, Europeans were cultural chauvinists who looked down upon the ‘heathen’, ‘primitive’, or 
‘barbarous’ indigenous people of the colonies in which they settled … Dutch and English colonists were more 
‘racist’ than their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts since they came from countries already advanced on the road 
of capitalism and democracy. Here society was not regarded as a complex feudal hierarchy of social ranks but 
mainly of two classes: the respectable burgers and the despicable poor.” 
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and character development. In this regard, I point to Motlhabi (2001) who said the following 
with regard to the role of communities in moral formation and character development: 
… one who has received moral formation becomes transformed in such a way that the moral outlook, that 
is the moral approach to life, becomes a way of life for this person. (p. 91)8 
 
 
 
Hence this chapter argues that the formation of the nation of Afrikaners was heavily influenced 
by the logic that those of European descendant are special beings who obviously had taken it 
upon themselves to be the heirs of reason and of a soul that was ordained by God. This formed 
part of the cornerstone of their formation as a people or nation as Afrikaners. 
 
 
 
A unique cultural development of the Afrikaners that combined the Calvinist religion with the 
political aspirations of the White Afrikaners led to the formation of their civil religion (Moodie 
1975:22-38). This civil religion which was greatly influenced by Kuyperian Neo-Calvinism, 
Scottish evangelicalism and romantic nationalism came to South Africa under the banner of the 
reformed tradition (theology) (Villa-Vicencio & De Gruchy 1985:39-51). It must be noted that 
the reformed tradition (theology) in South Africa played a crucial role in the promotion of the 
cultural development of the Afrikaners that combined the Calvinist religion with the political 
aspirations of White Afrikaners. This cultural development of the Afrikaners, which combined 
the Calvinist religion with the political aspirations of White Afrikaners, also needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of Europeans assuming a position of being heirs of reason or 
rationality and a chosen nation (that is, a nation with a soul ordained by God). The Afrikaners’ 
 
8Therefore, their racist Being was not strange, hence Giliomee and Adam (1979:84) asserted that “… South Africa’s 
institutionalised racism (the policies that distribute power, wealth, and privileges unequally on a racial basis) can 
best be understood as the product of the Afrikaners’ conception of their distinct place in the social structure. They 
have come to regard ‘group-belongingness’, ‘group mobilization’, and the defense of the group position as positive 
responses that occur universally. Discrimination and prejudice are seldom justified as ends in themselves but as the 
inevitable consequences of the maintenance of ethnic rights and interests.” 
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idea of separating people on the basis of race and colour needs to be understood against this 
background (Villa-Vicencio & De Gruchy 1985:39-51). 
 
 
 
The pseudo-interpretation of Calvinism molded the already-existing ideas of Europeans as special 
beings who can rationalize and have a soul ordained by God in contrast to those whom they 
found along the southern coast of Africa who appeared to be irrational and thus needed 
Europeans (later Afrikaners) to be their guardians. This follows the same line of thought as that 
of the ancient Greek society, namely the idea of reason as the sole descriptive feature for the 
definition of who was human and who was not. So it is the pseudo-interpretation of Calvinism 
that strengthened the already-assumed position of Afrikaners (as Europeans) as the heirs of 
reasoning  and  thus  the  chosen  nation.  This  pseudo-interpretation  molded  and  shaped  the 
political aspirations of the Afrikaners. 
 
 
 
It is thus imperative to note the following with Du Toit (1983): 
 
It was an Afrikaner deeply rooted, de-humanizing system of racial segregation based on the pseudo 
understanding of Calvinism. The Afrikaners conceived of themselves as a chosen and covenanted people, 
like the Israelites of the Old Testament. (p. 920) 
 
 
 
The motive behind Afrikaners perceiving themselves as a chosen nation is that, after the 
successful bestowment of being chosen by God, they would have power over those who are 
supposedly not chosen by God and who are thus inferior. This would result in those who are 
supposedly inferior. This status is attained through being a heathen, to be reduced to a pre- 
ordained  position  of  being  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  (Williams  1991:1-7  & 
Lephakga 2013:380). It is thus imperative to note that the successful classification of Africans 
56  
who did not meet the requirements of being human would give Afrikaners enough moral 
justification for the ways in which they treated those who looked like human beings. The moral 
justification for the treatment of lesser beings would be given under the pretext of Afrikaners 
serving as guardians to those of lesser being-ness, those who cannot rationalise and those who do 
not possess a soul ordained by God. 
 
 
 
The idea of Afrikaners assuming the status of being “special beings” (that is, a chosen nation) 
thus follows the same logic of conquering through reason and Christianity. The Afrikaners 
assumed this position of a chosen nation (thus special beings who must look after those who look 
like human beings), which needed justification through eisegesis (reading into, in contrast to 
exegesis). It is for this reason that the Afrikaners through the pseudo-reading of the Old 
Testament, which became like a mirror of their own lives, found the deserts and fountains, the 
droughts and plagues, the captivity and the exodus. Above all, they found the chosen people 
guided by a stern but partial Deity through the midst of the heathen to a promised land. 
 
 
 
It was the Old Testament and the doctrines of Calvin that molded the Boer into the modern 
Afrikaner (Templin 1999). Thus Paul Kruger, who was the State President of the South African 
Republic (Transvaal), once argued as follows (Giliomee & Adam 1979): 
They [Afrikaners] were also God’s people: He had led them from the colony as His chosen people and had 
given liberty, they had been tried and tempered but were also blessed if they were faithful to Him. (p. 102) 
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Through this reading into (eisegesis, which was heavily influenced the civil religion of the 
Afrikaners)9  the Old Testament, one sees the influence of the European self-assumed status of 
being heirs of reason and a soul ordained by God, which had given them the idea of being the 
chosen nation which could do anything in its power to defend the notion. 
 
 
 
In the moulding of the idea of Afrikaners as a chosen nation like Israel (which obviously 
involved the pseudo-reading assuming the position of being the heirs of reason and a soul 
ordained by God), they had to undergo some experiences10  which they equated to that of the 
 
9The civil religion was greatly influenced by the Dutch theologian Abram Kuyper who is one of the founders of the 
Free University of Amsterdam. This University had great influence on the architects of apartheid in South Africa 
(see Villa-Vicencio & De Gruchy 1985). This Afrikaner civil religion in the South African context formed what 
came to be known as Neo-Calvinism. This kind of Afrikaner theology was greatly influenced by the Kuyperian 
theology, which emphasized God’s sovereignty over all spheres of life. This Afrikaner theology was later racialized 
when it emphasized that God had created the White person (civilised) different from the Black person (heathen). It is 
for this reason that Jaap Durand (Villa-Vicencio & De Gruchy 1985:42) argued: “The ease with which Kuyper’s 
theology was transplanted to the South African soil and was adapted to the Afrikaner’s national struggle and 
aspirations is not surprising in view of the basic concepts of his theology and cosmology that were presented as 
biblical principles: the separate sphere of life (such as church, state, family) as part of the order of creation, the 
principle of sovereignty for each of these social spheres, and, last but not the least, the principle of diversity as a 
principle rooted in creation. Although Kuyper himself never mentioned the people (volk) as one of the social 
spheres with its own sovereignty, the idea itself was not alien to his cosmology, and therefore made it easy for the 
Afrikaners academics to see the people as a separate social sphere with its own structure and purpose grounded in 
the ordinances of God’s creation. And as God willed the diversity of peoples, He preserves their identity. From here 
the rest follows: as apartheid theology based on the biblical principle of the diversity of peoples. Two parts of 
scripture (Gn 11 and Ac 17:26) could be – and were – quoted to substantiate the claim that diversity is indeed an 
unchanging norm, and the whole fortress of apartheid theology became impregnable from outside, let alone to 
anybody trying to undermine it from inside”. 
10As a result, through the influence of the (of the pseudo-interpretation of the) theology of Abram Kuyper and the 
doctrines of John Calvin (see Ross 1978), Afrikaners wanted to have a purified nation of Afrikaners who would be 
proud of their language, culture and religion (see De Klerk 1975). This came after the Afrikaners were forced to 
fight alongside the British in World War I and after the betrayal of the Afrikaners by General Hertzog when he 
joined General Smuts and the United Party. This betrayal is seen in the words of General Smuts after negotiating 
with the British said, “We are not here as an army but as a people … Everyone represents the Afrikaner people … 
They call upon us to avoid all measures which may lead to the decline and extermination of the Afrikaner people … 
We commenced this struggle and continued it to this moment because we wished to maintain our independence …” 
Smuts further asserted: “But we may not sacrifice the Afrikaner people for that independence. As soon as we are 
convinced that, humanly speaking, there is not reasonable chance to retain our independence as republics, it clearly 
becomes our duty to stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice out people and our future for a mere 
idea which cannot be realised” (Jemison 2003/2004:77–78).The Afrikaners were later betrayed when they were 
again forced to fight in the World War II against the friend of the Afrikaner cause, Adolf Hitler (see Jemison 
2003/2004). This was terrible for the Afrikaners, hence they dreamed of a future republic which would be 
independent from the British Empire. It is for this reason that the anti-imperialist tract Een Eeuw van Onrecht [A 
century of wrong] (see Giliomee & Adam 1979:103), in stating the eagerness of the Afrikaners to dream of an 
independent republic which is separated from the British Empire, confirmed that “... [t]he solid white aristocracy, 
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Israelites. These experiences exaggerated their feelings of being “special beings” (that is, a 
chosen nation) that needed to do anything in their power to defend their position and status of 
being rational beings and people with a soul that is ordained by God. 
 
 
 
The  cultural  development  of  the  Afrikaners  that  combined  the  Calvinist  religion  with  the 
political aspirations of White Afrikaners led to the eagerness of the Afrikaners to cultivate an 
Afrikaner culture which can be classified under the crowd psychology (Reicher 2001:182–208). 
Under this culture, the feelings of an individual are suppressed in favour of those of the crowd 
for the sole purpose of survival (this also included the idea of defending and dying for anything 
of/by/for the crowd). This came as a result of the feeling of the Afrikaners that the British 
Empire  was  neglecting  their  language,  culture  and  religion.  Thus the  Afrikaners  wanted  a 
republic of their own, which would preserve the purified Afrikaners who were proud of their 
culture, language and religion. Hence Paul Kruger saw that “God’s people were persecuted by 
the Beast (the English) [that is, the British], who had done them injustices and had deprived them 
of their rights, their language, and their liberty” (Giliomee & Adam 1979:103). 
 
 
 
into which the Afrikaner people had developed, had been wounded by the British government. The Afrikaner would, 
however, persist in his struggle for liberty, and in the end, ‘Africa for the Afrikaner’ would triumph from the 
Zambezi to Simon’s bay” (Giliomee & Adam 1979:103). It is for this reason that the Afrikaners started their 
liberating journey of the Great Trek (see Templin 1999:397–417) and their wars (that is, the Anglo-Boer War I & II) 
for their independence from the British Empire. It is for this reason that Jemison (2003/2004:75–76) argued: “The 
desire of the Afrikaners for complete power in South Africa began when the British took over the Cape area in 1806, 
in an effort to prevent Napoleon from gaining control of the region, the introduction of another group vying for 
power served to awaken Afrikaner nationalism. The British who settled in the Cape in the early 19th century brought 
with them concepts of the 18th century Enlightenment and the pro-business liberalism of the 19th century. These 
ideas conflicted sharply with the conservative Calvinist ideology of the Dutch who had settled [in] South Africa 
beginning in the mid-17th century. As [a]the result of the anti-slavery lobby in Britain and of the efforts of Christian 
missionaries to end racial prejudice, the British advocated a lessening of segregation to allow some non-white to 
participate at least partially in the white-dominated society. Overall, the English possessed a more advanced culture 
and lifestyle than the Dutch living at the Cape, so the Dutch likely to be absorbed into a colonial British society as 
second-class citizens. Indignant about the possibility of such a fate and without sufficient skill to fend off the 
British, many of the Dutch Boers moved further inland to areas to the northwest of the Cape area beginning in 1835. 
These Afrikaners or Voortrekkers conquered the land of native tribes and established autonomous Boer republics. 
There, the Afrikaners began to cultivate an Afrikaner culture.” 
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As a result, these views in turn led to the Afrikaners to plead and later fight for an 
independent state from the British Empire (Smith 1990:24–60) so as to preserve themselves as a 
pure nation with its own language, culture and religion. It is for this reason that the idea of a 
chosen nation or pure nation grew amongst the Afrikaners (especially amongst right-wing 
supporters). Hence Mkhondo (1993) observes the following when he reports on the CODESA 
negotiations: 
White nationalism runs deepest in the Afrikaners, who forged their identity as a nation early in the 
nineteenth century [even though traces of this are seen earlier on in the history of the Afrikaners] when 
they rejected British rule of the Cape Colony. They laid claim to most of the interior, defeating black tribes; 
these victories, they believed, were granted by God. (p. 103) 
 
The notion of “purified Afrikaners”, which formed a central thought process for the Afrikaners, 
resulted in the development of separate races as they (the Afrikaners) were the chosen nation. 
This kind of thinking developed apartheid theology which was translated into apartheid ideology. 
The ideology was later adopted as the political ideology of the Nationalist Party after the election 
of1948. This ideology was supported with the teachings of John Calvin as interpreted by Abram 
Kuyper (Villa-Vicencio 1985) and the teachings of the covenant theology (Elazar 1980) as 
interpreted from the Old Testament. It is for this reason that Williams (1991:1-7), in 
distinguishing between the European Calvinism which became liberalized during the 
Enlightenment and the Afrikaner Calvinism which predominantly laid emphasis on the Old 
Testament, argued that “[i]n many instances, the Bible was the only book owned by the Boer 
settlers, so its influence was paramount …”11 
 
 
 
 
 
11William (1991:n.p.) asserts that “... [because of the influence of the Old Testament] Afrikaner theology and society 
became very legalistic and harsh because of their emphasis on the Old Testament’s codes of behaviour such as the 
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widely-known Biblical statement ‘an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth’. Thus, the Afrikaners began to identity 
with the Israelites of old.” 
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These sentiments by Williams are also shared by Manavhela (2009), who crushes the notion of 
 
Afrikaners replacing the Old Israel, when he made the following argument: 
 
The Bible speaks of Israel as a special chosen people of God. They are God’s people in a distinct and 
specific way. Israel’s identity occurs with relation to calling, land, origin, history and religion. Christians 
throughout history are inclined to claim the Old Testament text for themselves. (p.1-7)12 
 
 
 
The pseudo interpretation of the doctrines of John Calvin as interpreted by Abram Kuyper and 
the theologized politics in South Africa had a terrible impact upon the people of South Africa 
(both White and Black). It resulted in the inception of the ideology of a “chosen nation” amongst 
the White Afrikaners. Afrikaners saw themselves as the chosen nation who are civilized and who 
have conquered South Africa through blood, sweat and tears. They came to see themselves as the 
Israelites who were chosen to conquer and lead as God was with them. This ideology of a 
“chosen nation” was obviously internalizeinternalizedinternalized in the minds of the Afrikaner 
people (Williams 1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
12Manavhela (2009:n.p.) further asserted that “Whenever there is some struggle, the ‘Israel Story’ seems to be a 
consolation. The ‘Israel Story’ is likely put into the context to make pieces fit, hence the Old Testament texts about 
Israel is contextualized. The shift is created from ‘Israel Story’ to a church through to a specific nation or group of 
people. Whenever the nation is at struggle, should they win, their victory is considered as a gift from God. Likewise, 
the Afrikaner people developed their Christian heritage. They, for that matter had engaged themselves in the exodus 
to the new land, the Promised Land. Therefore they, like many other nations around the globe, had in mind that God 
was on their side when they were engaged in the Great Trek to the unknown land. They developed their national 
identity in the struggle for liberation. God was aligned with their victory, and thus the arguments shifted from 
theological arguments to political arguments. Because God was their victor, He gave them the land as well, and 
through this they can do what they like with the land, they can also kick the inhabitants out of the land. Because of 
this ideology, they made God their own God alone, and have forgotten that God of Israel has become the God of all 
people. The Biblical idea of the God of all nations should supersede any idea that people might have about a 
particular God of them own. It becomes a problem when the idea of God in the Old Testament is replaced by 
another context than Israel, or replaced by that particular tradition. Therefore the Afrikaners cannot claim to be the 
only people of God. If the God of Israel has become the God of all humankind through Christ, then there is no-one 
who could claim that his particular nation is God’s. Therefore it is theologically wrong to claim that there is an elect 
ethic or social group of people on the surface of the earth. Racial separation became widely accepted in the church in 
South Africa in the early twentieth century. Most of the Afrikaners community felt some threats from outside and 
they started to believe that their own survival as a community was threatened, and the belief in racial separation was 
gaining acceptance among Whites in South African general. Social and spiritual survival became intertwined in 
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church polity; this was partly influenced by the early twentieth-century struggle between the English and Afrikaans- 
speaking people.” 
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especially when they started drawing similarities between what they went through as Afrikaners 
and what God’s people in the Bible (that is, Old Testament) went through. 
It is for this reason that one of their leaders, Dr DF Malan, once said the following in illustrating 
the idea of the Afrikaners as a “chosen nation” (Moodie 1975:1): 
Our history is the greatest masterpiece of the centuries. We hold this nationhood as our due for it was given 
us by the Architect of the universe. [His] aim was the formation of a new nation among the nations of the 
world … The last hundred years have witnessed a miracle behind which must lie a divine plan. Indeed, the 
history of the Afrikaner reveals a will and a determination which makes one feel that Afrikanerdom is not 
the work of men but the creation of God. (p. 1) 
 
 
 
These sentiments by Dr DF Malan are just the result of a long process of socialization which the 
Afrikaners as a nation went through. They drew similarities between themselves and God’s 
people in the Bible (that is, Old Testament), and they were also heavily influenced by Calvinism 
which in itself went through some changes (that is, political and social changes within the world 
influenced the Calvinism in which the Dutch who settled in South Africa believed (De Klerk 
1975). 
 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that this chapter together with different sources argue that the Old Testament 
and  the  pseudo-interpretation  of  Calvinism  shaped  and  influenced  the  Afrikaners  of  South 
Africa. In particular, Calvin’s emphasis on the sovereignty of God, the pre-eminence and 
authority of the Bible and the doctrine of predestination played a huge role in this regard. Due to 
this, the Calvinists emphasized Biblical authority, and this led the Calvinists (Afrikaners) to 
argue that the “… Holy Scripture(s) revealed the true nature and only nature of God”. Hence 
Williams (1991:1-7.) argues that “[t]his attitude [of placing final authority with the scriptures] 
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toward scripture became manifest in an ultra-literal interpretation of the Bible by many early 
Calvinists”.13 The early Dutch and French settlers of South Africa were Calvinists who believed 
that the Holy Bible, especially the Old Testament, revealed the one true and living God. This 
belief is a most important factor in understanding the Boer society and its legacy, apartheid 
(Williams 1991:2). 
 
 
 
After the Afrikaners’ so-called liberating journey of independence from the British Empire 
(Great Trek), the idea of a “chosen nation” grew stronger and was exaggerated by the idea that 
they were predestined by the grace of God to be superior to the inferior black nation. The latter 
position was made possible through the pseudo-interpretation of Calvin’s doctrine of election. It 
is for this reason that the Afrikaners, as they came across native indigenous people in their 
liberating journey, believed that these indigenous people were inferior. Hence Lovell (1956:309) 
argues that “... [the] Calvinistic Boer found scriptural sanction in the relegation of the sons of the 
unfortunate Ham to servant status”. This point is taken further by Jemison (2003/2004) when she 
argues as follows: 
Afrikaners distorted their Calvinistic beliefs to further this attitude of not only white supremacy but also of 
supremacy of the Afrikaner volk over all other groups. Because Afrikaner culture derived support from the 
Calvinist tradition, the religious ties of Afrikaners were a natural place to find additional support for the 
Afrikaner volk. (p. 80–81) 
13It is for this reason that Moodie (1975:2–3) clearly sketches out historically how the Afrikaners started to see 
themselves as a ‘chosen nation’ when he argues: “For the Afrikaners the century between the British occupation of 
the Cape in 1806 and the execution of Jopie Fourie in December 1914 was the period of revelation. During this era, 
God made known His will for the Afrikaner people. Prior to that period events were unimportant except to the extent 
that they delineated a scant ‘myth of origin’. Thus every Afrikaner knows that Jan van Riebeeck founded the first 
Dutch settlement in 1652 and that two hundred French Huguenots, fleeing religious persecution in their homeland, 
followed in 1688. Many Afrikaners believe also that the harsh rule of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape and 
the hard life on the frontier fostered a spirit of unity and independence within the pioneer settlement. So, according 
to their creation story, Afrikaners were Calvinists of Western European origin and a nation in their own right before 
the arrival of the English … The subsequent history of this people, as interpreted by the civil religion, centers on the 
Great Trek. This latter forms the national epic – formal proof of God’s election of the Afrikaner people and His 
special destiny for them.” 
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The notion of Afrikaners perceiving themselves as a chosen nation is explained further by 
 
Moodie (1975) in the following argument: 
 
They [Afrikaners] were followed by the British army [after leaving the Cape Colony to the wilderness], like 
that of Pharaoh, and everywhere were beset by the unbelieving black ‘Canaanites’. Yet because God’s 
people acted according to His will, He delivered them out of the hands of their enemies and gave them their 
freedom in the Promised Land. (p. 5) 
 
 
 
It is for this reason then that this chapter, in line with different sources, argues that it is in the 
Afrikaners’ pseudo-understanding of Calvinism that they (Afrikaners) conceived of themselves 
as a chosen and covenanted people like the Israelites of the Old Testament. Early Afrikaners 
presumed a divine mandate to smite heathen peoples and reduce them to their pre-ordained 
position as perpetual hewers of wood and drawers of water (Williams 1991:1-7 & Lephakga 
2013:380). To the Boers, the Old Testament was like a mirror of their own lives. In it, they found 
the deserts and fountains, the droughts and plagues, the captivity and the exodus. Above all, they 
found the chosen people, guided by a stern but partial Deity through the midst of the heathen to a 
promised land. It was the Old Testament and the doctrines of Calvin that molded the Boer into 
the Afrikaner today (Hexam 1980:195). 
 
 
 
It is also imperative to note that the kind of thinking which this chapter brings together under 
what can be termed “Afrikaner theology” resulted in the segregation of people on basis of race. 
This segregationist theology had a terrible impact upon black people (Maimela 1987). It resulted 
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in the institutionalization of the Apartheid ideology14  within the Church and was then, in turn, 
adopted in the political sphere. This institutionalization of the apartheid ideology resulted in the 
formulation of the theologized politics of South Africa (De Klerk 1975) which were evidently 
seen after the 1948 elections when the NP came to power and officially adopted apartheid as a 
state policy (Lowenberg & Kaempfer 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14“South Africa is the only portion of that continent with an appreciable long-established European settlement. 
Unlike the European thrust into the Americas, that into southern Africa neither displaced non-Europeans nor 
produced large ethnic mixtures. Instead, as in New Zealand, the penetration left Europeans living alongside non- 
Europeans. But while New Zealand Maoris became a minority, South African Europeans remained one. From this 
basic population fact has flowed a historic concept recently caught up in the word ‘apartheid,’ which entered 
Afrikaans only in the late 1930’s. While the word can be translated as ‘apartness,’ significantly common usage does 
not make this apartness territorial or geographical. Instead the word connotes the entire complex of superior- 
subordinate relationships  between  Europeans  and  non-Europeans.  The two  concepts  of  territorial  and  social 
apartheid have competed in South Africa since Jan van Riebeeck’s wild orange hedge between colonists and 
Hottentots began official support of the literal, territorial type. When the colonists trampled the hedge, they initiated 
the rival frontier concept of social apartheid, which might also be termed frontier apartheid in that it was an attitude 
developed on the frontier, which pitted it against literal, territorial apartheid in a struggle with four stages. In each of 
them the frontier attitude identified itself more closely with Afrikaner nationalism and finally transferred to a larger 
South African nationalism, so that current usage of ‘apartheid’ is largely social with only slight territorial 
connotations.  During  the  first  stage  frontier  apartheid  emerged  and  vainly  sought  to  become  official  policy. 
Beginning with the Netherlands East India Company each regime deplored expansion with attendant expensive 
native wars, and also increasingly tended to view Europeans and natives as near equals. While the colony hugged 
the western district with its settled grain and wine growers of the Cape Peninsula and Berg River Valley, frontier 
a t t i t u d e s were slight. Converted natives were deemed equal with Europeans, and it was in this time and place that 
the only appreciable racial mixing occurred to form the basis of the Cape colored peoples that henceforth in South 
Africa ‘colored’ meant  persons of mixed ethnic strains with some white blood. With th e  second quarter of the 
eighteenth century Europeans moved into  the frontier eastern district, where constant friction with natives made 
Europeans  acutely  conscious  of  being  a  minority,  develop  frontier,  social  apartheid  attitudes.  Frontiersmen, 
w h e th e r  of the eastern district of South Africa or of the Dakotas, never thought h i g h l y  of aboriginal ‘rights,’ 
particularly t hos e  to land. As they trekked eastward, Cape Boers became stockmen, who like  their  Wyoming 
counterparts demanded ‘Land, lots of land underneath the starry sky’ and refused to be ‘fenced-in’ to anything less 
than 6,ooo acres, even while their Roman-Dutch law with its principle of male partage reduced individual holdings 
each generation. As they moved, trekkers either exterminated or drove the Bushmen into the Kalahari. But the 
Hottentots, u nlik e  the Sioux, were useful as indentured l ab o r . Trekker l a n d  and labor needs combined with 
typical frontier f r ic tio n  to produce frontier, social apartheid, for which the patriarchal, Calvinistic Boer found 
scriptural sanction in their legation of the sons of the unfortunate H a m  to servant status. Frontier apartheid  was 
social, connotative apartheid by its meaning ‘superior’ Europeans living among ‘inferior’ non-Europeans with 
overriding rights to their land and labor. The existence of slavery in the Cape was only incidental in the formation 
of this frontier attitude; because the great bulk of s la ve s , a nd t hos e m o s tly f r o m the E a s t I nd i e s , w e r e in 
the settled western district. In the eastern district stockmen with few slaves but many indentured servants pressed 
eastward until in 1778 at the Fish River they met the Bantu invaders from the north. When trekkers named these 
Bantu ‘kaffirs’, ‘derived from an Arab word for inferior unbelievers, they gave notice of their intention to apply 
frontier apartheid to these rivals’(Lovell 1956:308–309). 
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Consequently,  apartheid  could  never  have  been  as  successful  as  it  was  without  the  aid  of 
theology and the church closely linked to it at its time (Smith 1979:1&De Gruchy & Villa- 
Vicencio 1983). It is imperative to note that the Afrikaners are descendants from Europe (mainly 
Western Europe) who settled at the southern tip of Africa. Hence Giliomee and Adam (1979) 
argue as follows: 
South Africa’s institutionalised racism (the policies that distribute power, wealth, and privileges unequally 
on a racial basis) can best be understood as the product of the Afrikaners conception of their distinct place 
in the social structure. (p. 84) 
 
 
 
This in turn, as Giliomee mentioned, led to the Afrikaners regarding “group-belongingness”, 
group mobilization and the defense of the group position as positive responses that occur 
universally. As a result of the idea of “doing anything through the group and for the group”, 
discrimination was seldom justified as the consequence of the maintenance of ethnic rights and 
interests (Giliomee & Adam 1979:84). 
 
 
 
Giliomee argues, in my view correctly, that the Afrikaners in South Africa established the notion 
of preserving themselves as a pure nation like Israel. So with this understanding, they started to 
see themselves as a chosen nation (Templin 1999), hence a strong covenant theology was 
developed and the pseudo-teachings of John Calvin were used to back this up (Villa-Vicencio & 
De Gruchy 1985). It is for this reason that Du Toit (1985) made the following argument: 
Accounts of South African history and politics have been much influenced by what might be termed the 
 
Calvinist paradigm of Afrikaner history. As a model for the historical understanding of modern Afrikaner 
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nationalism and of the ideology of apartheid it has proved persuasive to historians and social scientist alike. 
(p.209)15 
These sentiments by Du Toit coincide with that of Williams (1991:1-7) who argues that “[r]acist 
sentiments are deeply ingrained in the minds of the ruling White people [in South Africa]”.16 
 
 
 
The pseudo-interpretation of the theology of Calvin was coupled with the pseudo-interpretation 
of the Old Testament to prove the point that Afrikaners were a chosen nation of God who 
underwent difficult times (persecutions at the hands of the British in South Africa) like the 
Israelites in the Old Testament (Du Toit 1985:209). Hence Moodie (1975), while explaining the 
rise of Afrikaner Nationalism, once made the following argument: 
They [Afrikaners] were followed by the British army [following the Great Trek], that of Pharaoh, and 
everywhere were beset by the unbelieving black ‘Canaanites’. Yet because God’s people acted according to 
His will, He delivered them out of the hands of their enemies and gave them freedom in the Promised Land 
[that is South Africa]. (p. 3) 
15Du Toit (1985:209) further argues that “[i]n outline, it amounts to the view that the seventeenth-century Calvinism 
which the Afrikaner founding fathers derived from their countries of origin became fixed in the isolated frontier 
conditions of trekboer society and survived for generations in the form of a kind of primitive Calvinism; that in the 
first part of the nineteenth century, this gave rise to a nascent chosen people ideology among early Afrikaners, which 
provided much of the motivation for, as well as the self-understanding of, that central event in Afrikaner history, the 
Great Trek, while simultaneously serving to legitimate the conquest and subordination of indigenous peoples; and 
that, mediated in this way, and authentic tradition of Afrikaner Calvinism thus constitutes the root source of modern 
Afrikaner nationalism and the ideology of apartheid.” 
16Williams (1991) further argues: “How did these sentiments become so ingrained that a racist society resulted in 
South Africa? One answer to this question must rest with the social impact that religion had upon South African 
society, in particular, the strict Calvinistic theology of the early European settlers. These settlers came to be known 
as the Afrikaners or Boers. Afrikaner Calvinism, though theologically similar to European Calvinism, differed from 
its European counterpart in that it helped ultimately to create an ultra-conservative society. European Calvinism 
became much more liberalised during the Enlightenment. On the other hand, South African Calvinists were isolated 
and, thus, were not affected by the cross-currents of change which occurred elsewhere. Afrikaner Calvinism, 
therefore, matured in somewhat of a cultural vacuum. This variance difference between the two forms of Calvinism 
may be attributed [at least] to the three major factors that set Afrikaner Calvinism apart from its European 
counterpart. Perhaps the major factor involves the Boer people’s relative isolation from new ideas pertaining to 
Calvinistic theology. This was a direct result of their geographical separation from the liberalizing influences that 
the Enlightenment had upon the European Calvinists. The second equally important component was the long series 
of conflicts with the Bantu tribe [tribes] and other indigenous people in this region. These conflicts brought about 
the need for an orthodox position toward the natives who were viewed as a threat both physically and culturally. 
This was not the case in Europe where most people were of the Caucasian race. The last significant consideration to 
be discussed involves the assumption, by the Boers, that they were a chosen people of God, as opposed to the 
European Calvinistic belief of an individual calling from God.” 
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For this reason, I argue that it is with the misinterpretation of the Old Testament and the 
teachings of John Calvin that Afrikaners internalizeinternalizedinternalized this superiority 
complex which has turned them into slaves of superiority over other races in South Africa. It is 
this kind of thinking which has led to the obliterating of the image of God in Black and White 
South Africans. Due to the internalization of the inferiority complex, Black people started to 
doubt their humanity which was affirmed by God in creation (Tshaka & Mogashoa 2010:541). 
They started to doubt whether they had a right to possess the image of God in them. The 
image of God in White people in South Africa was shattered when they started to play the role 
of God over other races. They became gods because they determined what other races should eat, 
chapter, posses, occupy and deserve (Cone & Wilmore 1993:193). 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that this chapter argues that the pseudo-interpretation Calvinism played a 
crucial role in the establishment of the apartheid ideology17 within the South-African society and 
also within the Church, specifically in the reformed churches in South Africa.18  It was the 
 
 
17For Maimela (1987:6), “… the Apartheid system which oppresses and denies Blacks their rights, which has 
become a theological problem, has its origin in the 17th century long before the Afrikaners took over the reins of 
government in 1948. The Afrikaners only perfected a system of racial injustice which they had inherited from the 
British government by merely carrying it ruthlessly to its logical conclusion with much candor.” 
18To strengthen or clarify this, I use the history of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) family as an example. If we 
remember the years 1857 and 1881 in the history of the DRC family, it is where apartheid started for them. At the 
1857 Synod of the DRC, the question of segregation or not was dealt with and paved the way for church separation 
and racism in practice. The Synod of 1857 spoke with a double tongue and that indicated clearly that they could not 
take a clear stand on issues of Biblical principle. They said YES this and Yes the other. Their inability to take a 
qualified stand on the issue paved the way for church and societal apartheid. The decision of the DRC Synod reads 
as follows. “The Synod considers it desirable and according to the Holy Scripture that our heathen members (non- 
whites) be accepted and initiated into our congregations wherever it is possible; but where this measure, as result of 
the weakness of some, would stand in the way of promoting the work of Christ among the heathen people, then 
congregations set up among the heathen, or still to be set up, should enjoy their Christian privileges in a separate 
building or institution” (see Prozesky 1990). This decision paved the way for the “final solution” for this heathen 
problem with the establishment of the first racially separated church in 1881, called the Dutch Reformed Mission 
Church for “colored” people (DRMC – Sendingkerk). After this, the DRC would establish racially separated 
churches for Black people, which were called Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (DRCA), and for Indian people, 
called the Reformed Church in Africa (RCA). That this theology of apartheid became entrenched in the DRC 
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teachings and doctrines of John Calvin and the pseudo-interpretation of the Bible which molded 
and formulated the apartheid ideology in the church and consequently in the political sphere. The 
Afrikaners misinterpreted the doctrines of John Calvin, specifically the doctrine of predestination 
or grace. Calvinism in this context refers to the pseudo-incarnation of the “chosen people 
ideology” which was taken from John Calvin’s doctrine of election or predestination. 
 
 
 
It is clear from the teachings of John Calvin that the Afrikaners misunderstood his notion of 
election or predestination because, for Calvin, election or predestination solely depended upon 
God (Moodie 1975). It is for this reason that Calvin defined this doctrine as follows (McGrath 
2001): 
 
… the eternal decree of God, by which he determined what he wished to make of every person. For he does 
not create everyone in the same condition, but ordains eternal life for some and eternal damnation for 
others. (p. 467) 
 
 
 
In this doctrine, Calvin tries to explain that there are those who are graciously chosen or elected 
by God, and there are those who will not receive this grace because they do not respond to the 
gospel message (McGrath 2001). 
 
 
 
It is therefore the contention of this chapter that apartheid gained prominence in South Africa 
with the blessing of Afrikaner churches like the DRC (Ritner 1967),and this led to the 
institutionalisation of apartheid in 1948. It is again with the blessing of churches like the DRC 
 
became clear when “Kerkbode”, the official newspaper of the DRC, wrote in its editorial in September 1948, after 
the NP came to power on an apartheid-policy platform: “Apartheid is a church policy”. This policy meant in South 
Africa white supremacy, and all the other races were inferior, and they were dealt with in an inferior manner. The 
result was the oppression of the Non-White people of South Africa and the privileged position of White people. 
Church (DRC) and state were inextricably linked in an unholy union. The state received moral and theological 
backing for its unjust and apartheid policies from the DRC (Prozesky 1990). 
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that the Nationalist government passed a series of laws which confined Black people in South 
Africa to not only slaves but pariahs in the land of their birth as Plaatje (2007) once said while 
referring to the Native Land Act of 1913. 
 
 
 
These laws were met with resistance because it is always that case that “oppression breeds 
resistance” (Hales 2009), and because of this, a series of painful events happened in South Africa 
to show that the Nationalist government was serious in imposing apartheid. Examples of these 
are the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the banning of political parties, the imprisonment of 
political activists, the formation of the militant wings of the liberation movements in South 
Africa and the Soweto student uprisings of 1976,to mention but a few, which shocked the entire 
world. More importantly, these events showed the entire world that the Black people in South 
Africa had heard enough of this evil policy called “apartheid” (Hlongwane & Ndlovu 2006). 
 
 
 
This policy of racial segregation called “apartheid” has fragmented South Africa into different 
South Africas (a house divided against itself) (Smith 1979:1). Others like Tshaka speak of the 
balkanization of South Africa (2009:155). It is for this reason that this chapter argues that Black 
people in South Africa were regarded as foreigners in the country of their birth after the 
development of the ideology of apartheid which led to the establishment of the Bantustans. 
These homelands were established in order for Black people to think under the separate 
development mentality or the inferiority complex mentality (Biko 2004:88-95). 
 
 
 
It is the contention of this chapter that the policy of apartheid in this regard was successful in 
making Black people in South Africa aliens (in thinking and acting) in the country of their birth 
72  
(Biko 2004). It is for this reason that the then minister of Justice, Mr Swart (1953), once said of 
South Africa: “In our country we have civilized people, we have semi-civilised people and we 
have uncivilised people. The government … gives each section facilities, according to the 
circumstances” (see Spinks 2001:15). It will be shown in this chapter how the establishment of 
the homelands, as per the sentiments of the then minister of justice, Mr Swart, racially divided 
the people of South Africa not only into different races but also into different classes as is 
evident from Mr Swart’s sentiments of civilised people, semi-civilised and uncivilised people. 
 
 
 
2.4 The ontology of domination and the 1948 civil religion and 
political victory 
 
 
 
The ideology of Apartheid, which was based on racial segregation, was developed by the 
Afrikaners as a liberating strategy from British rule (Giliomee & Adam 1979). It is for this 
reason that Serfontein (1982) asserted the following: 
In 1948 the Afrikaner was still in the last phase of this fight against British imperialism. This had taken 
several different forms. Early in the 20th century after the Anglo-Boer War, it was against English colonial 
domination with its declared policy of culturally anglicizing the Afrikaner. Later followed a political fight 
against the paternalism, and the spiritual and economic domination of the indigenous English language 
group. (pp. 7–8) 
 
 
 
Hence the policy of apartheid was adopted by the Nationalist government to play a liberating 
role in the advancement (that is, economically and for social status) of White South Africans 
(Giliomee & Adam 1979). 
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The advancement of White people in South Africa was done through excluding Black people in 
South Africa from participating in the country’s economic life and through preventing Black 
people in South Africa from asserting their political rights (Terreblanche 2002:3-21). Hence Van 
Niekerk (Department of Government Communication and Information Systems 2011/12) has put 
forward the following argument: 
[the] government policy in the Union of South Africa did not develop in isolation, but against the backdrop 
of black political initiatives. Segregation and apartheid assumed their shape, in part, as a white response to 
African’s increasing participation in the country’s economic life and their assertion of political rights. 19 
 
 
 
The integration of Black people into the system has resulted in Black people in South Africa 
becoming a product or a social construct of the racial structure of the colonial and apartheid rule. 
It is for this reason that Jean-Paul Sartre (Fanon 1990), in a preface to the manuscript of Frantz 
Fanon’s The wretched of the earth, put forward the following argument: 
The European elite undertook to manufacture native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; they 
branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the principles of western culture; they stuffed their mouths full 
with high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck their teeth. After a short stay in the mother 
country they were sent home, white-washed. (p. 7) 
 
 
 
The ideology of apartheid was developed over years until it was taken over as the official policy 
of the NP after the 1948 elections (Smith 1979). The policy of apartheid was at the heart of the 
governance of the NP which was successfully implemented by Hendrik Verwoerd. He thus 
became known as the “architect of apartheid” because he played a shaping role in the 
implementation of the apartheid policy from the time when he was still the minister of the native 
19Van Niekerk [please insert date and page numbers] further argues that “[d]espite the government’s efforts to shore 
up traditionalism and retribalise them, black people became more fully integrated into the urban and industrial 
society of 20th-century South African than elsewhere on the continent. Educated elite of clerics, teachers, business 
people, journalists and professionals grew to be a major force in black politics.” 
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affairs and later as the Prime Minister (Moodie 1975:146-174). Verwoerd implemented the 
policy of apartheid under the pretext of separate development (Spence 1962:3–20) or a state of 
being apart (Smith 1979). This policy was regarded by Verwoerd as a “policy of good 
neighbourliness”. Under the racial policy of apartheid, the majority of Black people in South 
Africa were made aliens and foreigners in the country of their birth with the aim of maintaining 
White  supremacy  and  Afrikaner  minority  rule  (Pheko  1984).  Hence  Sol  Plaatje  (2007:21) 
asserted with emotional sentiments when he said the following: “Awakening the morning, June 
20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of 
his birth.” These sentiments by Sol Plaatje attest to the cruel nature of the racial policies of 
colonilization which, after 1948, became the official policies of the NP. 
 
 
 
These racial policies did not only turn Black people into slaves (Dooling 2007), that is, people 
being the property of other people, but they made Black people in South Africa outcasts and 
aliens in their land of birth (Plaatje 2007: 21 &Pheko 1984). All these things were done to 
guarantee that White people in South Africa enjoy economic, social and religious privileges. As a 
result, Biko (2004) argued the following concerning the South African White community: 
… the white community is a community of people who sit to enjoy a privileged position that they do not 
deserve, are aware of this, and therefore spend their time trying to justify why they are doing so. (p. 20) 
 
 
 
The privileged position in which the White South African community found themselves came at 
the expense of the Black community of South Africa. It is because of the painful ripple effects of 
the apartheid policy that the Black community of South Africa were stripped off their right to be 
full human beings in this country (Tatum 2003). They became empty shells who accepted 
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everything coming their way even if it meant denying their human status (Biko 2004). It is for 
this reason that Boesak (1984) argued as follows: 
… racism [a powerful vehicle for the dehumanisation project as witnessed in South Africa] has brought 
dehumanisation, has undermined black personhood, destroyed the human-beingness of those who are called 
to be the children of God. It has caused those who are the image of the living God to despise themselves, 
for they cannot understand why it should be their blackness that calls forth such hatred, such contempt, 
such wanton, terrible violence. (p. 113) 
 
 
 
It is the argument of this chapter that, for White people to enjoy the privilege position that they 
have at the expense of the majority of Black people in South Africa, they had to oppress Black 
people by isolating them (this include preventing them from participating in the economy of 
South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:3-21?) and de-humanizing them with the aim of having Black 
people dependent on White people. The process of oppressing Black people in South Africa 
resulted in Black people being in chains everywhere they go. Hence Fanon (2008) attest to this 
when he says: 
Dirty nigger! Or Simply, Look, a Negro … I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in 
things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an 
object in the midst of other objects. (p. 82)20 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that this chapter argues that the ideology of apartheid has caused almost the 
same harm as the holocaust in Germany under the Nazi regime (Peires 2006). It caused many 
South Africans to be aliens in their own country and to themselves. It has fragmented the identity 
of the majority of the people of South Africa. White people in South Africa were brought up 
 
20Fanon (2008) further states that “[t]heir attention was liberation, running over my body suddenly abraded into 
nonbeing, endowing me once more with an agility that I had though lost, and by taking me out of this world, 
restoring me to it.” 
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under the pretext that they are a superior race which must take dominion over other races. In 
contrast, Black people in South Africa who are a majority were brought up under the pretext that 
they are inferior, less human and thus in need of White people in South Africa to survive as a 
people (Giliomee & Adam 1979). It is for this reason that Boesak (Cone & Wilmore 1993) 
argues: 
The right to live in God’s world as a human being is not the sole right of whites that eventually, through the 
kindness of whites, can be extended to “deserving” (Obsequious?) Blacks as a “special privilege””. (p. 
193)21 
 
 
 
 
The logic behind this fragmentation of Black people or Black society by the apartheid policies 
and government was to alienate Black people from their selves and the land and thus make them 
dependent upon White people in South Africa for their survival. As a result, White people in 
South Africa have preserved for themselves privileged positions. As Biko (2004:80) argues, 
these positions were “… created and preserved by the use of violence and fear, but the use of 
these methods was in itself a result of the white’s fear of the black population”. The reason why 
White people instilled fear in the Black population through violence was to dispossess them. 
Biko (2004) attests to this when he argues as follows: 
My premise has always been that black people should not at any stage be surprised at some of the atrocities 
committed by the government. This follows logically after their initial assumption that they, being a settler 
minority, can have the right to be supreme masters. (p.80-81)22 
 
 
 
 
21Boesak (Cone & Wilmore 1993:193) further states: “Human dignity for all is a fundamental biblical right. 
Nevertheless, many whites seem to think that Blacks live by the grace of whites. Whites determine who and what we 
must be. Whites determine what our life shall be like. Whites determine where and how we may live. Whites 
determine who shall be our friends. Whites determine who we may marry. Whites determine how we shall be 
educated. Whites determine – insofar as our children receive an education at all – what sort of education our 
children shall receive. Whites determine the possibilities and the boundaries of our humanity. In this process, the 
criterion always was and still is skin color [sic]: white.” 
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The cruelty as mentioned in the quotation above has resulted in Black people losing their God- 
given status as full human beings. This came as a result of the cruel process of dehumanization to 
which Black people were subjected (Asante & Hall 2011:1-24). Hence Black people started to 
doubt their humanness and started seeing themselves through the eyes of White people (Du Bois 
2007). It is for this reason that Fanon (2008), arguing for his context, said the following: 
 
The Negro is comparison. There is the first truth. He is comparison: that is, he is constantly preoccupied 
with self-evaluation and with the ego-ideal. Whenever he comes in contact with someone else, the question 
of value, of merit arises. (p. 163) 
 
 
 
Fanon further states that the Negro is always preoccupied with self-evaluation and with the ego- 
ideal because of alienation. Fanon states that Negroes are alienated from themselves and also 
from participating in the economy, and they are also alienated from the land of their birth. It is 
for this reason that this chapter argues that this alienation, to which I have already alluded in the 
paragraph above, was inherited and internalizeinternalized by both White and Black people in 
South Africa. Under the ideology of apartheid, a new culture of community emerged within the 
Black community of South Africa, namely a humiliated, segregated and fragmented 
community of Black people. This culture destroyed Black people. It led Black people to start 
doubting their God-given nature as being full human beings who deserve to be treated as such 
(Boesak 1977:1- 
7 & Cone & Wilmore 1993:193-194). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22Biko (2004) further argues: “If they could be cruel enough to cow the natives down with brutal force and install 
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themselves as perpetual rulers in a foreign land, then anything else they do to the same black people becomes logical 
in terms of the initial cruelty.” 
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As a result of them doubting their humanity, Black people were forced to conform to the 
“inferiority complex” which they were taught by the White community or which they were 
subjected to by the White community. Thus Biko (2004) has argued the following: 
...as long as Black people are suffering from the inferiority complex – a result of 300 years of deliberate 
oppression, denigration and derision – they will be useless as co-architects of a normal society where man 
is nothing but man for his own sake. (p. 22) 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that Fanon (2008) argues that the world (that is the world which is anti-Black) 
that has been created by White people always reminds the Negroes (Black people in (South) 
Africa) that they are inferior. Hence it was not surprising for Verwoerd (the then Minister of 
Native Affairs) to say the following (Morris 2004): 
There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour … 
what is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is quite 
absurd. Education must train people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere 
in which they live. (p. 165) 
These words clearly show how South Africa was created by White people to exclude Black 
people from South Africa and instead make them mere labourers (Terreblanche 2002) who will 
be reminded by their context that they are inferior. This in turn creates what Fanon (2008:83) 
terms the real dialectic between body and the world.23 
 
 
 
 
23It is for this reason that Fanon (2008:83) said: “...the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An 
unfamiliar  weight burdened me.  The real world challenged my claims.  In  the white world  the man  of  color 
encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating 
activity. It is a third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I know 
that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of 
the table. The matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back slightly. And all these 
movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge. A slow composition of myself as a body in the 
middle of a spatial and temporal world – such seems to be the schema. It does not impose itself upon me; it is, 
rather, a definite structuring of the self and of the world – definite because it creates a real dialectic between my 
body and the world.” 
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The dialectical tension to which Fanon refers was created by the White people (world) as a social 
construct to always enslave Black people (or Negroes). Biko (2004) thus argued as follows: 
The white man’s quest for power has led him to destroy with utter ruthlessness whatever has stood in his 
way. In an effort to divide the black world in terms of aspirations, the powers that be have evolved a 
philosophy that stratifies the black world and gives preferential treatment to certain groups. (p. 66) 
 
 
 
Maybe Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762:14) would have applied his words to the situation of Black 
people in (South) Africa, had he known the context of South Africa, when he said: “Man [black 
man] is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many Black people in South Africa can relate 
to these sentiments by Jean Jacques Rousseau. This is because, in every aspect of their lives, they 
(Black people) are always in chains. In South Africa, all the apartheid policies where created to 
exclude and disadvantage Black people with the aim of economically advantaging White South 
Africans (Giliomee & Adam 1979). 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that this chapter argues that the apartheid ideology has created a culture 
which directs power to certain people on the basis of colour, gender and race. This is the kind of 
thinking that many South Africans have internalizeinternalized and inherited. Hence it is my 
conviction that apartheid could never have been as successful as it was without the aid of 
theology and of the church closely linked to it at its time (Smith 1979: 1 &De Gruchy & Villa-
Vicencio 1983). 
 
 
 
2.5 The ontology of domination and the inculcation of the 
apartheid system 
 
 
The vast majority of literature on South-African history emphasizes the benefits that Black 
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exclusion held for the ruling White group. These benefits were entrenched with the establishment 
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of the  dispossession  project24  which  included, amongst  other  things, the  land-dispossession 
project which was officiated with the passing of the Land Act of 1913 and the official 
establishment of the homelands25 or Bantustans. These homelands came about as a the solution 
of the “native problem” (Biko 2004:89) which was based on “… the fear of black insurgence and 
the desire to present the world with a picture of South Africa showing whites less heavily 
outnumbered by non-whites than they really are” (Smith 1979:22). 
Attention is given in this section to the establishment of the homelands (Bantustans) because the 
homelands (Bantustans) project was the final seal on the guaranteed establishment of White 
supremacy in South Africa. The establishment of the Homelands (Bantustans) was eventually 
met with excitement by a few Black people in South Africa who would benefit at the expense of 
the Black majority. We can already see from this the division which was caused within the Black 
communities, which guaranteed the rehabilitation of the social and economic status of the White 
minority (Fanon 1986:64). 
 
 
 
I thus argue that the implementation of the segregation policy of the apartheid government and 
eventually the establishment of the Homelands (Bantustans) was a liberation project of the 
 
24The dispossession project as it is referred to in this chapter refers to the whole history of dispossession in South 
Africa. The dispossession project in South Africa was entrenched through land dispossession which was officialised 
with the passing of the 1913 Land Act and later sealed with a series of laws which were passed by the Nationalist 
government after the election victory in 1948. Amongst these laws was the law which enforced the establishment of 
the Bantustans. 
25The “homelands” policy was designed to maintain White supremacy and strengthen the government's apartheid 
policy. By definition, a “Bantustan” was an area set aside for African self-government and eventual independence. 
Later the word Bantustan was replaced by the less offensive but inaccurate term “homeland”. Over the years, many 
people had abandoned their ethnic regions and made their homes elsewhere in South Africa – a factor which the 
government refused to take into consideration. In 1951, the first stage of the policy was implemented. Black local 
authorities were set up in designated areas, but these soon met with bitter opposition from the local people because 
the chiefs and headmen that had been selected had very little real autonomy. Furthermore, they were promptly 
deposed and replaced if they did not cooperate with government officials. Resistance to the system was particularly 
vociferous in Pondoland, the Transkei and Sekhukhuneland. In 1959, the second step was taken with the passing of 
the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959. Eight ethnically defined areas were thereby designated to be 
given the machinery for self-government. Once this status had been attained, it was envisaged that full independence 
would subsequently be granted. In 1963, the Transkei became the first homeland to achieve self-government. 
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Nationalist government in order to rehabilitate poor Afrikaners socially and economically and 
also to segregate Afrikaners as a pure nation in Africa or puritans in Africa (Fanon 1986). The 
establishment of the Homelands (Bantustans) was a strategic move on the side of the Afrikaners, 
especially for their liberation project. Simultaneously, it was the official beginning of the 
enslavement of the Black people in South Africa after the dispossession policies which were 
passed by the colonial and apartheid system. The Homelands (Bantustans) created countries 
within a country and in turn began a process of dislocating, dehumanising and enslaving Black 
people in South Africa. 
 
 
 
The Homelands (Bantustans) created a situation where Black people in South Africa were, 
within moments, turned from being owners to being labourers, from being human beings to 
becoming beings who doubt their being human. Black people in South Africa were forced to 
depend on the so-called White South Africa for their survival. Due to this and the situations in 
the Homelands (Bantustans), Black people in South Africa were forced to internalize the 
inferiority complex which was preached to them by their oppressors and reaffirmed by their 
context. 
 
 
 
These contexts into which Black people in South Africa were dumped instilled doubt concerning 
their humanity in the minds of Black people in South Africa. Whiteness and the White context(s) 
soon became a yardstick for true humanity in South Africa. Hence Black people in South Africa 
started to see themselves through the eyes of the other or as a negation of Whiteness in South 
Africa. For as long as Black people in South Africa are faced with the same conditions as those 
of the apartheid times and are still faced with the same living conditions, they will always see 
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themselves through the eyes of the other (Whiteness), and they will, as Biko (2004) said, “… 
become an empty shell which accept everything”. White people in South Africa will remain 
slaves of the superiority complex for as long as they are still segregated and are faced with 
privileges which they enjoy at the expense still of the majority of Black people in South Africa. 
 
 
 
2.6  The ontology of domination and the solution to the native 
problem 
 
Following the idea of the ontology of domination and the challenge of what was termed the 
“native   problem”,   homelands   were   established.   The   establishment   of   the   Homelands 
(Bantustans) was the final seal of the apartheid government’s racial segregation, but this policy 
of racial segregation was presented to Black people in South Africa as beneficial for their 
independent survival even though it is a given fact that behind this policy is the old Roman 
imperialist idea of “divide and rule” (Biko 2004:88). The establishment of the Homelands 
(Bantustans) was a guaranteed seal to the maintenance and development of a privileged position 
(in this case, the economic privileged position). It is for this reason that Fanon (1986:64–65), as 
an outsider to the South-African situation, commented that “Negrophilism and philanthropy are 
pejoratives in South Africa … what is proposed is the separation of the natives from the 
Europeans, territorially, economically, and on the political level...”26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26Fanon (1986:64–65) further states that the aim of Homelands was “… allowing the blacks to build their own 
civilisation under the guidance and the authority of the whites, but with a minimum contact between the races. It is 
understood that territorial reservations would be set up for the blacks and that most of them would have to live there 
… economic competition would be eliminated and the groundwork would be laid for the rehabilitation of the poor 
whites who constitute 50 per cent of the European population.” 
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It is for this reason that Biko (2004), as an insider to the South-African situation, argues in 
disputing the point that the establishment of the Homelands (Bantustans) was beneficial for the 
independent survival of Black people: 
Economically the blacks have been given a raw deal. Generally speaking the areas where Bantustans are 
located the least developed in the country, often very unsuitable either for agricultural or pastoral work. Not 
one of the Bantustans has access to the sea [major port – editor’s note] and in all situations mineral rights 
are  strictly  reserved  for  the  South  African  government.  In other  words  Bantustans  only  have  rights 
extending to 6 feet below surface of the land. (p. 91) 
 
The notion that the establishment of the Bantustans was beneficial or that it would have been 
beneficial if it was funded is absurd because no African has ever asked for self-governance 
before.27Therefore this chapter argues that the establishment of the Bantustans was to maintain 
the privileged position of White people in South Africa and White supremacy while excluding 
Black people in South Africa from participating in its economy (Biko 2004:91). The above 
quotation also challenges us to also examine the rising costs of maintaining the enjoyment of the 
privileged position by White people in South Africa. Biko (2004:96–97) argues that “… Whites 
in South Africa enjoy a privilege which they do not deserve at the expense of Blacks in South 
Africa”. Thus, it is a fact that the apartheid ideology was created for the advancement and the 
liberation of the White people in South Africa at the expense of the majority of the Black people 
in South Africa (Giliomee 2003:487-541). Serfontein (1982) thus argued as follows: 
 
The experience and the struggle over nearly two centuries by the Afrikaner group to establish its right to 
exist as a separate volk and to resist both English domination and attempts to anglicize it, clearly influenced 
Nationalist thinking in rationalising the policy of Bantustans [or of apartheid for that matter]. (p. 9) 
27Hence Serfontein (1982:9) argued: “It should be noted that over the past 80 years there has been no insistence, 
claims, demands or campaigns by the Africans to be given ‘self-government’ or ‘independence’ on a Bantustan 
basis. No African political leader of any standing had asked ever asked for partition, or tribal ‘independence’, with 
the exception of a few tribal traditionalist chiefs and captains on the payroll of the government.” 
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The policy of apartheid, which came under the banner of “separate but equal” (apartness) (Smith 
 
1979), was created to bring generational racial imbalances between the racial groups in South 
Africa (Terreblanche 2002), and all this was done to guarantee White supremacy in South Africa 
(Johnstone 1970:124-140). The reason behind the racial segregation policy of the apartheid 
government was to rehabilitate the social and economic status of the poor White people (Fanon 
1986:64–65) at the expense of the majority of poor Black South Africans, who under the colonial 
and later apartheid rule always found themselves at the margins of society. It is for this reason 
that Boesak (De Gruchy & Villa-Vicencio 1983) argued as follows: 
Apartheid means that the most important thing about a person is not that he or she is a human being created 
in the image of God with inalienable rights, but his or her racial identity. It means that racial identity 
determines, with an overwhelming intensity, every-thing in a person’s life. (p. 5) 
 
 
 
Due to this, South Africa has become a house divided against itself (Smith 1979). This is because 
colonization and later apartheid has made the people of South Africa (especially Black people) 
slaves in their own country (Plaatje 2007). White people in South Africa have become slaves of a 
superiority complex and Black people in South Africa have become slaves of an inferiority 
complex (Kenworthy 2007). The enslavement of both White and Black people in South Africa 
was caused by an ideology and policy of governance called “apartheid” (Smith 1979). This 
policy of racial governance which was enforced by the Nationalist government in South Africa 
after their victory in the general elections of 1948 (De Klerk 1975) can be traced back from the 
colonial times under the Dutch and the British before it was legislated in 1948 (Moleah 1993). 
Hence Serfontein (1982) argued as follows: 
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Apartheid was the slogan which the National Party (NP) used with devastating effect in the general election 
of May 1948, when in an unexpected shock victory, they unseated the United Party government of General 
JC Smuts. (p. 7) 
 
 
 
2.7 The ontology of domination and socialization 
 
 
 
The habeas corpus, which is an ancient common-law prerogative writ, formed the foundation 
stone of legal institutions and legal systems of countries which were regarded as being civilised 
(Smith 1979). This law was simple and fundamental to American and all other systems of 
jurisprudence derived from English common law. The law of habeas corpus declares that “… 
anyone, no matter what rank, holding another person in custody has to produce that person 
before the court” (Smith 1979:5). This law declared the equality of people in spite of their race, 
culture, gender and religion. This is why a basic law developed out of this habeas corpus which 
declared that “… no man be punished without fair trial, that punishment must be proportionate to 
the offence and that justice may not be denied, delayed, or sold to any man” (Smith 1979:5). This 
law is specifically mentioned here because it declares equality between people. Because of this 
declaration, it posed a threat to the apartheid system which was going to be adopted. 
Consequently, it had to be scrapped in order to give way to the apartheid ideology which later 
became the apartheid system of governance which embodied the principle of governance 
according to skin colour. 
 
 
 
The system of governance called “apartheid” was developed and engraved in the hearts and 
minds of South Africans over many years through moral formation and character development. It 
is  through  internal  and  external  influences  in  terms  of  moral  formation  and  character 
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development that apartheid found its way into the hearts and minds of many South Africans. 
Mokgethi Motlhabi (2001) argues as follows in backing up the premise that apartheid found its 
way through internal and external influences which contribute to moral formation and character 
development: 
Human actions are not independent, spontaneous happenings. As human products – that is, products of 
conscious, reflective beings – they tell us more about the people who performs them than about the actions 
themselves. (p. 89) 
 
 
 
From the nature of actions, we are able to judge whether the actions of the performer are those of 
a good or bad person, whether the performer demonstrates good or bad character. To elucidate 
this hypothesis, Motlhabi refers to an event where a disgruntled terrorist plants a bomb in the 
building, and this bomb results in a deplorable death toll. Motlhabi (2001) argues in this regard: 
… we do not pass judgement on the bomb or the explosion itself but on the person who planted the bomb. 
We call him a bad or evil person, or even mindless killer … This is because we know that this person has 
an internal capacity to direct his or her own actions and, therefore, is responsible for what he or she does. 
(p. 89) 
 
 
 
This reflection contradicts the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) who argued that 
“… moral actions consists of dutiful adherence to formal rules and has nothing to do with pursuit 
of personal goals” (see Campbell & Christopher 1996:1). 
 
 
 
The reflection of moral actions as found in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant has been taken over 
by some contemporary moral developmentalists, for instance those who are called formalists 
(Kohlberg and Turiel) (Campbell & Christopher 1996:1). They argue that moral rules are 
universalisable categorical imperatives, recognizable by their formal features that pertain to 
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social  issues.  In  contrast,  the  altruists  (e.g.  Eisenberg;  ibid)  argue  that  moral  actions  are 
inherently self-sacrificial, and moral actions are motivated by the desire to benefit others (ibid). 
This understanding of moral actions neglects the personal. It is for this reason that Motlhabi 
argues that all people have an internal capacity for directing actions and a responsibility of what 
they do. Such capacity and responsibility are developed through time and are derived from one’s 
upbringing and environment, that is, from one’s experience in living in community (Mothlabi 
2001:89). 
 
 
 
 
The experience of living in a particular community shapes and influences the internal capacity 
and  responsibility  capacity  of  individuals  living  in  that  particular  community.  Due  to  this 
capacity and responsibility, one is able to develop into a person with a particular character, who 
acquires certain habits and who comes to the knowledge of certain norms and values of one’s 
community (Mothlabi 2001:89). This development, which is due to one’s experience of living in 
a particular community, is seen clearly in Biko’s (2004) expression when he says the following: 
I  have  lived  all  my  conscious  life  in  the  framework  of  institutionalized  separate  development.  My 
friendship, my love, my education, my thinking and every other facet of my life have been carved and 
shaped within the context of separate development. (p. 29) 
 
 
 
This character development and moral formation, which played an important role in 
institutionalizing the apartheid ideology in South Africa in the minds and hearts of many South 
Africans, created what Karl Marx refers to as the “bourgeois and proletarians” (Marx & Engels 
1848:1–5). The idea here is to point out that the institutionalization of colonization and clearly 
the institutionalization of the apartheid ideology created racialized classes – White bourgeois 
who own the means of production and the proletarians who slave on for the bourgeois. 
83  
The only way in which the Apartheid system could find its way successfully into South Africa 
was by creating a racially divided South Africa. 
 
 
 
White people in South Africa were trained or socialized to be a superior race, and Black people 
in South Africa were socialized by communities to be an inferior race. This process of training or 
socializing is significant in the process of moral formation. In defining moral formation, 
Kretzschmar (2004:144) says: “When we speak of moral formation, we mean the formation or 
development of moral character and conduct.” The apartheid ideology was thus socialised into 
communities and by communities. Hence Motlhabi (2001) says: 
Individuals, accordingly, are products of their communities. Just as we are physically born by our parents, 
we are also born psychologically, emotionally, spiritually and rationally by our communities. (p. 92) 
 
 
 
White  communities,  through  the  education  system,  demarcation  of  land  (this  refers  to  the 
creation of White South Africa and the establishment of Bantustans which were meant to be 
independent states for Black people), legal institutions, churches and other institutions, prepared 
White people to be an upper or bourgeoisie class. This process has led White people in South 
Africa to internalize a superiority complex. This socialization process of moral formation in 
White communities had one aim, namely protecting White supremacy at the expense of the 
majority of Black people in South Africa. Black communities, in contrast, were prepared through 
the education system, the demarcation of land, legal institutions, churches and other institutions 
to be inferior, and hence, they in turn internalizeinternalized an inferiority complex. It is for this 
reason that Biko (2004) once argued: 
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The logic behind white domination is to prepare the black man for the subservient role in this country. Not 
so long ago this used to be freely said in parliament even about the educational system of the black people. 
(p. 30)28 
 
 
 
The inferiority complex within the Black communities reinforced itself through the conditions in 
which  Black  people  found  themselves.  Hence  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  even  imagine 
themselves as having outgrown what the system of apartheid taught them. Consequently, Biko 
argued that, due to the conditions in which Black people find themselves, they lose hope that 
change will ever come in South Africa. He (Biko 2004) says: 
Black people under the Smuts government were oppressed but they were still men. They failed to change 
the system for many reasons … But the type of black man we have today had lost his manhood. Reduced to 
an obliging shell, he looks with awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the 
inevitable position. (p. 30) 
 
 
 
Due to the process through which an inferiority complex was socialised into the Black 
communities, Black people were dehumanized and exploited with the aim of maintaining White 
supremacy in South Africa. Mason (1990) thus argues: 
Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside 
ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low 
expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, everyday of our lives. (p. 28) 
 
 
 
Consequently Biko (2004) makes the following argument: 
 
Deep inside his [black person] anger mounts at the accumulating insult, but he vents it in the wrong 
direction – on his fellow man in the township, on the property of black people. (p. 30)29 
 
28Biko (2004:30) further states that “[i]t is still said even today, although in a much more sophisticated language. To 
a large extent the evil-doers have succeeded in producing at the output end of their machine a kind of black man 
who is man only in form. This is the extent to which the process of dehumanization has advanced.” 
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It is our communities that play a crucial role in socializing us into members of particular 
communities, people who behave in a particular manner. These communities also play an 
important  role  in  moral  formation.  White people  and  Black  people  were  socialized  to  be 
members of their communities in a particular manner. It is from these communities that they 
learned how to behave, and it is these communities which developed their character. It is for this 
reason that Motlhabi (2001:93) argues that “[h]uman communities and their institutions must be 
scrutinized for their moral significance because they have a bearing on the kind of people we 
become”. Motlhabi (ibid) further argues that “[w]e are what we are because of our communities 
and their institutions and we can only fully realise ourselves and moral capacities through these 
communities”. 
 
 
 
Conners and McCormick (in Motlhabi) identify mainly two ways in which communities help in 
shaping of our moral development. According to them, this is affected largely through the 
structures and through the stories of our communities. Community structures teach us how to 
see, feel and think about the world around us and in this way influence our moral imagination. 
The stories of our communities also contribute to the moral formation of our moral imagination 
and existence (Motlhabi 2001:93). Community structures such as schools and churches played an 
important part in the implementation of the apartheid system. It is these structures that created 
the  people  we  see  in  South  Africa.  South  Africa  is  a  racialized  country  because  of  these 
 
29Biko (2004:30–31) further states: “No longer does he trust leadership … In the privacy of his toilet his face twists 
in silent condemnation of white society but brightens up in sheepish obedience as he comes out hurrying in response 
to his master’s impatient call. In the home-bound bus or train he joins the chorus that roundly condemns the white 
man but is first to praise the government in the presence of the police or his employers. His heart yearns for the 
comfort of white society and makes him blame himself for not having been educated enough to warrant such luxury. 
Celebrated achievements by whites in the field of science – which he understands only hazily – serve to make him 
rather convinced of the futility of resistance and to throw away any hopes that change may ever come.” 
86  
structures. In the moral-formation process, these community structures are external factors which 
influence and carve the character of a particular person. External factors in moral formation 
include the influence of others such as parents, friends and teachers. 
 
 
 
It is imperative to note that values and virtues are transmitted or handed over by these significant 
people. Kretzschmar (2004:148) asserts that “[t]he process of forming moral persons is called 
moral socialisation”. Motlhabi (2001) quotes Berger, who writes the following on socialization: 
Socialization can, of course, be described psychologically as a learning process … Socialization, however 
 
… is not adequately grasped by speaking of a learning process. The individual not only learns the 
objectivated meanings [of society] but identifies with and is shaped by them. He draws them into himself 
and makes them his meanings. He becomes not only one who possesses these meanings, but one who 
represents and expresses them. (p. 90–91) 
 
 
 
Through socialization, new members of the community are taught the moral norms and values of 
a particular community. This process begins in childhood and is centerd on the life of a family. 
In this regard, the way children are brought up is crucial to the process of moral formation. 
Hence Kretzschmar (2004) argues as follows: 
The experiences of childhood, psychologists are agreed, have a profound effect on our personalities. The 
precise effects of childhood experiences are difficult to ascertain or to predict, but there can be little doubt 
that the way we grow up influences our mental, emotional and spiritual outlook on life. (p. 149–150)30 
 
 
 
It is in the process of development where a child learns what is right and good. It also in this 
process of socialization that children need to be disciplined properly so that they progressively 
30Kretzschmar (2004:46) further states: “Children who grow up in homes where they experience nurturing love and 
are encouraged to develop their own insights and abilities are likely to have much greater emotional stability and 
maturity than children who are unloved and neglected. Children who are forced to attend Church and Sunday school 
by parents, who show no spiritual life or commitment of their own, may stop attending church soon as they can.” 
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learn self-discipline and self-regulation. In the context of South Africa, however, where 
colonization and the apartheid system described all African wisdom and practices as evil, the 
socialization process was disturbed. More importantly due to the conditions in which Black 
people found themselves, their developmental experience were tormented, either by the forced 
removals, state of emergency incidents or other gross crimes against humanity of which Black 
people were victims (Biko 2004).31 
 
 
 
 
For Black people, socialisation was disturbed because the conditions in which they found 
themselves propelled them to internalize the inferiority complex which was reinforced by their 
poor conditions. This in turn resulted in Black people dreaming of becoming White and thus 
trying by all means to flee from being Black. It is in the influence of parents, friends and teachers 
that children in the Black communities developed the attitude of self-hatred. The internalization 
of the inferiority complex, which came about as a result of the process of socialization which 
initiated  Black  people  into  communities  with  immense  poverty,  exploitation  and 
dehumanization, resulted in at least four things: (1) learning, (2) identification, (3) representation 
and (4) manifestation. 
 
 
 
Through the process of moral formation (giving special attention to socialization), Black people 
in South Africa were trained in such a way that they started to identify themselves with the 
 
31It is for this reason that Biko (2004:31–32) argues as follows: “One writer makes the point that in an effort to 
destroy completely the structures that had built up in the African society and to impose their imperialism with an 
unnerving totality the colonialists were not satisfied merely with holding a people in their grip and emptying the 
Native’s brain of all form and content, they turned to the past of the oppressed people and distorted, disfigured and 
destroyed it. No longer was reference made to African culture, it became barbarism. Africa was the Dark Continent. 
Religious practices and customs were referred to as superstition. The history of African society was reduced to tribal 
battles and internecine wars. There was no conscious migration by the people from one place of abode to another. 
No, it was always one tyrant who wanted to defeat the tribe not for any positive reason, but merely to wipe them out 
of the face of this earth. No wonder the African child learns to hate his heritage days at school. So negative is the 
image presented to him that he tends to find solace only in close identification with the white society.” 
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conditions of their communities. In turn, they represented those conditions, and as a result, they 
regarded  those  conditions  as  a  normal  way  of  life.  They  were  faced  with  impoverished 
conditions. They were made aliens who once belonged in South Africa and were now foreigners 
belonging to the Bantustans. These conditions became a way of life for them, and they in turn 
represented and manifested those conditions. They became inferior, as suggested by their living 
conditions. It is for this reason that Motlhabi (2001) argues regarding moral formation: 
One who has received moral formation becomes transformed in such a way that the moral outlook, that is 
the moral approach to life, becomes a way of life for this person. It becomes part of one, part of one’s 
character, which means simply part of one’s normal way of behaviour. (p. 91) 
 
 
 
Due to the internalized inferiority complex within Black communities, new communities that 
were broken, confused, victimized, hopeless and self-hating emerged in Black society. As a 
result Biko (2004:31) uttered these words: “All in all black man has become a shell, a shadow of 
man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, slave, an ox bearing yoke of oppression 
with sheepish timidity.” It is as a result of this that Black people started to lose hope that things 
will ever change in their lives, and thus, they started to doubt their humanness and only saw 
themselves through the eyes of White people who had inflicted the inferiority complex upon 
them. A true human being, in their eyes and mind, was a White person, and hence, they sought to 
be White (Fanon 1986). This has in turn resulted in Black people having a fragmented 
consciousness or what W.E.B Du Bois calls “double-consciousness”. It is for this reason that Du 
Bois (2008) writes about this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. 
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The double consciousness has fragmented Black people in South Africa. It has caused them to 
see themselves through the eyes of White people because whiteness in South Africa became 
yardstick for true humanity, and thus, Black people in South Africa idolized White people. This 
came as result of the fact that Black people in South Africa internalizeinternalized the inferiority 
complex which was made worse by the conditions that reminded Black people in South Africa 
that they are inferior and thus had to depend on White people in South Africa for their 
survival. This in turn has led to Black people in South Africa being aliens to themselves and 
living in fear and by comparison. Fanon (1986) puts it in the following words: 
The negro is comparison. There is the first truth. He is comparison: that is, he is constantly preoccupied 
with self-evaluation and with ego-ideal. Whenever he comes into with contact with someone else, the 
question of value, of merit, arises. (p. 163) 
 
 
 
The reason for this comparison within the Black person(s) is the result of self-doubt or self- 
worth, which arouses as a result of the inferiority complex that development over a number of 
years. Black people in South Africa doubt their worth as a result of the dehumanization process 
which was inflicted upon them in the process of safeguarding White dominance in South Africa. 
Hence Fanon (1986) further argues as follows: 
The question is always whether he [black/negro] is less intelligent than I, blacker than I, less respectable 
that I. Every position of one’s own, every effort at security is based on relations of dependence, with the 
diminution of the other. It is the wreckage of what surrounds me that provides the foundation for my 
virility. (p. 163–164) 
 
 
 
Due to this fragmentation of consciousness, any hope for change or resistance against oppression 
by Black people in South Africa became  futile because the double consciousness led to a 
struggle with a double aim. On the one hand, Black people in South Africa wanted to be Black, 
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and on the other hand, they were dependent on White people in South Africa for their survival or 
for the affirmation of their humanity in relationship to White South Africans. This was the 
struggle within Black people in South Africa. Du Bois (2008) argues as follows regarding this 
double-aimed struggle within Black people or Negroes: 
The double-aimed struggle of the black artisan – on the one hand to escape white contempt for a nation of 
mere hewers if wood and drawers of water, and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty- 
stricken horde – could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either 
cause. (p. 13) 
 
 
 
Another way in which communities help with the shaping of our moral development is through 
stories.  These  stories  contribute  to  the  formation  of  our  moral  imagination  and  existence. 
Motlhabi (2001:93) argues that these stories “… shape our moral consciousness and offer lessons 
about virtues and right actions”. The stories are community stories which are based on the 
experience of the  members  of a  particular  community  (Black  community in  this  instance). 
Stories in the Black communities are deeply embedded in songs which tell the story of an event 
that happened in the community. In the Black communities, even names are given after events. 
Hence, there were songs like the following: 
Sobashiy’abazal’ekhaya                                 Our parents we will leave behind 
 
Siphuma sangena kwamany’amazwe We will tread in foreign lands 
 
Lapho kungazi khon’ubaba nomama Where our fathers and mothers never stepped 
 
Silwel’inkululeko Chasing the freedom dream 
Sithi salani We bid you well 
Salan’ekhaya We bid you well 
Salan’ekhaya At home stay well. 
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Thina sizwe We the nation 
 
Thina sizwe esimnyama The Black nation 
 
Sikhalela We weep Sikhalela 
izwe lethu For our land 
Elarojwa Which was robbed 
Elarojwa ngamabhulu Robbed by the Boers 
 
Mabawuyeke They should leave 
 
Mabawuyek’umhlaba wethu They should leave our land alone 
 
 
 
 
These songs formed part of the stories of Black communities. They brought hope and thus played 
an important role in the moral formation of Black people in Black communities. Some of these 
stories of Black communities were transmitted through radio, which played an important part 
during the dark days of the struggle (Riddle n.d:n.p). These community stories shaped and 
socialized Black people into the kind of community which was portrayed on the radio. 
Community stories under the apartheid regime, especially in the Black communities, were 
overwhelmed by police brutality towards the Black community. 
 
The plan of using force or police brutality towards the Black community was to instill fear in the 
Black  community,  which  would  continue  the  institutionalisation  of  the  inferiority  complex 
within Black people, resulting in them trying to “flee from being black”. It is for this reason that 
Biko argues that, “[t]he philosophy behind police action in this country seems to be “harass 
them”! And one needs to add that they interpret the word in a very extravagant sense”.32These 
 
 
 
32Biko (2004:83) point to the fact that “... even young traffic policemen, people generally known for their grace, 
occasionally find it proper to slap adult black people. It sometimes looks obvious here that the great plan is to keep 
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stories which played an important part in the moral formation and character development of 
Black people were clouded with experiences which dehumanised and inflicted an inferiority 
complex upon them. These experiences, influenced by the conditions under which Black people 
lived, were worsened by utterances on Black conditions (conditions in which Black people in 
South Africa found themselves) made by White politicians and ministers. As such, we can note 
PW Botha’s 1985 speech, known as the Rubicon speech.33 
 
 
 
 
These are the kind of utterances which had a great influence upon Black people and which 
resulted in them internalising the inferiority complex, hating their Blackness and yearning to be 
White because Whiteness in this case meant to be a recognised and full human being. Malcolm 
X (Dyson 1995) argued as follows in this regard: 
When you teach a man to hate his lips, the lips that God gave him, the shape of his nose that God gave him, 
the texture of the hair that God gave him, the color of the skin that God gave him, you’ve committed the 
worst crime that a race of people can commit. And this is the crime you’ve committed … This is how you 
imprisoned us. (p. 129) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
black people thoroughly intimidated and to perpetuate the ‘super race’ image of the white man, if not intellectually, 
at least in terms oferee [sic]. White people, working through their vanguard – the South African Police – have come 
to realise the truth of that golden maxim – if you cannot make a man respect you, then make him fear you.” 
33“We do not pretend like other whites that we like blacks. The fact that Blacks look like human beings and act like 
human beings do not necessarily make them sensible human beings. Hedgehogs are not porcupines and lizards are 
not crocodiles simply because they look alike. If God wanted us to be equal to the blacks, He would have created us 
all of a uniform color and intellect. But he created us differently: Whites, Blacks, Yellow, Rulers and the ruled. 
Intellectually, we are superior to the blacks; that has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt over the years … 
[Botha went on to say] By now every one of us has seen it practically that the Black people cannot rule themselves. 
Give them guns and they will kill each other. They are good in nothing else but making noise, dancing, marrying 
many wives and indulging in sex. Let us all accept that the Black man is the symbol of poverty, mental inferiority, 
laziness and emotional incompetence” (Sunday Times 18 August 1985) 
93  
The internal oppression did not only allow Black people to imbibe a second-class citizenship 
given to them by White structures, but it created essential distrust within and amongst Black 
people themselves. It was the likes of Willie Lynch who capitalized on this.34 
 
 
 
The results of this divide-and-rule policy described by Willie Lynch and later used by the 
apartheid system resulted in what Frantz Fanon(1986:42–43) asserted as follows:“… the negro is 
enslaved by his inferiority … and thus negroes have self-hate; they are constantly trying to run 
away  from  their  own  individuality  and  to  annihilate  their  presence.”  Fanon  (see  Forsythe 
1973:161) went on to say that “… the black man is insulted and feels insignificant.” And 
Forsythe (1973:161) asserts that “… the natives are dehumanized, and thus they are anxious, 
insecure, devalued, abandoned, hypersensitive, and feel worthless. This neurotic behaviour in 
turn fosters intra-group rivalries among the blacks – “false consciousness”. 
 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I argued that the “scramble for Africa”, that is, the invasion, occupation, 
colonization and annexation of African territories by European powers needs to be understood 
 
34Lynch asserted as follows with regard to the making of slaves: “Take this simple little list of differences and think 
about them. On top of my list is ‘age’ but it’s there only because it starts with an ‘A’. The second is ‘COLOR’ or 
shade, there is intelligence, size of plantations and status on plantations, attitude of owners, whether the slaves live 
in a valley, on a hill, East, West, North, South, have fine hair, course hair, or is tall or short. Now that you have a list 
of differences, I shall give you an outline of action, but before that, I shall assure you that distrust is stronger than 
trust and envy stronger than adulation, respect or admiration. The black slaves after receiving this indoctrination 
shall carry on and will become self refuelling and self-generating for hundreds of years, maybe thousands. Don’t 
forget you must pitch the old black male vs. the young black male, and the young black male the old black male. 
You must use the dark skin slaves vs. the light skin slaves, and the light skin slaves vs. the dark skin slaves. You 
must use the female vs. the male. And the male vs. the female. You must also have you white servants and overseers 
distrust all blacks. It is necessarily that your slaves trust and depends on us. They must love, respect and trust only 
us. Gentlemen, these kits are your keys to control. Use them. Have your wives and children use them, never miss an 
opportunity. If used intensely for one year, the slaves themselves will remain perpetually distrustful of each other”. 
This speech was delivered by Willie Lynch on the bank of the James River in the colony of Virginia in 1712. Lynch 
was a British slave owner in the West Indies. 
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against the backdrop of the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign” and the ontology 
of domination. As it has been shown through the engagement of the Dusselian geopolitics of 
space, the world has been divided into two parts, namely center, which is occupied by the 
Europeans and Beings (with a capital B), and a periphery, which is occupied by Non-Europeans 
and Non-beings. Through the influence of the ontology of domination, the center has imposed 
itself on the periphery for a long time. As a result of the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the 
sovereign”, the center felt justified to impose itself on the periphery. The center, which is 
occupied by Europeans and Beings, has assumed the position of being the space for rational 
beings and beings whose soul has been ordained by God. As a result of the center assuming the 
position of a space of rational Beings, the Beings in this space (Europeans) felt justified to 
impose themselves as guardians on the non-beings of the periphery. As a result of the ontology 
of domination and the rise of civil religion in South Africa, White people in South Africa 
(particularly Afrikaners, who are descendants of Europeans) developed the notion of a chosen 
nation and of South Africa as a promised land. Afrikaners who felt themselves belonging to the 
center further felt justified in devising the apartheid policy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE NEO-LIBERAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
IN SOUTH     AFRICA:     COMPROMISES     AND     A 
POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
 
“Socialism has collapsed. The long historic struggle between capitalism and 
socialism has come to an end, and capitalism has emerged the victor.” (Fiss 
1992:908) 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
The notion of a negotiated settlement (that is, a transition to democracy) which is investigated in 
this chapter has given birth to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a 
constitutional democracy (Rosenfeld 2001:1370). I contend that the NP and the corporate sector 
in South Africa (at that time) opted for the negotiations not because of personal convictions but 
because of circumstances (Cronin 1994:5). As such, in this chapter, I shall argue that the move 
by the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa for negotiations was a calculated move on 
their part (ibid). 
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It must be noted that the assertion made above is informed by my hypothesis that FW de Klerk 
and his NP entered these negotiations with the aim of safeguarding the interests (that is, the 
assets they have accumulated) of the White people in South Africa. These interests were later 
invented under the pretext of the so-called minority rights. FW de Klerk himself promised the 
White community that he would not sign the constitution before the minority rights were assured 
in the constitutional democracy (Mkhondo 1993:3-13; Terreblanche 2002:102). 
 
 
 
It is in the nature of negotiations to have compromises, and it is also within the nature of the 
negotiations to come to a decision through a mutual concession. It is furthermore in the nature of 
the negotiations that those who prepared adequately for the negotiations always get the upper 
hand. Thus, the notion of a negotiated settlement needs to be invoked carefully because the 
negotiated transition established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for a decorative 
exhibition (that is, to give the world the impression that South Africa and South Africans are 
moving forward). It is the contention of this chapter that the TRC was established to avoid a type 
of commission like the Nuremberg International Tribunal, which used a judicial approach as its 
solution (Mamdani 2013:33–34). 
 
 
 
It seems that a political solution was only recommended for the victims of gross crimes against 
humanity  on  the  continent  of  African  and  for  descendants  of  the  African  continent  in  the 
diaspora or Third-World countries. This is based on Mamdani’s (2013) assertion: 
I want to suggest an alternative way of thinking of mass violence, as political rather than criminal. Rather 
than arguing that no one be held responsible to arrive at a new political imagination, a new state form, a 
more inclusive political participation. (p.1) 
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A political solution fits in well with the idea of “democratization”. This is because the notion of 
“democratization” is a strategic system for the beneficiaries of the authoritarian regimes (that is, 
the NP in South Africa) (Cronin 1994), which results in the freedom for perpetrators (that is, 
slave owners, in Lenin’s words) and nothing for the victims of gross crimes against humanity 
(that is, slaves, in Lenin’s words) (Lenin 1917:41). It must be added that a political solution in 
this regard becomes a final seal that guarantees freedom for perpetrators and nothing for victims. 
Freedom for the perpetrators is freedom to participate in the economy with the assets and 
property that was accumulated under the authoritarian regimes. Because of the freedom for 
perpetrators to participate in the economy with the assets that they had accumulated under the 
authoritarian regime, this freedom becomes a barrier for victims and thus continue to exclude 
them from participating in the economy of South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:25-47). 
 
 
 
The notion of “negotiations” was the last resort that the NP used deviously to make sure its 
people (that is, the White community) continued to hold on to strategic sectors of the country 
(e.g. the corporate/economic sector). This was done while the NP was giving political power to 
the incoming Black government. In a capitalist system under democracy, political power and 
economic power become two separate entities. The NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
thus took advantage of the (ideological) un-preparedness of the ANC. One cannot but note that 
idea of democratization and of a transition to democracy was promoted at the same time as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991), which it the time when the ANC was in ideological 
disarray. The disarray follows from the fact that the ANC based their policies on the notion of 
“socialism” and, during this time (1989–1991), socialism collapsed and “… the long, historic 
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struggle between capitalism and socialism had come to an end, and capitalism had emerged the 
victor” (Fiss 1992:908). 
 
 
 
The following series of events which happened around the period 1989 to 1991 (that is, the same 
time as the collapse of the Soviet Union) were not accidental: the release of political prisoners 
(specifically, the release of Nelson Mandela and the core leadership of the ANC), the debate over 
sanctions, the debate over negotiations and specifically the debate over the idea of shared power 
(Mkhondo 1993; Terreblanche 2002). This is the transition to democracy, especially under the 
capitalist system, was the only viable option for the NP and the corporate sector of South Africa 
to continue to have a grip to the economy of South Africa. The association between democracy 
and capitalism results in conflicting logics, which boil down to privileges being maintained. 
Terreblanche (2002) points out the following: 
… democracy is based on the equality of rights and privileges maintained and supplied by state power, 
while capitalism is based on the unequal distribution of property and assets and on the state guaranteed 
freedom of everyone to use his/her assets and property as he/she pleases within the prescription of the law. 
(p. 17) 
 
 
 
It is no accident that the ANC and the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa became the 
major role players in the negotiations (that is, the informal negotiations and the formal CODESA 
negotiations). This is because the NP was in government and the ANC had ignited international 
media attention, that is, they had managed to ignite support for their sanction campaigns against 
the apartheid government. The ANC was the only major player convincible to the notion of 
democratization or of transition to democracy as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(1989–1991). This is because of its strong links with the Soviet Union. Parties like the Pan 
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Africanist   Congress   of   Azania   (PAC)   could   not   be   convinced   about   the   notion   of 
democratization or transition to democracy because of its links with China which was still 
waving the socialist banner during the period of 1989 to 1991 (Fiss 1992:908). As such, the ANC 
assumed the status of being the mouthpiece of the Black masses, and the NP assumed the status 
of being the mouthpiece of the White masses. As a result, any decision and/or compromises 
reached at the negotiations became a pseudo-concession of the people of South Africa (Mkhondo 
2002:7-8). 
 
Thus, the move to negotiations was a calculated move on the side of the NP and the corporate 
sector in South Africa. Prior the negotiations, the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
had already started making the environment conducive for capitalism, which is based on free- 
market system. The NP and the corporate sector in South Africa did this by starting to privatize 
state-owned companies or institutions (e.g. ISCOR) through selling them to private business 
companies and/or private business people. Private companies had started shifting money from 
South Africa to other countries (Mkhondo 1993:29-32; Terreblanche 2002:51-89). 
 
 
 
While the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa was busy making the ground fertile for 
capitalism based on a free-market system, the economy of South Africa was going through 
difficult times. This is mentioned here to point out that the notion of democracy or a transition to 
democracy in South Africa was the last resort for the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
to come up with a new accumulation strategy for their constituency. They opted for negotiations 
not because of their convictions but because of circumstances (Cronin 1994). As such, it must be 
noted that the negotiations resulted in the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa obtaining 
their first prize, namely the economic power of South Africa, and the ANC getting their first 
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prize, namely the political power of South Africa, with a bankrupted economy which needed 
loans to recover (Terreblanche 2002:96-108). 
 
 
 
It is thus important to note that the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa entered the 
negotiations from a position of strength. The NP had the political power whilst the corporate 
sector in South Africa had the economic power. Thus, the NP and the corporate sector of South 
Africa had bargaining power, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they strategically showed 
courage and willingness to reconstruct South Africa. One also has to mention that, in contrast to 
the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa entering the negotiations from a position of 
strength, the ANC entered the negotiations from a position of weakness. This is because the 
ANC, on the one hand, found itself in ideological and political disarray as a result of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, they found themselves having to accept the NP’s 
challenge for reconstructing South Africa (Mkhondo 1993:34-43; Terreblanche 2002:51-89). 
 
 
 
The ANC found itself in a position where it had to amend policies in order for them to fit their 
policies within the parameters of democracy. This is because their policies were mainly 
influenced by and based on socialism. Their strategy was to overthrow the authoritarian regime 
in South Africa through military power. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) 
left the ANC in disarray. This is because the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the authoritarian 
regime in South Africa the bargaining power to promote the idea of democratization or transition 
to  democracy  as  a  last  available  option.  The  bargaining  power  became  possible  because 
capitalism had won the long historic struggle between socialism and capitalism. As such, notions 
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of nationalization were not going to be viable in a democratic state. Thus the ANC had to amend 
their policy positions (Cronin 1994:1-6; Mkhondo 1993:3-33; Terreblanche 2002:51-89). 
 
 
 
Thus, the ANC was outsmarted during the informal and formal negotiations. This is because the 
NP and the corporate sector of South Africa created different platforms (that is, informal and 
formal – CODESA – negotiations) for negotiating for political issues or power and economic 
issues or power. It means that the corporate sector in South Africa managed to shift the 
ideological position of the ANC and convinced it that a transition to democracy under the 
capitalist system was the only way out. This challenged the core position of the ANC. As such, 
the shift in the ideological position of the ANC was a victory for the corporate sector in South 
Africa. During the period of a transition to democracy (1989–1991), the accumulation strategy of 
the corporate sector in South Africa was failing mainly because of the sanctions campaign of the 
ANC. As such, the shift in the ideological position of the ANC would mean that the South 
African economic system would be based on a free market and little state intervention. This 
constituted a victory for the corporate sector. 
 
 
 
After the corporate sector had “boxed in” the ANC in the informal negotiations, it puts pressure 
on the formal negotiations to reach an agreement. It thus seems that the corporate sector in South 
Africa outsmarted the ANC on economic matters, which resulted in the ANC adopting economic 
policies which continue to benefit the past beneficiaries. Furthermore, the economic policies 
which were agreed upon in the informal negotiations were politically sealed in the formal 
negotiations. As such, it is the contention of this chapter that the ANC was outsmarted in both 
the informal and the formal negotiations because the delays in the formal negotiations were not 
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accidental. It is my argument that the corporate sector in South Africa were controlling the 
negotiations. I argue that it is suspicious that an agreement was finally reached only after an 
agreement was reached in the informal negotiations when the corporate sector in South Africa 
obtained its first prize (economic power) while the ANC obtained its first prize (political power 
which does not translate to economic power). 
 
 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa then ratified the agreement reached at 
both the informal and formal negotiations. I make this claim because of the failure of the TRC to 
execute its mandate, namely (TRC 1998): 
… promoting national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts 
and divisions of the past by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent 
of the gross violations of human rights. (p. 130) 
 
 
 
Gross violations include violations which were part of a systemic pattern of abuse (Terreblanche 
 
2002:127). As such, the TRC failed to execute its mandate, especially that of identifying all 
persons, authorities, institutions and organisations which were involved in the gross violations of 
human rights (ibid). 
 
 
 
It is no accident that, following the promotion of the notion of democratization and/or transition 
to democracy and the ideological shifts within the ANC, NP and corporate sector in South Africa 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, was passed. This act 
gave birth to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. This is mentioned here 
to point out that none of these events were accidents. It is the contention of this chapter that these 
occurrences – specifically the passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
103  
Act, No. 34 of 1994 – strategically occurred as a final seal to the elite compromise reached at the 
informal and formal negotiations in order to close the chapter on apartheid and open a new 
chapter on a democratic South Africa. 
 
 
 
This chapter will make the argument, namely that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa was a final seal on the elite compromise and that the TRC ratified the agreements 
of the informal and formal negotiations, by looking at the following sub-sections: 
(1) Neo-liberal transition: democratization as the only way out? This sub-section will look at 
how the notion of democratization and/or transition to democracy was promoted for Third-World 
countries, specifically South Africa. This sub-section will point out how the notion of 
democratization and/or transition to democracy was strategically promoted when capitalism was 
becoming global in character (Cronin 1994). Democracy under capitalism results in the 
maintenance of privileges because democracy under capitalism promotes conflicting logics. On 
the one hand, democracy emphasises joint interests, equality and common loyalties whilst, on the 
other hand, capitalism is based on self-seeking inequality and conflicting individual and group 
interests. Democracy in this regard becomes freedom for the beneficiaries of the apartheid 
system (Democracy 2002). 
(2) Neo-liberal transition: shifts in the thinking of the ANC and NP (and the corporate sector in 
South Africa)? This sub-section will look at how the promotion of the notion of democratization 
and/or the transition to democracy at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989– 
1991) had an impact on the ideological position of the ANC (Cronin 1994:1-8; Terreblanche 
 
2002:95-124). It will become clear that the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) had a 
massive impact upon the bargaining power and ideological position of the ANC (Terreblanche 
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2002:95-124).  The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  (1989–1991)  left  the  ANC  in  ideological 
disarray because the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that capitalism had won the long historic 
struggle against socialism. As such, the ANC was forced to amend its fundamental policy 
positions (ibid). 
(3) Neo-liberal transition: TRC as a final seal? This sub-section will look at how the promotion 
of the notion of democratization and/or the transition to democracy and the ideological shifts 
within the thinking of the NP, the corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC led to the 
sudden passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, 
which gave birth to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (Terreblanche 
2002:126). It is the contention of this chapter that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa became a seal to the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal 
negotiations. This is seen in how the TRC dealt, for instance, with the corporate sector in South 
Africa. 
 
 
 
3.2 Neo-liberal transition: Democratization as the only way out? 
 
 
 
The South African transition, which is of a special kind, can be seen as a neo-liberal transition to 
democracy.35 It tries to unify the previously divided parties (that is, the oppressor and the 
oppressed) or to balance forces into a shared political power under a multi-party democracy. This 
approach  to  a  transition  from  an  authoritarian  regime  to  a  multi-party  democracy  reduces, 
 
35We need to note that there are different types of transitions from a regime within a country like the following: (1) 
A transition after regime breakdown: Here the authoritarian elite, having been thoroughly discredited and 
delegitimized, has virtually no control over the process of transition. (2) Transition through extrication: Here the 
regime manages to avoid a breakdown or collapse but for several reasons, including a lack of popular support, is 
compelled to retreat from its position of power. (3) Transition through transaction: Here the balance of power is in 
favour of the regime which is reflected in the transactions it concludes with its democratic challengers. Over time, 
the regime’s control declines noticeably, but the authoritarian elite retain a greater capacity to shape the parameters 
of the political process than other types of transition (Rantete & Giliomee 1992:515). 
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according to Cronin (1994:3), the South African transition to “… part of a global phenomenon, 
the third wave of democratization – that is, the negotiated shift from authoritarian regimes to 
some kind of a multi-party democracy”. 
 
The neo-liberal approach to a transition to democracy operates under a pseudo-assumption that 
political  power  comes  first  and  that  the  rest  shall  follow  automatically  (Cronin  1994; 
Terreblanche 2002).The reason for this assumption is that the imperialist forces were working 
hand in hand with the authoritarian regimes to do everything in their power to deceive Third- 
World countries, that is, the countries that developed after the division of humanity into haves 
and have-nots. Consequently, this process suggests that, through democratization, those who 
were previously excluded will be included, and everything will fall into place. However, the 
notion of democratization is mainly suggested for Third-World countries because the imperialist 
forces36  fear that authoritarian regimes will be overthrown, and as a result, these imperialist 
 
forces will lose their grip on the economy of the Third-World countries. As a result, 
democratization becomes the only way in which they can maintain their grip to the economy of 
the Third-World countries. 
 
 
 
The notion of democracy (that is, the idea of power to the people) started as a system that 
replaced the aristocratic system (that is, the system which channelled power and resources to the 
few elites who are members of the aristocracy). The idea here is to point to the hypothesis that 
the notion of democracy started in a society (ancient Greek society). In the mentioned context, 
36References to imperial forces in this chapter refer to former colonialists or colonial countries which had expanded 
their territories to other countries which later became their colony. These countries include the United Kingdom, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. So the notion of former colonialists or colonial 
countries using a different strategy to maintain a grip on their colonies is named colonialism. These former 
colonialists or colonial countries make use of financial bodies (the IMF, the World bank etc.) and control over 
knowledge production, control over power and control over being. 
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one finds slaves and freemen (Sinclair 1962). Democracy meant, in this context, participation 
and freedom for slave owners only (Lenin 1917). The idea of democratization was thus 
recommended as an option for Third-World countries because the democratization process was 
going to fit in well with the continued domination of imperialists over Third-World countries 
because it was going to be exerted through capitalism. It is for this reason that Cronin (1994) 
notes that the idea of democratization was recommended at the same time that capitalism was 
becoming global in character. 
 
 
 
With (democratic) capitalism, Third-World countries would get political power whilst the 
imperialist forces would still maintain their grip on the economy of these countries. It is 
concerning this matter that Lenin (1917) argued as follows: 
In a capitalist society, under the conditions most favourable to its development, we have more or less 
complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always bound by the narrow 
framework of capitalist exploitation and consequently always remains, in reality, a democracy for the 
minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich. (p. 41) 
 
 
 
Capitalism under a democratic state would mean that those who have assets and properties would 
have state-guaranteed freedom to participate in the economy of a particular capitalistic country. 
Under a capitalistic democracy, questions concerning the history of accumulation are never 
asked. As such, democracy becomes a convenient lever for the privileged. 
 
 
 
Imperial forces thus deploy the notion of democratic capitalism, and under this system, Third- 
World countries take political power whilst the imperial forces retain their grip on the economy 
of these countries (Cronin 1994; Terreblanche 2002). This system is contradictory in that, on the 
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one hand, it emphasizes joints interests, equality and common loyalties whilst, on the other hand, 
it is based on self-seeking inequality and bringing individual and group interests into conflict 
(Terreblanche 2002:96). The bottom line here is that this system does not translate into socio- 
economic transformation. As such, it means nothing to those who are on the margins of society 
as a result of their exclusion by authoritarian regimes. It is for this reason that Lenin (1917:41) 
further argues in relation to this kind of democracy that “[f]reedom in capitalist society remains 
just about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners”. 
 
 
 
Cronin (1994) points to the following as the strengths of neo-liberal thinking on democracy. 
Firstly, this approach introduces useful comparative material, that is, it gives different parties a 
chance to learn from a study of transitions in other countries (for example, Brazil, the Philippines 
or El Salvador). Secondly, this approach helps to explain why, on some issues at least, there is a 
very broad national and international consensus on a negotiated transition to democracy. Thirdly, 
this approach draws attention to the need for practical, tactical and medium engagement with the 
transition process. 
 
 
 
Let us now briefly engage critically with some of the strengths of this approach as outlined by 
Cronin. Given the outlined strengths of this approach, it presents itself as the best possible 
solution. This approach is also presented as the best approach for Third-World countries, being a 
prescriptive approach. This is because the approach seems to presents itself to Third-World 
countries with two options: One is peace through negotiations, and the other is power struggle 
through violence. The former is presented as practical and tactical and the latter as impractical 
and irrational. This is because the latter option is presented as being unsuccessful in countries 
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which have close links to the liberation movements in Third-World countries. It is for this reason 
that De Klerk once said in South Africa (Mkhondo 1993:9): “The choices are between peace 
through negotiations or a power struggle through violence.” 
 
 
 
As such, it could be asked why the South-African transition to democracy is internationally 
praised, and why the NP coincidentally decided to unban the liberation movements, release the 
figure of Nelson Mandela and opted for negotiations (Mkhondo 1993) at the same time as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Cronin 1994). Fiss (1992:908) captures this well when he argues 
that “[s]ocialism has collapsed. The long, historic struggle between capitalism and socialism has 
come to an end, and capitalism has emerged the victor.” It is the contention of this chapter that 
the NP opted for the negotiations coincidentally at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet 
Union because it was a strategic period to convince the liberation movements, specifically the 
ANC, that democratization was the only approach viable because a different approach led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Cronin 1994). 
 
 
 
It is, however, important to be sceptical about this approach. It is the contention of this chapter 
that this approach or model (that is, the neo-liberal approach to transition) is not innocent. This 
because this approach is mainly recommended for Third-World countries. Thus Cronin (1994:3- 
4)  argues  that,  “[i]n  many  ways  the  transition  to  democracy  literature  reflects  changing 
imperialist strategies towards third world countries”. As such, Cronin further notes that the 
notion of transition to democracy was a strategic shift by imperialists in their approach to Third- 
World  countries.  These  shifts,  according  Cronin,  have  gone  through  major  steps  after  the 
strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam at the beginning of the 1970s. 
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According to Cronin, the shift entailed a shift to a “Vietnamese” Third-World struggle, that is, 
the United States gave massive political and military support for the regional authoritarian 
regimes (e.g. PW Botha in Southern Africa). Cronin further notes that, due to the hypothesis that 
these regional authoritarian regimes were becoming unstable, the United States had to make 
some changes to their approach towards Third-World countries. The instability of these regional 
authoritarian regimes was viewed as being targeted and as often becoming the direct causes of 
growing mass and guerrilla movements (Cronin 1994). 
 
 
 
In the interpretation of Cronin, we could construe the view that the imperialist powers, after 
realising that their allies (that is, the regional authoritarian regimes) were unstable and were at 
the  verge  of  being  overthrown,  strategically  deployed  what  they  termed  “a  low-intensity 
warfare”.  This  was  a  double-strategy  approach,  which  meant  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
imperialist forces did not abandon the local military proxy forces and, on the other hand, they 
started encouraging a transition to democracy in Third-World countries. 
 
 
 
The imperialist forces were realigning themselves because they realised that the “winds of 
change” were blowing through Third-World countries. Because of this change, they had to shift 
their strategy in order to balance forces. Cronin (1994:4) thus argued that “[t]hey [imperialist 
forces]  progressively  withdrew  full  support  from their  own  dictators,  or  pressured  them to 
reform, while building [a] pro-imperialist centrist political alliances”. It must be mentioned that 
the imperialist forces were building a pro-imperialist centrist political alliances because their 
plan was to blunt the edge of the national liberation movements and mass struggles. 
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Thus, the imperialist forces strategically deployed a “low-intensity warfare” which was now 
closely connected to the world capitalist system. This is because the imperialist forces started to 
exert domination over Third-World countries through financial mechanisms imposed by bodies 
like the IMF, World Bank, et cetera. The transition to democracy as enforced by the imperialist 
forces was to make sure that they continued to maintain a grip on Third-World countries. For 
instance, Terreblanche (2002) argues as follows: 
… in 1993 the corporate sector [in South Africa] and the ANC leaders reached a hugely important elite 
compromise. This happened before the transitional executive council (TEC) accepted a secret $850 million 
loan from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to help tide the country over the balance payments 
difficulties in November 1993. (p. 96) 
 
 
 
The IMF loaning money to the transitional executive council (TEC) is mentioned here to show 
the extent of the strategy that the imperialist forces were using to exert domination over Third- 
World countries, using financial mechanisms. For instance, after the ANC agreed with the IMF 
in the statement on economic policies, it committed itself to a neo-liberal, exported-oriented 
economic policy and a redistribution-through-growth strategy. 
 
 
 
Thus, Terreblanche (2002:98) argued: “As soon as the ANC’s leaders agreed to the statement, 
they were trapped in the formidable establishment, represented by the IMF and World Bank.” It 
must be noted that these actions were taken under the pre-text of democratizing Third-World 
countries. Cronin (1994) notes the following: 
Democratization in the third world [countries] has often been motivated by the belief in imperialist circles 
that [the] elected centrist [or even left] governments would have more legitimacy in imposing the bitter pill 
of structural adjustment programmes on their own third world populations. (p. 5) 
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On has to remember that the notion of democratization was presented to Third-World countries 
as the only way out of authoritarian rule. According to Cronin, this was a strategic move on the 
side of the imperialist forces. These imperial forces used the collapse of the Soviet Union as an 
example to show that democratization is the only way out. This strategy was used because most 
of the liberation movements in Third-World countries, more specifically those in South Africa, 
had connections with the Soviet Union (Cronin 1994). 
 
 
 
The idea was to show the Third-World countries that the Soviet Union deployed an approach or 
model other than democratization, and it collapsed. As such, democratization became the only 
way out. It is thus not surprising that the NP opted for the negotiations and the idea of z 
transition to democracy at the same time that the Soviet Union collapsed. The timing of FW de 
Klerk’s move to unban the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan 
Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and to engage in negotiations was no accident (Cronin 
1994:5; Mkhondo 1993:14-23; Terreblanche 2002:95-124). 
 
 
 
 
As said above, this chapter contends that the NP’s option for negotiations and the idea of a 
transition to democracy was not accidental. I make this claim that the idea of negotiations and 
democratization was calculated because the NP feared the socialist programmes of the ANC as 
outlined in their Freedom Charter. As such, democratization and negotiations were the only way 
out for the NP. 
 
 
 
This point is captured well by Terreblanche (2002) when he argues as follows: 
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Because of the ANC’s alliance with the SACP, and its close relations with the Soviet Union, they were 
interpreted  as  prescribing  a  programme  of  nationalization  and  even  the  introduction  of  full-blown 
socialism. (p. 84) 
 
 
 
Cronin (1994), in arguing that the idea of negotiations and the idea of a transition to democracy 
was no accident, says the following: 
... in the historic speech in February 1990 in which these measures were announced, De Klerk specifically 
referred to the collapse in eastern Europe as a reason allowing for democratization in South Africa. He was 
admitting that he was not a democrat by conviction, but by circumstances. (p. 5) 
 
 
 
3.3 Neo-liberal transition: Shifts in the thinking of the ANC and 
NP 
The NP was forced due to internal and external forces to commit itself as a matter of urgency to 
admit Black people to the country’s White-dominated parliament in a bid to help the transfer of 
power to a post-apartheid authority (Mkhondo 1993:8). However, this shift by the NP, and the 
corporate sector in South Africa, was calculated. It is the contention of this chapter that the 
release of political prisoners, specifically the release of Nelson Mandela, and the proposed 
debate over the negotiations were not accidental but strategic and calculated by the NP (Cronin 
1994). This is because these developments (that is, the release, especially of Nelson Mandela, 
debate over sanctions and the debate over the negotiations) were done deliberately to confront 
the ANC with a host of thorny questions about how to adapt their strategies to the new political 
terrain. Given the years of banning, detentions, restrictions, jailing and mass protests, the ANC 
found themselves having to accept de Klerk’s challenge of reconstructing South Africa (Cronin 
1994). 
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The ANC entered the negotiations as a result of accepting the challenge by the NP of 
reconstructing South Africa. Both the NP and the ANC entered the negotiations not out of 
conviction but as a result of circumstances. As such, both the NP and the ANC had to change 
their strategy. Mkhonto surmises that the NP strategically wanted a non-racial country with a 
free-market economy, an entrenched Bill of Rights, a guarantee of regular, multi-party elections 
for a government with a limited lifespan and an independent judiciary (Mkhondo 1993:4). The 
ANC initially wanted a share in the country’s wealth. They wanted the wealth and heritage of 
every South African restored to the people, and they wanted the mineral wealth beneath the soil, 
the banks and the monopoly industries transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole. 
They wanted all other industries and trade to be controlled to assist the well-being of the people. 
It is imperative, to note that, the shift the ANC had to make to partake in the negotiations. For 
instance the ANC strategically for the negotiations wanted the following: redressing the 
inequalities of wealth and the creation of a unitary, non-racial, non-sexiest democratic state 
(Terreblanche 2002:84). 
 
 
 
As argued, one should note the shifts in ideology and demands between the NP and the ANC in 
their commitment to a transition to democracy. It is particularly important to note the drastic shift 
in ideals of socialism to democracy within the ANC. The struggle in the ANC shifted from what 
it had committed to in the freedom charter to the ideals of democracy. After the ANC had agreed 
to the ideals of democracy, under capitalism, it allowed itself to be outsmarted, and from all the 
demands it had made it only received the right to vote. It is for this reason that De Klerk said 
(Mkhondo 1993): 
For the first time … this government was committed as a matter of urgency to admitting blacks to the 
country’s white dominated parliament in a bid to help transfer of power to a post-apartheid authority. (p. 8) 
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On thus has to point to the sacrifices the ANC had to make in its commitment to the transition to 
democracy. As argued above, the transition to democracy is always recommended for Third- 
World countries by the imperial forces which previously funded the authoritarian regimes. Their 
sole purpose with this recommendation is maintaining the colonial power relationships. As a 
result, the liberation movements who agree to this transition get the vote, but power relationships 
remain the same. Mkhondo observes that the following elements formed part of the demands by 
the NP, which they obtained: constitutional negotiations with Black moderates, the maintenance 
of group rights on a non-discriminatory basis, political incorporation of all groups with no 
domination of one by another, security, the normalization of foreign relationships and maximum 
devolution of state functions at a regional and local level (Mkhondo 1993:16). As such, this 
chapter contends that it is not surprising that the NP opted for negotiations. 
 
 
 
The commitment by the ANC to the ideals of democracy cost them some of their crucial 
positions (especially on nationalization). This is mentioned to point out how the imperial forces, 
through enforcing the notion of a transition to democracy, reproduce the authoritarian (colonial) 
regimes’ power patterns. This means that only political systems change in the context of 
democratic capitalism, but power relations remain the same. For instance, Nelson Mandela, the 
leader of the ANC, made the following statement concerning ideas of nationalization on the day 
of his release (Terreblanche 2002): 
The white monopoly of political power must be ended, and we need a fundamental restructuring of our 
political and economic systems to address the inequalities of apartheid and create a genuine democratic 
South Africa. (p. 86) 
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Under democratic capitalism, the idea of the restructuring of economic systems to address the 
inequalities of an authoritarian regime is not possible. Furthermore, under democratic capitalism, 
which is what the ANC committed itself to under the notion of a transition to democracy, the 
idea of redressing inequalities of wealth collide with financial markets, which the imperial forces 
use to dominate Third-World countries. Terreblanche notes that it is thus not surprising that, 
early in 1992, Mandela became convinced – under severe internal and external pressure – that 
South Africa would not be able to attract foreign investment if investors felt the sword of 
Damocles of nationalisation hanging over their heads. In 1992, the ANC then dropped 
nationalisation from its policy programmes (Terreblanche 2002:84-89). Mkhondo captures this 
well when he argues the following: 
As a result of internal and external pressure, the nationalisation and redistribution hysteria has subsided 
because of the ANC promise that it would keep them as options, but not as policies. (p. 86) 
 
 
 
The Cold War (1947 until 1989–1991), the apartheid system (1948 until 1990–1994), the 
transition from an authoritarian regime (that is, apartheid) to democracy (1989–1994) and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) remarkably ran concurrently. It is the contention of 
this chapter that the sudden interest of the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa, to opt for 
the negotiations and a transition to democracy was no accident. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
was enough proof to the authoritarian regime of the NP, and the corporate sector in South Africa 
that they could use to persuade the ANC that democratization was the only option. As such, 
democratization was used strategically to help the constituency of the NP to maintain their grip 
on the economy of South Africa (Cronin 1993:1-12 & Terreblanche 2002:95-124). 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union further disadvantaged the ANC during the negotiations. This is 
because the ANC, like many other liberation movements, had as their liberation strategy the idea 
of overthrowing the authoritarian regimes militarily. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
had tremendous effects on the liberation movements. This is because the Soviet Union was 
supporting many of the liberation movements, and they (the liberation movements) were 
encouraged to overthrow the authoritarian regimes militarily. So the collapse of the Soviet Union 
meant that there would be a decline in financial support from the Soviet Union, and therefore, 
many of the liberation movements were forced to abandon the idea of overthrowing authoritarian 
regimes militarily. It is for this reason that this chapter contends that, without a military victory, 
the  ANC’s  bargaining  power  at  the  negotiations  were  reduced  significantly  (Terreblanche 
2002:103). 
 
 
 
 
The claim, namely that democratization was used strategically to help the constituency of the NP 
to maintain a grip on the economy of South Africa, has to be seen in context. The NP, and more 
specifically  the  corporate  sector  in  South  Africa,  opted  for  a  transition  to  democracy,  in 
particular through negotiations, for their own narrow interest of finding a new accumulation 
strategy (Cronin 1994; Mkhondo 1993; Terreblanche 2002). The years leading up to the 
negotiations have cost the corporate sector in South Africa dearly because of sanctions. They 
therefore needed a new accumulation strategy. It is for this reason that they opted for the 
negotiations. Prior the negotiations, however, the corporate sector in South Africa and the NP 
strategically had informal negotiations with the ANC. It is alleged that, during those informal 
negotiations,  “ the  leaders  of  the  ANC  were  wined  and  dined  from  morning  till  
night” (Terreblanche 2002:95). 
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What was at stake for the corporate sector was not only the economic policy of the ANC but the 
very nature of South Africa’s future economic system (Terreblanche 2002:95). For them, South 
Africa was the most-developed country in Africa, and therefore the stakes were extremely high. 
The negotiations were therefore of immense strategic importance for the corporate sector (ibid). 
In particular, the stakes were high for the corporate sector in South Africa because of their fear of 
the ANC’s socialist-orientated policies, given their association with the Soviet Union. As such, 
the corporate sector in South Africa wanted to make sure that the ANC did not argue strongly for 
a socialist-orientated economic system. Terreblanche (ibid) argues as follows in this regard: 
Owing to the extraordinary nature of the power shift in the making in the early 1990s, informal negotiations 
were essential in order to dispel the mutual suspicion between the capitalist-oriented corporate sector and 
the socialist-oriented democratic movement. (p. 95) 
 
 
 
It must be noted that the accord which came about as result of the leaders of the ANC being 
wined and dine were doomed and set up the ANC for failure. It caused them to move away from 
their priority as outlined in the Freedom Charter, namely transforming the economy of South 
Africa in order to uplift the majority of Black people in the country. This is because the accord 
upon which they agreed made it difficult for the ANC to transform the lives of Black people in 
South Africa. Terreblanche (2002), once again, points out the following: 
By convincing ANC leaders to accept the AAC’s approach, the corporate sector in effect persuaded – or 
forced – the ANC to move away from its traditional priority, namely to uplift the impoverished black 
majority socially and economically. (p. 96) 
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I have to point out that the ANC went through a series of ideological shifts or compromises. 
Most of these compromises came at the expense of their traditional priorities. As a result, they 
agreed to a neo-liberal, export-oriented economic policy and to a strategy of redistribution 
through growth. This (economic) strategy, as Terreblanche notes, appears to be a wish list of a 
corporate sector that was desperate to resolve its 20-year-long accumulation crisis. As a result, 
the corporate sector further outsmarted the ANC under the pseudo-notion of transition to 
democracy. To this day, the corporate sector continues to maintain their grip on the economy of 
South Africa at the expense of Black people. Terreblanche (2002) puts it in the following words: 
By agreeing to a elite compromise the ANC put in place the first cornerstone of the economic edifice of a 
post-apartheid South Africa. In effect, it agreed to an economic policy and system that would exclude the 
poorest half of the population from a solution that was really aimed at resolving the corporate sector’s long 
standing accumulation crisis. (p. 98) 
 
 
 
On thus cannot but come to the realisation that the corporate sector in South Africa outsmarted 
and used the ANC to solve their accumulation problems and to help them to come up with a new 
accumulation strategy in order to continue to hold on to the economic power of South Africa. It 
was the idea and strategy of the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa to have informal 
negotiations  and  the  formal  negotiations  because  it  was  in  the  interest  of  the  NP  and  the 
corporate sector in South Africa to have political issues and economic issues being discussed on 
two separate forums. 
 
 
 
As such, the corporate sector in South Africa felt strategically comfortable discussing economic 
issues with one party (that is, the ANC) in the informal negotiations and, later, concurrently 
allowing other parties (that is, opposition parties) to discuss political issues. The ANC was 
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outsmarted and used by the corporate sector to solve their accumulation strategy problems, and 
when they had reached a deal with the ANC, they pushed for formal negotiations to reach a deal 
on political issues. It is for this reason that Terreblanche (2002:102) says when he outlines the 
influence of the corporate sector in South Africa: “As soon as it [the corporate sector] was 
satisfied that it had boxed in the ANC leaders to the necessary degree, it pressurised the 
participants at Kempton Park into agreeing on constitutional matters.” 
 
 
 
The corporate sector in South Africa and the NP realised that the ANC operated under an 
unpractical and tactically bad slogan, namely: “Get political power and the rest shall follow” 
(Kwame Nkrumah, in Biney 2011). As such, the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
were willing to give the ANC the political power under a constitutional democracy (contrary to a 
parliamentary democracy under which the NP governed). This meant that the ANC was 
strategically outsmarted because, after their long years of struggle, they would only obtain 
political power and little access to economic power. Terreblanche (2002) puts it eloquently in the 
following words: 
Be that as it may, in this way the ANC got its first prize – political control of South Africa – while the 
corporate got its first prize – continued control of the South African economy – to an even greater extent 
than before. (p. 102) 
 
 
 
The ANC was thus put in a position were in had to make unpopular choices and even 
compromises, and this would eventually make it unpopular with its Black constituency and lead 
to the segmentation of the Black masses of South Africa. It is for this reason that Mkhondo 
(1993) argues as follows: 
By legalizing the ANC, he [de Klerk] removed its cloak of underground heroism and turned it into an 
ordinary political party which  would have to  make hard  choices  and unpopular  compromises.  These 
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compromises were expected to anger and disillusion segments of the black majority, giving the government 
an additional opportunity to divide the opposition. (p. 30) 
 
 
 
This chapter contends that the NP strategically put the ANC in a situation where they were 
forced to drift from their political and ideological positions. Cronin captures this well, when he 
mentions that, since May 1990 when the ANC started negotiating with the De Klerk government 
as led by the NP, the ANC started to drift strategically, tactically and organizationally. Cronin 
1976:1) further asserts that “[s]ome of this drift was due to a deliberate, double agenda strategy 
from the incumbent regime”. One has to note that the NP, obviously with the corporate sector in 
South Africa, in their double-agenda strategy, was negotiating with the ANC while at the same 
time destabilizing the ANC. 
 
 
 
One of the other things which led to the drift within the policy and ideological position of the 
ANC was the internal difficulties within the organization, in particular the disunity within the 
organisation. It must be kept in mind that the banning of the liberation movements in South 
Africa opened a political vacuum. Some leaders of the liberation movements were jailed, and 
some left the country for exile, which meant that there was a political gap between the leadership 
of the liberation movements and the younger generation (e.g. the 1976 generation). Because of 
differences in approaches and ideologies, of the generational kind mentioned above, the ANC 
had to drift in its positions. Mkhondo (1993) argues as follows regarding the challenges faced by 
the ANC leadership: 
Mandela also faced challenges inside his own organisation. His first and most daunting task was to unify 
his party and to persuade the various factions of the black community to move forward together. (p. 30) 
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Concerning the notion of drifting from political and ideological positions, which occurred within 
the ANC during the period of the negotiations, there is another aspect that comes into play. I 
refer to the notion that the negotiations did not form part of the strategy that the ANC was going 
to utilise. This created more disjuncture within the organisation, in particular between the 
leadership and the younger militant generation within the organisation. It is for this reason that 
Cronin (1994) notes the following statement from a SASCO student: 
At the national political level, the advent of the negotiations has seen a continuous marginalization of the 
masses of our people. Instead of playing a central role in shaping the direction the struggle takes in the era 
of negotiations, the masses found themselves side-lined. (p. 1) 
 
 
 
Except for the disjuncture within the ANC and its constituency, which caused them to drift away 
from their ideological and policy positions, the idea of negotiations – which I contend the ANC 
was never prepared for – led to a fundamental disjuncture in the strategy to be utilised for the 
liberation of the oppressed in South Africa. Thus, the ANC started to become alienated from its 
constituency, specifically the militant younger generation. As a result, the younger militant 
generation  of  the  organisation  started  to  become  skeptical  about  the  leadership  of  the 
organisation, specifically the jailed leadership. 
 
 
 
The political or the strategic (that is, what is to be done to overthrow the apartheid government) 
gap between the leadership of the ANC and the new generation of militant youth widened. This 
was because the young militant youth saw militancy as the only solution for the problems of 
South Africa. The idea of negotiations made the youth of the ANC even more sceptical about the 
leaders  of  the  organisation.  Mkhondo  (1993)  argues  as  follows  concerning  the  idea  of 
negotiations within the organisation: 
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If a deal was to be struck with the government, it had to be acceptable to a broad black constituency. The 
biggest  challenge  came  from  a  new  generation  of  militant  youth  within  the  ANC  who  resented  his 
[Mandela] resumption of leadership. They considered him too willing to compromise and were angered by 
his [Mandela] initiating a personal dialogue with De Klerk. (p.30) 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, the ANC was never prepared for negotiations. This is because the ANC 
(and other liberation movements) had prepared themselves for a revolutionary take-over. Thus, 
the idea of negotiations presented them with an unforeseeable problem, namely that of an 
evolutionary reform process (Terreblanche 2002:85–86). This is mentioned here to point to the 
hypothesis that the ANC, as a mouthpiece of the majority of the Black masses, was not prepared 
for negotiations. It was only after some persuasion that they started changing their ideological 
position. It must also be reiterated that the NP and the corporate sector of South Africa did not 
opt for negotiations because of their moral convictions. Rather, they opted for negotiations 
because there was no other way out. In this regard, Mkhondo (1993:19) makes clear the point 
that “De Klerk himself said there had been no Damascus conversion, just a realisation that ‘if we 
[NP and its constituency] remained as we were, we were in a cul-de-sac’”. 
 
 
 
As indicated earlier, one has to take note of the sudden agreement on a negotiated settlement 
between the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa. As pointed out, the negotiations 
became  a  viable  option  to  guarantee  that  the  White  community  maintains  its  grip  on  the 
economy. This development came about because the NP and the corporate sector of South Africa 
needed each other for the accumulation of riches in the White community. The corporate sector 
of South Africa needed the NP for its political power whilst the NP needed the corporate sector 
of South Africa for their continuing grip on the economy. As such, the corporate sector of South 
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Africa pushed the NP to “… risk Africans’ inclusion in the political system in a desperate 
attempt to resolve the accumulation crisis” (Terreblanche 2002:79–80). 
 
 
 
The NP then came with a threefold strategy to resolve the accumulation crisis in South Africa. 
According to Terreblanche (2002), this strategy entailed the following: 
Firstly, accommodating black people in a majoritarian democratic system. Secondly, attaining a high 
economic growth rate within the framework of an unrestrained free-market capitalist system, marked by 
minimum state intervention and a neo-liberal and export-oriented economic approach. Thirdly, avoiding an 
aggressive redistribution policy because the benefits of high levels of economic growth would trickle down 
to the poor, while the government could provide some support through welfare measures and public 
projects to the short-term victims of the adjustment process. (pp. 79–80) 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, the economy of South Africa was in a crisis because of, amongst other 
things, internal and external pressure such as sanctions. The only solution with which both the 
NP and corporate sector of South Africa could come up was the inclusion of Black people into 
the political system of South Africa and convincing them of the virtues of capitalism. 
Terreblanche (2002) phrased it as follows: 
During the five years from 1990–1994 the corporate sector anxiously participated in various scenario- 
building exercises aimed at formulating an economic strategy that would be business-friendly and would 
perpetuate its position of power and privilege in a fully democratised South Africa. (p. 80) 
 
 
 
Thus, the NP had already made calculated arrangements with the corporate sector in South 
Africa  prior  to  the  formal  negotiations.  These  arrangements  included  the  political 
accommodation of Black people and an economic strategy which would exclude Black people, 
based  on  their  history  of  a  lack  of  accumulation  of  wealth.  Terreblanche  points  to  the 
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commitment by the NP after it was put under massive pressure by the British Prime Minister, 
Margaret  Thatcher,  and  the  local  corporate  sector  as  well  as  many  proposals  from  the 
Democratic  Party  (DP).  In  his  words  (Terreblanche  2002:79),  the  external  pressure  “… 
committed the NP government to negotiating a constitution embodying the political 
accommodation of black people, while also reaffirming the economic strategy of privatisation, 
deregulation, and ‘free marketeerism[sic]’”. 
 
 
 
I thus argue that the negotiated transition was a mere amendment to the apartheid system which 
excluded Black people in South Africa. This is because the negotiated transition was a ploy 
aimed at politically accommodating Black people whilst simultaneously employing economic 
strategies which would exclude them. The notions of privatisation, deregulation and a free 
market were put in place to continue, under the disguise of the constitution, to exclude Black 
people from participating in the economy. These notions, namely privatisation, deregulation and 
the free market, are based on the capitalistic idea of competition, which is based on competing 
through capital. This is modern-day economic exclusion, which is regulated by law. The 
settlement of the new South Africa thus continued the history of accumulation in South Africa, 
favoured White people in South Africa at the expense of the Black majority of South Africa 
(Terreblanche 2002). 
 
 
 
In my view, then, the ANC was misled by both the NP and the corporate sector of South Africa, 
but more so the corporate sector, to view the crisis in South Africa as a political crisis and not so 
much an economic crisis. A political solution would thus be perfect for South Africa. The ANC 
and the democratic government of the new South Africa were therefore misled into follow the 
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logic that, once political and constitutional issues were sorted out, the rest would follow. Morris 
(as quoted in Terreblanche 2002:81) sums up logic when he argues that “[t]here was an 
assumption that, once the constitutional issues were sorted out, the dozing South African 
economic giant would lumber its feet and cart off to the land of promise”. 
 
 
 
The NP and the corporate sector thus used the notions of the political accommodation of Black 
people and an economic strategy which was based on the notions of privatisation, deregulation, 
and the free market as a new accumulation strategy. The kind of economic system that the NP 
and the corporate sector left when they vacated office had in mind an economic strategy which 
guaranteed the White population – mainly those who were in the corporate sector – that the 
economy would continue to be managed to their advantage. Terreblanche (2002:79) puts it as 
follows: “… the NP became convinced in 1990 that a fundamental restructuring of the political 
and ideological system had become a sine qua non for formulating a new accumulation strategy 
…” 
 
 
 
 
With the new accumulation strategy, disguised under the capitalist notions of privatisation, 
deregulation and the free market, Black people in South Africa would continue to be excluded 
from participating in the economy of South Africa. The current economic system, which came 
into being as a result of the calculated collusion between the NP and the corporate sector of 
South Africa, means that Black people will always find themselves at the margin of the 
accumulation  chain.  This  is  because  the  current  economic  system  benefits  those  who  can 
compete in the market, and Black people in South Africa find it impossible to compete as a result 
of a lack of capital (Wale 2013:1–44). It is for this reason that Terreblanche (2002:78) argued 
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that the “… victims of apartheid were [and still are] not fit – psychologically, educationally, or 
physically [and I would add economically] – to play the free market game”. The constitutional 
democracy and specifically the economic system, which is based on the free-market 
acknowledges the history of exclusion of a few at the expense of the majority. However, 
acknowledging this history does not in any practical way automatically benefit those who were 
previously disadvantaged. Instead, it operates from the premise that everybody would partake 
equally in the economy of South Africa. 
 
 
 
The notion of equally partaking in the economy sounds good and well in policies, but in practice, 
this system works on competition based on capital. Given the long history of exclusion of Black 
people in South Africa, it means that Black people remain at the receiving end of the economy of 
South Africa. Terreblanche (2002:78) contends that this free-market system excludes those who 
were previously excluded when he argues that the Black people in South Africa “… were not 
equipped with even the minimum of resources and opportunities needed to make progress in a 
free market environment”. 
 
 
 
As argued before, the NP and the corporate sector of South Africa outsmarted the ANC in the 
informal negotiations (Terreblanche 2002:78). This is mentioned here to illustrate that the NP 
and the corporate sector of South Africa set up the ANC and the coming democratic government 
for failure in their struggle for socioeconomic transformation. This is because the conditions and 
arrangements set out in the informal negotiations led to the dismantlement of the notion of “the 
winner takes all”. Instead, a new notion of political and economic history emerged, namely the 
notion of both parties, the former government with its constituency and the current government 
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with  a  united  constituency,  becoming  winners  (Mamdani  2013).  It  is  for  this  reason  
that 
 
Terreblanche (2002) argues the following point: 
 
While  the  NP  was  still  unclear  about  the  terms  under  which  Black  people  should  be  politically 
incorporated, it was adamant about constraining the ANC’s ability to wield political power in the service of 
a radical agenda of socio-economic transformation. (p. 79) 
 
 
 
As pointed out before, the ANC, who assumed the status of being the voice of the Black people 
of South Africa, operated under a pseudo-slogan, namely “Seek ye first the political kingdom 
[power],  and  all  else  will  follow.”  In  contrast,  the  NP  and  corporate  South  Africa  had 
strategically  prepared  the  ground  for  the  implementation  of  an  economic  strategy  which 
included, amongst other things, the notions of privatisation, deregulation and the free market. 
This economic strategy would result in discouraging state intervention in the economic activities 
of South Africa. Concerning matters economic, the market would decide, not so much the state. 
This would eventually lead to the democratic government, eventually under the ANC, having 
political power but not much economic power. 
 
 
 
I thus contend that the slogan which the ANC followed will not materialise. This is because the 
ANC  found  itself  entangled  in  a  position  which  they  had  rightly  deemed  impossible  for 
executing their quest for liberation, namely the idea of reforming capitalism. The ANC had 
rightly pointed out that it is impossible to reform capitalism because it was inseparable from 
apartheid. This is why the ANC had advocated the eradication of racial capitalism. Due to its 
failure to pay attention to the future of the economic system and economic policy in a democratic 
South Africa, the ANC thus opted for a reformed form of capitalism, namely free-market 
capitalism (Terreblanche 2002:79). 
128  
 
 
Because of the vacuum opened by the ANC’s lack of a position on economic views and 
ideologies, the NP and corporate sector of South Africa had ample time to prepare the ground for 
the implementation of free-market capitalism. This outcome was contrary to what the ANC 
advocated for long before the negotiations. I thus highlight the point that the failure on the side 
of the ANC to pay attention to what the economic system and economic policy in a democratised 
South Africa should be caused it and its constituency, the Black people of South Africa, to get a 
raw deal at the negotiation table. 
 
 
 
The ANC’s last statement on the economy was set out in the Freedom Charter of 1955. In this 
document, the statements on the economy included the following: (1) The people shall share in 
the country’s wealth. (2) The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, 
shall be restored to the people. (3) The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly 
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole. (4) All other industries 
and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people (Freedom Charter 1995; see 
Terreblanche 2002:84). The failure on the side of the ANC to think about the economic system 
and economic policy in a democratized South Africa led to its policy, as outlined in the Freedom 
Charter of 1955, being un-implementable. Maybe the ANC operated under the pseudo-idea that, 
with political power, it would easy to implement its policy as outlined in the Freedom Charter. 
Thus Morris (in Terreblanche) argues as follows: 
… the ANC’s historical neglect of economic policy left it prone to the counsel of business and mainstream 
foreign experts that set about schooling ANC leaders in the realities of the world. (p. 85) 
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3.4 Neo-liberal transition: The TRC as a final seal? 
 
 
 
Following the ideological shifts within the thinking of the ANC and the NP, the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, was passed. This act was passed as the 
final seal to the elite compromise in order to close a chapter on the negotiations and open a new 
chapter on a democratic state. My argument is based on the following occurrences: (1) the idea 
of a transition to democracy (Cronin 1994), (2) the sudden ideological shifts within the thinking 
of specifically the NP (Cronin 1994:1-8; Mkhondo 1993:14-23; Terreblanche 2002:95-124), (3) 
the informal and formal negotiations and (4) the sudden passing of the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995. 
 
 
 
After a political transition had been negotiated, the new government deemed it necessary to 
consolidate its precarious political power by using the formation of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to delegitimize the apartheid regime and its security forces. Equally 
important to note is that the TRC, in its work, identified individuals as either perpetrators or 
victims. This choice means that they ignored gross crimes, namely human-rights violations 
perpetrated  collectively  and  systematically  against  millions  of  Black  people  under  White 
political domination and racial capitalism (Mamdani 2002:?). In this regard, Terreblanche (2002) 
makes the following argument: 
But because of the new symbolic relationship between ANC leaders and the corporate sector, it was 
expedient for the new government not to pressurize the TRC into uncovering the truth about systematic 
exploitation, or to delegitimize the corporate for its part in the design and utilization of repressive labour 
systems. (p. 125) 
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I have to mention that the TRC has done an excellent job of discrediting the apartheid regime 
and the atrocities of the past committed under its aegis (Terreblanche 2002:124). However, 
despite the excellent job the TRC did in discrediting the apartheid regime, it let the corporate 
sector in South Africa off the hook. The reason for this problematic thinking of the TRC is that 
they  identified  individual  rather  than  group  or  collective  perpetrators  and  victims  of  gross 
human-rights violations. To my mind, the idea of identifying individuals as either perpetrators or 
victims of gross human-rights violations was an oversight on the side of the TRC. As Mamdani 
(1996) notes, it should have been clear that “... beneficiaries [of the system of apartheid] are a 
large group, and victims defined in relation to beneficiaries are the vast majority in society”. 
 
 
 
In a sense, then, the South African TRC was a final seal to the transition to democracy. This is 
because, the TRC ignored the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively and 
systematically against millions of Black people under White political domination and racial 
capitalism. Terreblanche (2002:124) notes that “[i]ts [TRC] inability and/or unwillingness to 
systematically analyse South Africa’s history of unequal power structures are puzzling”. 
Terreblanche (2002) clarifies his claim about the puzzling conduct of the TRC as follows: 
… there was close relationship between the corporate sector in South Africa and successive white 
supremacist governments. Those relationships were maintained for a century, from ±1890 to ±1990. This is 
mentioned here, to point out, that the relationship between the corporate sector in South Africa and 
different white supremacist governments worked hand in glove to protect and promote their mutual interest 
in the maintenance of the racist political and economic structures that secured power, privileges, and wealth 
for whites, and inevitably caused – as the other side of the same systematic coin – deprivation, repression, 
and poverty for the majority of blacks. (p. 65) 
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Thus, the South African TRC tried to uncover the “truth” about one form of victimization and 
unfortunately ignored the other form of victimization. This chapter thus contends that the South 
African TRC ratified the agreement between the corporate sector in South Africa and ANC. This 
agreement entails that the benefits that had been accumulated [mostly undeservedly] in the hands 
of the corporate sector and other White people through systemic exploitation would either be 
forgotten or condoned. The systemic exploitation was ignored because the TRC, in their work in 
trying to uncover the truth, intentionally or unintentionally failed to take the corporate to task. In 
this regard, Terreblanche (2002) makes the following argument: 
By trying to uncover the truth about one form of victimization under apartheid and ignoring another (and 
perhaps even more important) form of victimization, the TRC has failed dismally in its quest for truth and 
reconciliation. (p. 125) 
 
 
 
So the TRC ratified the way in which the ANC was outsmarted at the negotiation table as the 
corporate sector in South Africa and the NP managed to convince the ANC to opt for informal 
and formal negotiations. On the one hand, the corporate sector in South Africa would negotiate 
separately with the leaders of the ANC while, on the other hand, the NP and other stakeholders 
would negotiate mainly with the ANC and other political parties at the formal negotiations 
(Terreblanche 2002:125). Both the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa used delaying 
tactics. The reason for this was that the corporate sector in South Africa strategically “boxed in” 
the ANC and misled them into accepting an economic system which served as a new 
accumulating strategy for the corporate sector in South Africa. In this process, the NP used 
delaying tactics so as to allow the corporate sector in South Africa to finish with the ANC. 
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In this regard, I can point, for instance, to a speech in which FW de Klerk assured his White 
constituency that he would not sign a new constitution if it did not contain a statuary entrenched 
minority (read “white”) veto (Mkhondo 1993). After several insurrections in 1992 threatened to 
derail the negotiation process, the NP accepted, on 26 September 1992, the so-called sunset 
clauses in which agreement was reached on a “… one person, one vote system and on a period of 
power sharing of five years in a government of National Unity” (Terreblanche 2002:79). My 
point is that the NP’s reluctance to sign the agreement was a delaying tactic on its side because 
the NP signed the constitution only after the corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC had 
reached an agreement (that is, an elite compromise) (Cronin 1994; Mkhondo 1993; Terreblanche 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
What this brought to the fore was the notion of the “truth” that the TRC was supposed to 
uncover. It remains puzzling that the TRC thought of uncovering the “truth” by looking at one 
form of victimization and ignoring the other. As I argued above, through this oversight of 
uncovering the “truth” at an individual level and not at a communal level, the TRC ratified and 
sealed the transition to democracy. The TRC should thus be judged against the compromise, that 
is, the elite compromise, reached at the informal and formal negotiations that preceded it (Boesak 
2008:636-654). Moosa, in Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 2002:116; Terreblanche 2002:125) thus 
concluded that “… the truth of the TRC was what the party (parties) said it was. The truth was 
not measured, but manufactured. To be charitable [to the TRC], we can say that truth was 
negotiated [in the informal negotiations].” The “truth” was thus manufactured by elites in the 
negotiations, and the TRC became a final seal to the neo-liberal transition to democracy. 
Mamdani in Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000) argues as follows: 
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The truth of the TRC makes more sense when understood as institutionally produced truth, as the outcome 
of a process of truth-seeking, one whose boundaries were so narrowly defined by power [especially, the 
corporate  sector]  and  whose  search  was  so  committed  to  reinforce  the  new  power  [of  the  ANC 
government]. (p. 55) 
 
 
 
Established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, the 
mandate of the TRC was as follows: The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote 
national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and 
extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period 1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994. 
 
 
 
 
The definition of gross violations of human rights was stated as follows (TRC 1998): 
 
The commission shall facilitate … inquiries into (1) gross violations of human rights, including violations 
which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse ... (2) [And shall facilitate inquiries into] the identity of all 
persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in such violations. (p. 56) 
 
 
 
The definition of gross violations of human rights was left vague, but the TRC decided to 
interpret its mandate far more narrowly. It is for this reason that Terreblanche (2002) notes the 
following: 
… in its final report, it states categorically that its governing mandate act limited its investigation to gross 
violations of human rights defined as killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment and the attempt, 
conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit such acts. Consequently, it 
concentrated almost exclusively on violations of human rights on individual victims by individual 
perpetrators. (p. 127) 
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By interpreting its mandate narrowly, the TRC for all practical purposes chose to ignore the 
violation of human rights which were part of a systemic pattern of abuse. By concentrating on 
individual perpetrators and victims, it also chose not to identify all authorities, institutions, and 
organisations involved in violations of human rights. In addition, the TRC also chose to interpret 
human rights as mainly first-generation or legal human rights whilst the violation of second- 
generation human rights or social rights were practically ignored. Consequently, it concentrated 
on perpetrators and victims while neglecting the relationship between the beneficiaries and 
victims of racial capitalism and White political domination (Terreblanche 2002:127). As a result, 
the TRC, “… made perhaps the greatest moral compromise … [in embracing] the legal fetishism 
of apartheid … [by making] little distinction between what is legal and what is legitimate [and] 
between law and right” (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:181). As indicated above, the TRC made 
this compromise because it focused on individual perpetrators and victims rather than on a group 
and a system which perpetrated gross human-rights violations. These violations were perpetrated 
not only against individuals but collectively and systemically against millions of Black people 
under White political domination and racial capitalism. Terreblanche (2002) comments on this 
situation as follows: 
The TRC understood beneficiaries to mean those who had gained from corrupting the laws and from acting 
illegally, but not those who those who had designed and implemented the immoral, corrupt, and skewed 
system of apartheid. (p. 127) 
 
 
 
Due to the oversight, or intention, on the side of the TRC to understand the beneficiaries of the 
apartheid system narrowly as those who merely corrupted the system and not helped to design 
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and implement it, the TRC allowed the corporate sector in South Africa to get off the hook. In its 
final report, the TRC (1998) acknowledged the following: 
… there had been an expectation that the commission would investigate many of the human rights 
violations which had been caused by the denial of freedom of movement through the pass laws, by forced 
removals of people from their land, by denial of the franchise to citizens, by treatment of farm workers and 
other labour disputes, and by discrimination in such areas as education and work opportunities. (p. 11) 
 
 
 
All the laws passed by either the colonial or the apartheid system were passed in order to exclude 
Black people from participating in the affairs, namely the economy and socio-political matters, 
of South Africa. As such, these laws helped to build the economic system which benefited White 
people. Terreblanche (2002) explains this situation as follows: 
The South African economic system was deliberately molded (by compact power between successive 
white supremacist political authorities and the white-controlled corporate sector on the basis of un-free 
black labour, the systematic exploitation of blacks ... (p. 57) 
 
 
 
The corporate sector in South Africa can claim that it had strongly opposed apartheid it have 
impeded the unfolding of capitalism (see Terreblanche 2002:101). However, the corporate sector 
can never claim that it had opposed repressive labour and other segregationist measures. This 
means that the corporate sector in South Africa can never be excused from helping to design and 
implement the apartheid system. On the contrary, these repressive labour and segregationist 
measures helped design and implement the apartheid system. It is for this reason that the 
commission (TRC 1998) acknowledges this point in its final report: 
Many  organizations  lobbied  the  Commission  to  insist  that  these  issues  should  form  part  of  its 
investigations. Commission members, too, felt that these were important areas that could not be ignored. 
(p.11, vol5, chp1 ) 
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Interestingly, however, the TRC argued, that these issues cannot be interpreted as falling directly 
within the Commission’s mandate (TRC 1998). The decision by the TRC not to investigate the 
issues involving the corporate sector in South Africa remains suspicious. The excuse that these 
issues could not be interpreted as falling directly under the commission’s mandate is flawed 
because the mandate of the TRC was clear. Only the TRC decided to interpret its mandate 
narrowly. In this regard, Terreblanche (2002) argues as follows: 
[this decision] … could only have resulted from pressure exerted on it by the corporate sector (and perhaps 
also by the new government), which realized that a broader investigation would include a systematic 
analysis of racial capitalism. Such an investigation would have embarrassed – and even angered – the 
business sector. (p. 128) 
 
 
 
To my mind, it is an important factor in the development of the new South Africa that the 
corporate in South Africa was never investigated though it was responsible for racial capitalism. 
By racial capitalism, I mean the economic system which caused economic wealth to be 
accumulated undeservedly in the hands of White beneficiaries through systemic exploitation and 
the huge economic power concentrated in White conglomerates through racial capitalism and 
White political domination. It is noteworthy that the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission devoted only three days of its existence to the corporate sector (Terreblanche 
2002:128). As Terreblanche notes not surprisingly, the hearings were conducted in a way that 
obscured the systemic character of apartheid and offered business people an undeserved 
opportunity to clear themselves and their corporations of any guilt in respect of or 
responsibility for the legacy of apartheid. Furthermore, during the informal negotiations, the 
corporate sector in South Africa strategically proceeded to clear its name of any wrongdoings 
and later presented itself as the 
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deus ex machina that would solve all of the social problems of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. Thus, at the TRC, the corporate sector of South Africa had to face its history for 
three days only in order for them to finish clearing themselves of any wrongdoing (Terreblanche 
2002:128). 
 
 
 
 
All  of  these  occurrences  contributed  to  the  notion  that  the  South  African  Truth  and 
Reconciliation Commission was the final seal to the elite compromise. With regard to the idea of 
a transition to democracy, it was no accident that the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
opted for the idea of transition to democracy. Concerning the ideological shifts within the 
thinking of the ANC and the NP, it was also no accident but part of a well-thought strategy. This 
strategy came about as the NP operated with the strategy of many imperialist forces, namely to 
opt for a transition in order strategically to continue to hold on to the economy of South Africa 
(Cronin 1994). Cronin notes that the idea of the transition to democracy, specifically for Third- 
World countries, came from imperial forces upon realizing that their authoritarian regimes were 
losing their grip on these countries. It is important to note that these authoritarian regimes (that 
is, the apartheid regime under the NP) belonged or had a relationship with these imperial forces. 
The imperial forces gave massive political and military support to these authoritarian regimes. 
This support, however, caused a growing mass of guerrilla movements so that these imperial 
forces, through the authoritarian regimes, had to change their strategy. 
 
 
 
One of the strategies that the imperial forces used through their authoritarian regimes (namely 
the apartheid regime under the NP) was the notion of democratization (Cronin 1994). This notion 
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of democratization was presented as the only option available for the Third-World countries to 
use. Cronin (1994) says the following about this notion, democratization: 
[It] has often been motivated by the belief in imperialist circles that elected centrist (or even left) 
governments would have more legitimacy in imposing the bitter pill of structural adjustment programmes 
on their own third populations. (p. 5) 
 
 
 
The imperialist forces thus strategically changed their strategies in order to maintain a grip on the 
economy of Third-World countries, as Cronin (1994:5) argues: “In the past two and a half 
decades, domination has been exerted more and more through financial mechanism imposed by 
bodies like the IMF, World Bank and GATT.” 
 
 
 
The notion of democratization was not recommended for Third-World countries by accident. The 
reason why I make this claim is that this notion (democratization) was promoted in Third-World 
countries at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) (Cronin 1994:1-8; 
Mkhondo 1993:14-23; Terreblanche 2002:95-124) and when the capitalist system was becoming 
global in character (Cronin 1993:4-5 & Terreblanche 2002:95-124). The notion of a transition to 
democracy was thus presented as the only way or solution to the problems (of South Africa). 
Yet, simultaneously, the notion of democracy became attractive at the same time as when 
capitalism was becoming global in character. This meant that this new system would be based on 
equal rights, and privileges would be maintained and supplied by state power. At the same time, 
this system would be based on the unequal distribution of property and assets and on the state- 
guaranteed freedom of everyone to use their assets and property as they please within the 
prescriptions of the law (Terreblanche 2002:16-17). 
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The association between democracy and capitalism would mean that those who had previously 
accumulated would continue to participate in the economy at the expense of the majority (that is, 
mainly Black people in South Africa). This is because the association between democracy and 
capitalism would send contradictory messages to the people of South Africa. On the one hand, 
this association would be based on joint interests, equality and common loyalties, and on the one 
hand, it would be based on self-seeking inequality and conflicting individual and group interests 
(Terreblanche 2002:16-17). The direct result of this association, the association between 
capitalism and democracy, would be unequal freedom and unequal rights (ibid:16). This 
association, which was supposed to defend equality on two conflicting positions, by definition 
has to maximise efficiency and profit through merciless competition in a free-market system and 
simultaneously work for those who can compete through assets. This resulted in a victory for the 
stronger, the skilful and the property owners and loss for the less cunning (ibid:16). 
 
 
 
The notion of a transition to democracy, in my opinion, caught the liberation movements, the 
ANC in South Africa, of Third-World countries off guard and also set up for failure the so-called 
democratically elected governments in Third-World countries. The notion of democratization 
presented itself as a perfect solution for Third-World countries which operates on the premise of 
equality. At the same time, it operates under the notion of global capitalism, which works with 
competition in the free-market system. This notion of democratization thus presented dual 
freedoms: freedom for those who own the means of production – those who have accumulated 
and can continue to participate in the economy of South Africa – and freedom for those who are 
on the margins of society – Black people in South Africa. These two freedoms are unequal and 
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thus the people of South Africa remain unequal. Terreblanche (2002) quotes Lyndon Johnson, 
who said the following: 
But freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and 
liberate him, bring him to the starting line of the race, and then say you are free to compete with all the 
others, and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. (p. 35) 
 
 
 
Freedom which does not lead to (socio-politico-economic) opportunities is not enough. Opening 
up opportunities without citizens, specifically those who have been prevented from accessing 
these opportunities, who can walk through those gates is not enough. It is for this reason that I 
use Terreblanche’s quote of Johnson again: “We seek not just freedom but opportunity – not just 
legal equity, but human ability – not just as a right and a theory but equality as a hypothesis and 
as a result.” Thus, the notion of democratization presented dual and conflicting freedoms. This 
duality and conflicting nature of democratization presented itself as the best solution, but at the 
same time, it left the democratically elected government (ANC) with conflicting logics as 
presented by democratic capitalism. Terreblanche (2002) expresses this dilemma as follows: 
It is the task of a democratically elected government to reconcile not only the conflicting logics of 
democracy and capitalism, but also the power with which they exert themselves in the dual system of 
democratic capitalism. South Africa’s democratically elected government must try to bring about 
reconciliations that will promote the welfare of society at large. It must also rectify the unacceptable 
inequalities produced by capitalism. (p. 16) 
 
 
 
In the negotiating process, the corporate sector in South Africa strategically started presenting 
itself as unblemished by apartheid and racism. This was because the corporate sector wanted to 
convince the ANC during the informal negotiations that it was committed to the transition to 
democracy and that it was, at the same time, committed to proposing an economic system which 
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would equally benefit the people of South Africa. This happened at the time when the NP, as the 
party responsible for apartheid, had lost its legitimacy (both internally and externally) and the 
ANC  was  enjoying  the  moral  high  ground  (Cronin  1994;  Mkhondo  1993;  Terreblanche 
2002:100). This means that the corporate sector in South Africa strategically wanted to align 
itself with where political will was going. Therefore, the corporate sector in South Africa claimed 
that it had always strongly opposed apartheid because it had impeded the unfolding of capitalism 
(Terreblanche 2002:101). It claimed that it has always been promoting the idea of individuals 
(whether Black or White) partaking in the economy through competition as outlined by the free-
market system. 
 
 
 
In this process, the corporate sector in South Africa was strategically shifting attention away 
from the consequences of racial capitalism, which could be conceptualized as follows: 
… the economic wealth that had accumulated undeservedly in the hands of white beneficiaries through 
systematic exploitation, the huge economic power concentrated in white conglomerates through racial 
capitalism and white political domination; or the abject poverty, destitution, and socio-economic 
powerlessness of the victims of racial capitalism. (p. 101) 
 
 
 
The corporate sector in South Africa managed to convince the ANC that the focus should only be 
on a transition to majoritarian democracy and the creation of economic and political conditions 
conducive to accumulation (Terreblanche 2002:101). In this regard, Terreblanche (ibid)notes the 
following: 
By remaining silent about its own ignoble involvement with colonialism, segregation and apartheid, and 
even explicitly denying involvement, the corporate sector presented itself as the deus ex machine that 
would solve all social problems and poverty, inequality, and unemployment. (p. 101) 
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In the negotiations then, the corporate sector in South Africa managed to reach an agreement 
with  the  ANC  that  South  Africa  would  not  become  a  parliamentary  democracy  but  a 
constitutional democracy (Terreblanche 2002:99). It also reached the following agreements with 
the ANC: (1) that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) would remain an independent 
institution and (2) that property rights would be entrenched to the extent that they could only be 
revoked by a 75% majority in the national assembly (ibid). The corporate sector thus managed to 
cleanse itself of any involvement with the apartheid government and how they managed to 
mislead the ANC into accepting a system which exclude the poorest part of the population from 
a solution. 
 
 
 
The corporate sector in South Africa helped to entrench the policy of apartheid, and when power 
changed hands, they managed to use the ANC to come up with an accumulation strategy. They 
did this by providing three preconditions for their involvement in solving social problems in 
South Africa: (1) South Africa should be democratised, (2) the corporate sector should be left 
intact and granted all freedom (that is, a free-market system) normally granted to a corporate 
sector in a genuinely liberal capitalist system and (3) a neo-liberal macroeconomic and export- 
oriented policy should be implemented in order to integrate South Africa into global capitalism 
(Terreblanche 2002:101). 
 
 
 
In convincing the ANC of the implementation democratization, a free-market system and the 
implementation of a neo-liberal macroeconomic, export-oriented policy in order to integrate 
South into global capitalism, the corporate sector in South Africa had scored an immensely 
important victory which had far-reaching implications for the poorer part of the population. Out 
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of  the  negotiations,  the  ANC  and  its  constituency  received  only  political  power  and 
constitutional democracy, which is why this chapter contends that the ANC was outsmarted with 
lies. 
 
 
 
Terreblanche (2002) makes this point vividly: 
 
Almost  all  its  argument  [corporate  sector  in  South  Africa] were  based  on  myths  and  lies,  but were 
presented with so much conviction, sophistication, and power that the ANC leaders apparently had little 
choice but to accept them. (pp. 101–102) 
 
 
 
While explaining how the ANC was outsmarted, Pheko notes that, in September 1985, the ANC 
leaders met with a group of White people in Lusaka. The latter were led by Anglo-American 
chairman Gavin Relly. Their message to the ANC leaders in exile was that a transition to a 
Black-governed liberal democracy was possible only if order and stability were guaranteed. This 
was a reference to a free-market state where social justice would not be a priority (Pheko 2012). 
 
 
 
The  idea  of  democratization,  which  presented  itself  under  the  notion  of  a  transition  to 
democracy, dismantled the liberation strategy of the ANC. This notion also led the ANC to be in 
a situation where it had to choose between economic power and political power, which means 
that the NP strategically caught the ANC off guard. The NP was able to do this because the ANC 
operated under a pseudo-idea, namely “seek political power and the rest shall follow”. The NP 
also saw the ideological vacuum opened by the unattainable idea of “seek political power and the 
rest shall follow”, and they led the ANC to have informal negotiations on economic issues with 
the corporate sector in South Africa and have formal negotiations on political issues with all the 
stakeholders. 
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The corporate sector was thus directly and indirectly a major player in the negotiations or the 
transition to democracy. The chapter pointed out that, as soon as the corporate sector in South 
Africa was satisfied that it had “boxed in” the ANC’s leaders in the informal negotiations, it 
pressured the participants at the formal negotiations into agreeing on political and constitutional 
matters (Terreblanche 2002:100). 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
It is the contention of this chapter that the passing of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, which led to establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa, was the final seal to the elite compromised reached at the informal 
and formal negotiations. This is based on the following occurrences: (1) the sudden promotion of 
the notion of democratization and the transition to democracy, (2) the sudden ideological shifts 
in the thinking of the NP, corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC and (3) the sudden 
passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995. 
 
 
 
The sudden promotion of the notion of democratization and the transition to democracy were not 
accidental. This is because the notion of democratization was promoted as a strategic shift in the 
approach to Third-World countries by imperialist governments. Cronin notes that these shifts 
have gone through two major steps after the strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam at 
the beginning of the 1970s. The first shift was to Vietnamese Third-World struggles. This meant 
massive political and military support for regional authoritarian regimes such as the NP in South 
Africa. By the end of the 1970s, however, these regional authoritarian regimes were proving to 
be increasingly unstable. They were the targets and often the direct cause of growing mass and 
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guerrilla movements. As such, the imperial governments strategically shifted their strategy 
because their politico-military strategy was not working and posed threats to their continued 
control over these countries. Thus, these imperial governments started promoting the notion of 
democratization and that at the same time as capitalism was becoming global in character. 
 
 
 
The notion of a transition to democracy was promoted strategically at the same time as the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  (1989–1991).  This  becomes  important  as  many  liberation 
movements were supported by the Soviet Union and were promoting the idea of overthrowing 
the authoritarian regimes through military power. The collapse of the Soviet Union thus provided 
the imperial governments through their authoritarian regimes the opportunity to promote the 
notion of a transition to democracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) left the 
liberation movements in disarray. As a result, the notion of democratization or a transition to 
democracy was the only option available for Third-World countries. 
 
 
 
The notion of democratization was promoted at the same time when capitalism was becoming 
global in character. Though democracy sounds good in theory, in practice, especially under the 
capitalist system, it becomes a nightmare. Whilst democracy is based on the equality of rights 
and privileges maintained and supplied by state power, capitalism is based on the unequal 
distribution of property and assets and on the state-guaranteed freedom of all people to own their 
assets and property as they please, within the prescriptions of the law. The sudden promotion of 
the notion of democratization under the capitalist system thus resulted in unequal freedom and 
unequal rights. 
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The sudden ideological shifts in the thinking of the NP, the corporate sector in South Africa and 
the ANC were not accidental. This means that the promotion of the transition to democracy and 
the opting by the NP and corporate sector in South Africa to negotiate and the sudden shifts in 
the ideological thinking of the ANC were not accidental. Given the internal and external 
pressures, the apartheid government, and specifically the economy and the corporate sector in 
South Africa, had to make a strategic move to guarantee their continued grip on the economy of 
South Africa. Under that time, the economy of South Africa was under pressure, which was why 
the  NP  and  specifically  the  corporate  sector  in  South  Africa  were  looking  for  a  new 
accumulation strategy. As a result, the idea of a transition to democracy was the only option for 
the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa. 
 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left the ANC in disarray. This is because their alternative to the 
authoritarian system, apartheid, was socialism or communism. The ANC was not prepared or had 
never prepared themselves for democracy. Their policies (e.g. the Freedom Charter) were based 
on influences from socialism and communism. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989– 
1991) opened an ideological vacuum within the ANC, and the NP and corporate sector in South 
Africa grabbed the opportunity and convinced the ANC to opt for democracy. I have to note 
again that the notion of democratization was promoted when capitalism was becoming global in 
character. Thus, the ANC was not only unprepared for democracy, but they were also unprepared 
for democracy under a capitalist system. This is why the ANC accepted all the policies proposed 
by the corporate sector and other international financial bodies. By making this choice, the ANC 
played into the strategy of the imperialist government through authoritarian regimes to exert 
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growing domination through financial mechanism imposed by bodies like the IMF, the World 
 
Bank and GATT (Cronin 1993:5). 
 
 
 
 
Also, the sudden passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 
 
1995, was not accidental. The passing of this act, which eventually established the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, was aimed at sealing the elite compromise reached 
at the informal and formal negotiations. The TRC was tasked with the promotion of national 
unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions 
of the past by establishing as complete a picture of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations of human rights which were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 
1994. 
 
 
 
 
The idea of “gross violation of human rights” was left vague, that is, it was stated that the 
commission should facilitate inquiries into (i) gross violations of human rights, including 
violations which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse and (ii) the identity of all persons, 
authorities, institutions and organizations involved in such violations. The mandate given to the 
TRC was vague, but the TRC decided to interpret its mandate narrowly because it was a result of 
a political compromise reached at the negotiations. 
 
 
 
The TRC did an excellent job of discrediting the apartheid regime and the atrocities committed 
under its aegis, but it failed to hold institutions such as the corporate sector in South Africa 
responsible. I argued that the TRC was established to seal the elite compromise reach at the 
negotiations. The TRC did indeed identify many of the individual perpetrators of gross human- 
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rights violations and also many of the individual victims of these violations. However, the TRC 
focused on individual perpetrators and victims and ignored institutions. Because of this choice, it 
ignored the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively and systematically against 
millions of Black people under White political domination and racial capitalism. This inability 
and/or unwillingness of the TRC to systematically analyze South Africa’s history of unequal 
power  structures  are  puzzling.  By  trying  to  uncover  the  truth  about  only  one  form  of 
victimization  under  apartheid  and  ignoring  another  form  of  victimization,  the  TRC  failed 
dismally in its quest for truth and reconciliation. 
 
 
 
In the following chapter, I shall look at how the formation of the TRC in South Africa became a 
political project with a political solution. This argument is based on how the proceedings of the 
TRC ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. The claim 
that the TRC ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations is 
based on how the TRC deliberately narrowed down a vague mandate given to it. The mandate of 
the TRC mandated the TRC to investigate, amongst others, gross human-rights violations 
perpetrated by institutions which benefitted from these violations. Surprisingly, the TRC opted to 
interpret its mandate narrowly as a mandate of investigating individuals. Therefore, the inquiry 
into gross human-rights violations focused on individuals, and the institutions which backed up 
the apartheid system got away scot-free. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE TRC AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE ELITE 
COMPROMISE REACHED AT THE INFORMAL AND 
FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
The TRC ratified this agreement [that the benefits that had been accumulated mostly undeservedly in the hands of 
the  corporate  sector  and  other  White  people  through  systematic  exploitation  would  be  either  forgotten  or 
condoned], although it was not in the interests of truth-seeking and reconciliation to do so. (Terreblanche 2002:125) 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
The South African Truth (and Reconciliation) Commission, which was initially called the Truth 
Commission, was formed against the background of the pronouncement of the international 
human rights community that apartheid was judged “a crime against humanity” and against the 
background of the negotiated settlement (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). The TRC was thus 
established, on the one hand, to please the international human rights community and, on the 
other hand, to ratify the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. This 
claim is based on how the TRC accidentally and/or intentionally narrowed down the wide 
mandate given to it. I contend that it did so in order to please both the international human-rights 
community and the corporate sector in South Africa through obscuring the systemic character of 
apartheid and thus offering the corporate sector in South Africa an underserved opportunity to 
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clear themselves and their corporations of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy 
of apartheid (Terreblanche 2002:124–132) 
 
 
 
As noted previously, the sudden interest of the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa in a 
negotiated settlement and the sudden passing of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995, were not accidental. This act, which gave birth to the TRC, 
was passed as a ratification of the elite compromise reached in the informal and formal 
negotiations. Furthermore, notion of democracy was promoted for the benefit of the imperial 
forces through the authoritarian regimes, in order for the imperial forces to maintain their grip on 
the economy of the Third-World countries. 
 
 
 
The previous chapter pointed out how the promotion of the notion of democratisation caught the 
ANC off-guard and resulted in the ANC accepting pacts that would result in the authoritarian 
regime and its constituency becoming economic victors whilst the ANC and its constituency 
became political victors. 
 
 
 
It is important to note that these events occurred without the participation of the church though 
some theologians were indeed involved. Although the church was not involved in the either the 
informal or formal negotiations, its theological concept(s) like “reconciliation” was used in the 
formation of the TRC (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). It is the contention of this chapter that the 
church  and  its  theological  concept,  reconciliation,  was  used  to  ratify  the  elite  compromise 
reached at both the informal and formal negotiations. I base this claim on the argument that the 
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church as the most influential organ of society was the only organ of society left to ratify the elite 
compromise. 
 
 
 
This seal was important as the church as an influential organ of society in South Africa was 
known, amongst other things, to have helped in the fight against the apartheid system despite the 
fact that the very church also gave theological justification for the system of apartheid (Smith 
1979:1 & De Gruchy 2005:182). This very influential position37  of the church could not be 
 
ignored in the process of the TRC. Thus, the church was also used to ratify the elite compromise. 
During the informal and formal negotiations, the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
managed to obtain approval for their plans from the ANC, which assumed the position as the 
political voice of the Black majority. Now, the only influential organ of society outstanding was 
the church. 
 
 
 
The notion of “reconciliation”, which is a theological concept, is based on the idea of “restoring” 
things or relationships to their original status (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:11-12). I argue, once 
again, that the use of this notion in the formation of the TRC was not accidental. There is a long 
history of the taming of the biblical message in South Africa. This is why I argue that the use of 
this theological concept was calculated. The inclusion of this tamed concept in the TRC led to it 
be given the meaning of “forgiveness”, which resulted in blanket “amnesty” to all perpetrators 
(Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9-10; Mamdani 2002:33-34). The inclusion of this concept in the 
TRC and the inclusion of theologians in the TRC became a powerful symbolical ratification of 
 
37It is vital at this stage to mention, that the history of the church in South Africa puts it an oxymoronous situation. 
On the one hand, the church is known to have played a crucial role in providing theological justification for 
apartheid, and on the other side, the church is also known to have played a role in fighting the apartheid system. As 
such, the church finds itself in this influential position which, this chapter contends, forces the role players in the 
negotiations to notice the church in their task to move South Africa and South Africans forward. 
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the elite compromise reached at the negotiations. This was seen in how the TRC conducted its 
proceedings especially under the chairmanship of a theologian, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. 
 
 
 
This chapter will make its argument, that the TRC was established to ratify the elite compromise 
reached at the informal and formal negotiations, by looking at the following sub-sections: (1) 
Historical and ideological influences on the TRC, (2) TRC: The biblical concept of 
“reconciliation” within the TRC, (3) TRC: Individualistic and legalistic approach to human- 
rights violations, (4) TRC: A political project with a political solution? And (4) Conclusion. 
 
 
 
4.2 Historical and ideological influences on the TRC 
 
 
 
I start off the argument by noting the historical and ideological influences on the TRC. This is 
because an impression has been created that the concept of truth commissions emerged with the 
South African TRC. As such, the South African TRC is looked at with awe for its success. This 
perception might be as a result of its symbolic position in bringing about a successful and so- 
called peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. This perception has led South Africa to 
be regarded as the miracle child of Africa in particular and the world in general. Thus Stevens, 
Franchi and Swart (2006) rightly notes the following: 
… although a great deal of international attention has tended to focus on the South African TRC with its 
successes and failures. But the actual concept of truth commissions emerged in the 1970s in Uganda and 
later gained prominence in Latin America in the 1980s. (p. 296) 
 
 
 
It is for this reason that attention will be given to the historical and ideological influences of the 
 
Ugandan Truth Commission (1974), the National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina 
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(1983), the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile (1991) and the 
Commission of Inquiry in Chad (1992) (ibid; Mamdani in Amadiume and Abdullahi 2000:179; 
Terreblanche 2002:128–129). This is because the South Africa TRC drew largely on the Latin- 
American examples to help shape its truth commission. However, it must pointed out that, as a 
result of the historical and ideological influence of the Latin American truth commissions, the 
TRC  obscured  what  was  distinctive  about  apartheid  (Mamdani  in  Amadiume  &  Abdullahi 
2000:179). As a result of this obscuring, the TRC made the following three mistakes which 
resulted in “… amnesty without reparations for a crime against humanity”: (1) Firstly, the TRC 
individualised the victims of apartheid. Though the TRC acknowledged apartheid as a crime 
against humanity which targeted entire communities for ethnic and racial cleansing, it was 
reluctant to go beyond this formal acknowledgement. (2) Secondly, when the TRC focused on 
individuals, thus obscuring the victimisation of communities, it was unable to highlight the 
bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non- 
natives. (3) Thirdly, the TRC extended mostly to perpetrators of apartheid. In the absence of a 
full acknowledgment of victims of apartheid, there could not be a complete identification of 
perpetrators (Mamdani 2002:33–34; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
Stevens et al. 2006:296 (see also Terreblanche 2002:124-132 ) points to this background in the 
following words: 
… while a great deal of international attention has focussed on the South Africa TRC and its successes and 
failures, the actual concept of truth commission emerged in the 1970s Uganda, and gained prominence in 
Latin America in the 1980s. 
154  
The TRC drew from these truth commissions, and Stevens et al. (2006) rightly point outs the 
following: 
…  generally,  truth  commissions  are  official  agencies  that  are  sponsored  by  governments  and/or 
international organizations to formally investigate and report on human rights violations that occur in 
specific countries or regions that have endured a period of social conflict. (p. 196) 
Truth commissions are a forum for victims, relatives and even perpetrators to give testimony and 
evidence of human-rights abuses. These commissions are intended to provide closure in these 
tragedies, to account for past abuses, to provide recommendations to prevent similar acts from 
recurring in the future and to stimulate national reconciliation (Terreblanche 2002:124–132; see 
also Stevens et al. 2006:296). The inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth 
about the systemic exploitation must be understood against this background of the truth 
commission  being  a  “…  forum  for  victims,  relatives  and  even  perpetrators”  (Terreblanche 
2002:124–132; Stevens et al. 2006:296). Terreblanche (2002) rightly points to this when he 
notes the following: 
… the TRC has done an excellent job in discrediting the apartheid regime, and the atrocities committed 
under  its  aegis.  In  doing  so  it  identified  many  of  the  individual  perpetrators  of  gross  human  rights 
violations, and also many of the individual victims of these violation. (p. 124) 
 
 
 
The individualisation of the victims and the perpetrators of human-rights violations by the TRC 
in South Africa came as a result of, amongst other things, the influence of the truth commissions 
in Uganda in the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s (Stevens et al. 2006:296; Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). Stevens et al. (2006) refers to the following history of truth commissions: 
 
… after the first truth commission in 1974 in Uganda, several other countries employed this process, 
namely, he National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983, the National Commission for 
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Truth and Reconciliation in Chile in 1991, the Commission of Inquiry in Chad in 1992, and the South 
 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995. (p. 196–197) 
 
 
 
 
In this section, I am looking at some of historical background which led to the establishment of 
the truth commissions of Uganda (1974), Argentina (1983), Chile (1991) and Chad (1992). The 
focus will specifically be on these countries because Uganda was the first country to have a truth 
commission whilst the other countries mentioned (Argentina, Chile and Chad) followed Uganda. 
In most of the mentioned countries, the human-rights violation came as a result of dictatorships 
and the disappearance of citizens (Stevens et al. 2006:296; Terreblanche 2002:124– 
132).  Amadiume  and  Abdullahi  (2000:179)  rightly  points  out  that,  because  the  truth 
commissions in these countries (Uganda, Argentina, Chile and Chad) dealt with the human-rights 
violations which were caused by dictatorships and the disappearance of citizens, the influence of 
these commissions on the TRC obscured what was distinctive about apartheid in South Africa. 
 
 
 
Firstly, I deal with the historical background behind the establishment of the truth commission in 
Uganda in 1974. This truth commission in Uganda was established by Idi Amin Dada. This came 
about when Idi Amin Dada, who was then a junior soldier in the army removed the authoritarian 
president Milton Obote from power, a move welcomed by the people of Uganda. However, it 
was not long until he disbanded the parliament and changed the composition of the country, 
granting himself absolute power. This move resulted in resistance from the people of Uganda. In 
response, Idi Amin Dada enforced his power through running an organised campaign of 
repression that included killings and disappearances. This was the background to the people of 
Uganda demanding the establishment of an inquiry into the disappearances that occurred during 
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Idi Amin’s early years in power The truth commission of Uganda was established in 1974 
(United States Institute of Peace 1971–1974). 
 
 
 
The United States Institute of Peace (1971–1974) reports as follows on the Ugandan truth 
commission: 
In 1971, a junior army Idi Amin Dada ousted the authoritarian president Milton Obote from power. It must, 
also, be noted, that though Amin was initially welcomed enthusiastically, he quickly dissolved parliament 
and altered the constitution granting himself absolute power. Consequently, the Ugandan state forces 
carried out an organized campaign of repression that included killings and disappearances. As a result, 
strong public pressure mounted for an inquiry to be conducted into disappearances occurring during the 
early years of the Amin government. As a result, President Amin established the Commission of inquiry 
into the Disappearances of People in Uganda. (n.p.) 
 
 
 
Following  the  truth  commission  in  Uganda  in  1974,  several  other  countries  employed  this 
process. I now look at the National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983. The 
1983 Argentinian National Commission on the Disappeared was established as a consequence of 
the systematic disappearance, torture and death of thousands of people suspected by the regime 
of supporting groups which were fighting the regime (Sugiyama 2008:31–39). This came after 
the military coup in March 1976 where President Isabel Peron was overthrown. Following this, a 
military dictatorship was installed under the leadership of General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral 
Emilio Eduardo Massera and Brigadier-General Orlando Ramon Agosti. This military 
dictatorship, which was known as the “National Reorganization Process”, remained in power 
until 1983. However, during the seven years between the ousting of the dictator, President Isabel 
Peron (1976), and the running of the country by the National Reorganized Process (1983), there 
was an armed struggle between the military dictatorship of the National Reorganized Process and 
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opposition which resulted in the systematic yet secret disappearance, torture and death of 
thousands of individuals suspected by the government of supporting the left-wing agenda 
(Sugiyama 2008:31–39). As a result of the growing internal and international pressure, the 
National Reorganized Process was forced to hold general elections. These elections resulted in 
Raul Alfonsin being elected as president. Shortly after his inauguration, he established the 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) of 1983. This commission 
was established to investigate the fate of the victims of disappearance and other human-rights 
violations during the military dictatorship (Sugiyama 2008:31–39). 
 
 
 
Regarding this process, the United States Institute of Peace (1983–1984) reports as follows: 
 
… following a military coup in March 1976, a series of military juntas exercised power in Argentina, while 
an  opposing  leftist  guerrilla  movement  grew.  A  seven-year  armed  struggle  between  the  military 
dictatorship and opposition “subversives” resulted in the systematic yet secret, disappearance, torture, and 
death of thousands of individuals suspected by the government of supporting the left-wing agenda. The 
regime of Reynaldo Benito Bignone was forced to allow general elections in 1983 because of the combined 
effect of increasing domestic and international pressure to clarify the fate of the disappeared, an economic 
crisis, and the military defeat in the war against Great Britain over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. Raul 
Alfonsin was elected as president. During his first week in office, he created the CONADEP on December 
16, 1983 and repealed the military amnesty that had protected its members from investigation. (n.p.) 
 
 
 
 
Following the National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983, the National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established in Chile in 1991. This commission 
was established following a numerous acts of repression against opposition groups by General 
Augusto  Pinochet’s  government.  This  came  after  the  1973  Chilean  coup  where  President 
Salvador Allende was overthrown by the armed forces and national police. As a result, a military 
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dictatorship was established under General Augusto Pinochet (Ensalaco 1994:656–675). After 
the coup, General Augusto Pinochet rose to supreme power within a year with the help of the 
United-States government, which had worked hard to create the conditions of the coup which 
resulted in the ousting of President Salvador Allende. Under President Salvador Allende, Chile 
was hailed as a beacon of democracy and political stability in South America. However, under 
the  leadership  of  General  Augusto  Pinochet,  Chile  turned  into  a  military  dictatorship  and 
caudillo (that is, a state under a political-military leader). It is also under Pinochet’s government 
that the Chilean civilian government was abolished, and all left-wing political activities were 
repressed. As a result of growing internal and international pressure, Pinochet allowed elections 
lost to Patricio Aylwin (Ensalaco 1994:656–675). Shortly after his inauguration, President 
Patricio Aylwin established Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation known as 
“The Rettig Commission” to investigate human-rights abused that occurred during the Pinochet 
regime. This commission was mandated to document human-rights abuses resulting in death or 
disappearance during the years of military rule, from 11 September 1973 to 11 March 1990. It is 
also important to mention for the purpose of this chapter that torture and other abuses that did not 
result in death fell outside of the scope of this commission’s mandate (Ensalaco 1994:656–675). 
 
 
 
The following is the historical background with led to the establishment of the TRC in Chile in 
 
1991 (United States Institute of Peace 1990–1991): 
 
In 1973, President Salvador Allende was removed from power and General Augusto Pinochet took over the 
Chilean government. Pinochet was accused of numerous acts of repression against opposition groups. The 
Pinochet dictatorship ended in 1989 when he conceded to holding elections and then lost to Patricio Aylwin 
by a narrow margin. Shortly thereafter, President Aylwin established Chile’s National Commission for 
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Truth and Reconciliation known as “the Rettig Commission” to investigate human rights abuses that 
occurred during the Pinochet regime. (n.p.) 
 
 
 
Lastly, I note the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry in Chad in 1992. This commission 
was established following widespread human-rights abuses and atrocities which were instituted 
by Hissene Habre’s government (Human Rights Watch 2005:1–41). This came after Hissene 
Habre, who was given the post of prime minister of Chad in 1978, deposed Goukouni Oueddei as 
president through a coup in 1982. As a result of the coup, Hissene Habre seized power in Chad 
and ruled from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990. Habre’s one-party regime was characterised 
by human-rights abuses and atrocities. After Habre seized power, he created a secret police 
known as the Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS) which tortured and executed the 
government’s opponents (Human Rights Watch 2005:1–41). Some of the methods which this 
secret police used included burning with incandescent objects; spraying of gas into the eyes, ears 
and nose; forcing victims to swallow water and forcing the mouths of detainees around the 
exhaust pipe of a running car (Human Rights Watch 2005:1–41). Habre’s government also 
became engaged in an ethnic-cleansing campaign against groups such as the Sars, Hadjerai and 
Zaghawa. Under these conditions, Libya (under Muammar al-Gaddafi) invaded Chad in 1980 in 
an attempt to drive Habre out, with little success (Human Rights Watch 2005:1–41). Later, a 
rebel offensive group led by Idriss Deby defeated Habre’s forces. Then Idriss Deby became the 
president of Chad. It was under his rule that the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and 
Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre, his accomplices and/or accessories was 
established to investigate illegal detentions, assassinations, disappearances, torture, mistreatment, 
other attacks on the physical and mental integrity of persons and all violations of human rights, 
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illicit narcotics trafficking and embezzlement of the state fund between 1982–1990 (Human 
 
Rights Watch 2005:1–41). 
 
 
 
 
In this regard, the United States Institute of Peace (1991–1992) notes the following: 
 
… a civil war in Chad ended in August 1979 with the signing of the Lagos Accord, and a national unity 
government was established. In 1981, fighting out between President Oueddei’s and Defence Minister 
Hissene Habre’s forces. Once Habre gained power control, he began a campaign of widespread repression 
including torture and killings. Intervention by French, Zairian (Congolese), and Libyan forces failed to oust 
Habre from power until Idriss Deby, one of Habre’s former generals, fled to Sudan and gained the Libyan 
backing  to  launch  a  successful  attack  against  Harbre  in  December  1990.  Deby  became  president  in 
February 1991 and established the commission to investigate crimes committed during Habre’s eight-year 
rule. (n.p.) 
 
 
 
Reflecting  on  these  processes,  I  now  observe  some  of  the  similarities  in  the  historical 
backgrounds which led to the establishment of truth commissions in Uganda (1974), Argentina 
(1983), Chile (1991) and Chad (1992). This is for the purpose of showing some similarities 
between all of these countries whilst pointing their differences from the South-African situation. 
In Uganda, the truth commission was established after Idi Amin Dada ousted the authoritarian 
President Milton Obote from power (United States Institute of Peace 1971–1974:n.p.). In 
Argentina,  however,  the  National  Commission  on  the  Disappeared  was  established  after  a 
military coup in March 1976 (United States Institute of Peace 1983–1984:n.p.). In the case of 
Chile, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established after General 
Pinochet took over the Chilean government. It must be noted that General Pinochet was a 
dictator until 1989 when he conceded to holding elections, which he lost to Patricio Aylwin 
(United States Institute of Peace 1990–1991:n.p.). President Aylwin then established Chile’s 
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National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. The situation in Chad entailed that the 
Commission of Inquiry into the crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre 
was established after Hissene Habre had ousted President Ouddei (United States Institute of 
Peace 1991–1992:n.p.). 
 
 
 
Before looking into the similarities and differences between the acts of gross human-rights 
violations in these countries (Uganda, Argentina, Chile and Chad) and in South Africa, I am 
looking into how, theoretically, these commissions (the Truth commission in Uganda, the 
National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina, the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile and the Commission of Inquiry in Chad) came into being. Stevens et al. 
(2006:297) observes that “… the truth commissions tend to be employed as a strategy in contexts 
of social evolution in which a stable transition is being pursued”. In all of these countries, the 
political transition was not stable because the transitions in these countries were based either on a 
military coup or a total take over by dictators such as Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Reynaldo 
Benito Bignone in Argentina, General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Hissene Habre in Chad 
(United  States  Institute  of  Peace  1971–1974:n.p.;  United  States  Institute  of  Peace  1983– 
1984:n.p.; United States Institute of Peace 1990–1991:n.p.; United States Institute of Peace 
 
1991–1992:n.p.). Stevens et al. (2006:297) further notes that the Truth Commissions were “… 
therefore fundamentally associated with the politics of transformation and are consequently an 
invariable tool of political reformism”. 
 
 
 
Political reformism, especially in Third-World countries such as Uganda, Argentina, Chile, Chad 
and South Africa, refer to the notion of democratisation or transition from authoritarian regimes 
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to democratic regimes (Cronin 1994). It is for this reason that Stevens et al. (2006:297) rightly 
notes: “This is in contrast to a situation in which outright political purges occur, where these 
purges are often associated with socio-political ruptures rather stable transitions.” The truth 
commissions in countries like Uganda, Argentina, Chile and Chad, on which the South Africa 
TRC drew, were constituted in situations where the transitions were not stable whilst the idea 
was that “… truth commissions tend to be employed as a strategy in contexts of social evolution 
in which a stable transition is being pursued” (ibid:297). Thus Stevens et al. (2006) rightly points 
out the following: 
… the very choice of such commissions as a strategy denotes potential characteristics of the social 
formations in which they are embedded - namely that these contexts are highly likely to be pervaded by 
conditions of socio-political compromise. (p. 297) 
 
 
 
When one looks at the historical background which led to the establishment of the TRC, the 
notion that the “…truth commissions tend to be employed as a strategy in contexts of social 
evolution in which a stable transition is being pursued” (Stevens et al. 2006:297) needs to be 
considered. The notion of a “stable transition” in the South-African situation is a misnomer. I 
make this claim because the transition in South Africa came as a result of the cul-de-sac in which 
the NP, the Corporate Sector in South Africa and the ANC found themselves during the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Cronin 1994; Mkhondo 1993; Terreblanche 2002). During this period, the 
1980s to early 1990s, the notion of democratisation was promoted in Third-World countries at 
the same time when capitalism was becoming global in character (Cronin 1994; Terreblanche 
2002).  Thus,  the  notion  of  democratisation,  which  advanced  the  notion  of  transition  to 
democracy, was promoted for the sole purpose of guaranteeing that the authoritarian regime 
maintain its grip on the economy of South Africa (ibid). 
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The liberation movements in Third-World countries, namely the ANC in South Africa, resorted 
to the notion of a transition to democracy as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989– 
1990) which left them in a cul-de-sac. As noted earlier, the ANC, NP and the corporate sector in 
South Africa opted for the transition to democracy as a result of circumstances. In the words of 
Stevens  et  al.  (2006:297),  “…  the  backdrop  of  sanctions  and  a  flailing  political  economy 
rendered it impossible for the apartheid state to sustain its escalated oppression”, which is why 
the notion of a “stable transition” is a misnomer in South Africa. They (ibid) rightly point out the 
following: 
… the socio-political condition predating the TRC in South Africa was one which the NP, on the one hand, 
was unable to effect a victory over an increasingly militant resistance to the apartheid system from the 
liberation movement. 
… the resistance movements, on the other hand, were unable to initiate a comprehensive revolution against 
the apartheid state because of a variety of objective and subjective political reasons. (p. 297) 
 
 
 
After looking at how these commissions came into being, I now proceed to noting the similarities 
between acts of human-rights violation in these countries, Uganda, Argentina, Chile and Chad, 
which led to the establishment of their truth commissions. In Uganda, the truth commission was 
established after the Ugandan state forces had carried out an organised campaign of repression 
that included killings and disappearances. In Argentina, the National Commission on the 
Disappeared was established after a seven-year armed struggle between the military dictatorship 
and opposition “subversives” resulted in the systematic, yet secret, disappearance, torture and 
death of thousands of individuals suspected by the government of supporting the left-wing 
agenda. In Chile, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was established after 
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General Pinochet was accused of numerous acts of repression against opposition groups. Lastly, 
in Chad, the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex- 
President Habre was established after Habre carried out a campaign of widespread repression, 
including torture and killings. 
 
 
 
In spite of the differences between the historical backgrounds, namely gross violations which 
were committed under dictators, which led to the establishment of the truth commissions in these 
countries, the South African TRC drew largely on the Latin-American examples to help shape its 
form and processes. The influence of these commissions led to the inability and unwillingness of 
the TRC to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation as Terreblanche (2002:128) points out. 
In their task of uncovering the truth with the aim of promoting national unity and reconciliation 
in  a  spirit  of  understanding  which  transcends  the  conflicts  and  divisions  of  the  past  by 
establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations of human rights (TRC 1998:56), the TRC decided to narrow down their investigations 
to individual perpetrators and victims (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179). 
 
 
 
Mamdani rightly pointed out that “… the TRC passionately embraced [the analogy] of 
dictatorship in Latin America, when they decided to narrow their investigation to perpetrators 
and  victims  (legally  defined)  gross  human  rights  violations”  (in  Amadiume  &  Abdullahi 
2000:179). When the TRC agreed to construct itself on the analogy of the previous commissions 
(the Truth Commission in Uganda, the National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina, 
the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile and the Commission of Inquiry 
in Chad; Stevens et al. 2006:296) in Latin America, it ignored what was distinctive about 
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apartheid in South Africa (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179). Thus Terreblanche (2002:128) 
argues that, “[i]n the process, the TRC agreed that apartheid was no more than a harsh and cruel 
dictatorship, a gross denial of human rights”. Thus, the analogy with Latin America obscured 
what was distinctive about the gross human-rights violations in South Africa. The difference was 
that the gross violations of human-rights in South Africa were perpetrated collectively and 
systemically against millions of Black people under the White political domination and racial 
capitalism (ibid:124). 
 
 
 
Thus, the influence of the Latin-American analogy on the TRC led to its inability and/or 
unwillingness to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation of the apartheid system 
(Terreblanche 2002:124). Due to this influence, the TRC did not only obscure what was 
distinctive about apartheid in South Africa, but it failed to honour its mandate, namely to 
facilitate “… inquiries into (i) gross violations of human rights, including violations which were 
part of a systematic pattern of abuse … (ii) the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and 
organisations involved in such violations [of human rights]” (TRC 1998:56). Mamdani (in 
Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179) puts it succinctly: “The Latin American analogy obscured 
what was distinctive about apartheid. For the violence of apartheid was aimed less at individuals 
than at entire communities and entire population groups.” 
 
 
 
Looking at other distinctive factors between the Latin-American and South-African situations, I 
note  that  the  violence  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  TRC  was  not  just  political 
(Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179). In other words, the violence that was perpetuated against 
the  millions  of  Black  people  in  South  Africa  (Terreblanche  2002:124)  was  not  just  about 
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defending power by denying people their rights (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179). In the case 
of South Africa, “… the point of torture, terror, death, was more far-reaching: its aim was to 
dispossess people of means of livelihood” (ibid). This is why I agree with the conclusion that “… 
the Latin American analogy obscured the colonial nature of the South Africa context: the link 
between conquest and dispossession, between racialized power and racialized privileges” (ibid). 
As a result of the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions – 
particularly  the  National  Commission  for  Truth  and  Reconciliation  in  Chile  –  the  TRC 
accidentally or intentionally embarked on a journey that led to its inability and/or unwillingness 
to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation caused by apartheid. Thus, the TRC failed in 
its mandate to establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights which were committed during the given period (Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
 
4.3 TRC: The biblical concept of ‘reconciliation’ within 
the TRC 
Following the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions in 
Argentina and Chile on the South African truth commission, I now turn to the addition of the 
biblical concept of “reconciliation” on the South-African truth commission. As argued often 
above, I contend that the biblical concept of “reconciliation” was added, like Boesak and 
DeYoung (2012:1) points out, to “… reach some political accommodation that did not address 
the critical questions of justice, equality, and dignity that are so prominent in the biblical 
understanding  of  reconciliation”.  Boesak  and  DeYoung  (2012:10)  point  out  that,  in  South 
African and especially under the political accommodation and arrangement of the elite 
compromise,   the   biblical   concept   of   “reconciliation”   has   come   to   mean   assimilation, 
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appeasement,  a  passive  peace,  a  unity  without  cost  and  maintaining  power  with  cosmetic 
changes. 
 
 
 
As alluded to before, “reconciliation” is a biblical concept which denotes “restoring” things to 
their original state. However, under the political accommodation and arrangement of the elite 
compromise, this concept underwent a change in meaning. Boesak and DeYoung explain change 
in meaning by employing two notions namely political pietism and Christian quietism. They 
point out that, in the context of the South-African political accommodation and arrangement, 
“reconciliation” was presented as if it does not need genuine reconciliation, and it employs a 
language that sounds like the truth but is in fact deceitful. This is what Boesak and DeYoung 
(2012:1) call political pietism. They further note that, at some point, people discovered that what 
was happening at the TRC was in fact not reconciliation, and yet for reasons of self-protection, 
fear or a desire for acceptance or to accommodate this situation, they justified it. In this process 
of refusing to run the risk of challenging and prophetically telling the truth, people became 
complicit in deceitful reconciliation. Boesak and DeYoung (2012:1) thus come to the following 
conclusion: “We deny the demands of the gospel and refuse solidarity with the powerless and 
oppressed. This we call Christian quietism.” 
 
 
 
Following Boesak and DeYoung’s notions of political pietism and Christian quietism, Stevens et 
al. (2006:296; see also Terreblanche 2002:124–132) put forward their view concerning the 
addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation. According to them, it should be understood 
against the backdrop of a series of events, namely (i) the historical and ideological influence of 
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the Latin American truth commissions, particularly the National Commission for Truth and 
 
Reconciliation in Chile and (2) the informal and formal negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
In particular, the South-African TRC drew its use of the notion of “reconciliation” from the truth 
commission of Chile (Stevens et al. 2006:296). This historical link is important because it shows 
how the addition of the biblical notion of “reconciliation” in both the Chilean and South-African 
truth commissions led to the same outcomes despite different mandates (United States Institute 
of Peace 1990; 1995). 
 
 
 
For instance, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile was mandated to 
document human rights abuses resulting in the death or disappearance of people during the years 
of military rule from 11 September 1973 to 11 March 1990. The Chilean truth commission made 
the following recommendations (United States Institute of Peace 1990–1991): 
(1) the commission recommended the establishment of a National Corporation for Reparations and 
Reconciliation to provide continuing assistance to victims that testified. It suggested that reparations should 
include symbolic measures as well as significant legal, financial, medical and administrative assistance. (2) 
The commission recommended the adoption of human rights legislation, the creation of an ombudsman 
office and the strengthening of civilian authority in Chile society and judicial system. It is, however, 
interesting to note that after all these recommendations the Chilean government passed the amnesty law. 
(n.p.) 
 
 
 
On its part, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was mandated to 
investigate gross human-rights violations that were perpetrated during the period of the apartheid 
regime between 1960 and 1994, including abductions, killings and torture. Its mandate covered 
violations by both the state and the liberation movements and allowed the commission to hold 
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special hearings focussed on specific sectors, institutions and individuals. It is interesting to note 
that, controversially, the TRC was empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators who confessed 
their crimes truthfully and completely to the commission (United States Institute of Peace 1995). 
The South African TRC made the following recommendations (United States Institute of Peace 
1995): 
 
(1) The TRC made detailed recommendations for a reparations program including financial, symbolic and 
community reparations. (2) The commission further recommended that South Africa’s society and political 
system should be reformed to include faith communities, businesses, the judiciary, prisons, the armed 
forced, health sector, media and educational institutions in a reconciliation process. (3) The prosecution 
should be considered in cases where amnesty was not sought or was denied. (n.p.) 
 
 
 
The  addition  of  the  biblical  concept  of  reconciliation  should,  however,  also  be  understood 
against the backdrop of the informal and formal negotiations in the South-African peace process. 
This is because the establishment of the TRC came about as a result of the elite compromise 
reached at the informal and formal negotiations. In the formal negotiations, the balance of forces 
favoured the ANC whilst those in the informal negotiations favoured the NP and the corporate 
sector in South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:125). The political establishment of the apartheid 
regime was dramatically defeated during the formal negotiations whilst, on behalf of White 
South Africans, the corporate sector, which formed an essential part of the system of racial 
capitalism, came out unscathed from the informal negotiations (ibid). 
 
 
 
In the process of balancing forces and/or powers, a political arrangement had to be made, namely 
that a truth commission would established to de-legitimize the apartheid regime whilst its security 
forces and individuals would be identified as both victims and perpetrators (ibid; see also Boesak 
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& DeYoung 2012; Mamdani 2002; Stevens et al. 2006:296). The addition of the biblical concept 
of “reconciliation” thus served to ratify the elite compromise. This addition, namely the biblical 
concept of reconciliation, was for the sake of reaching some political accommodation. Boesak 
and DeYoung (2012:1) further points out that “[s]uch political arrangements invariably favour 
the rich and powerful but deprive the powerless of justice and dignity”. In line with Boesak and 
DeYoung’s notions of political pietism and Christian quietism, I contend that the presentation of 
this  tamed  biblical  concept  of  reconciliation  as  if  it  responds  to  the  need  of  genuine 
reconciliation and the employment of a language that sounds like the truth but is deceitful 
constitutes political pietism. Similarly, knowing that this tamed biblical concept of reconciliation 
is known by Christians to be deceitful, and yet ignoring this knowledge, constitutes Christian 
quietism (ibid). 
 
 
 
Following Boesak and DeYoung’s notions of political pietism and Christian quietism, I concur 
with them when point out the following (Boesak & DeYoung 2012): 
… the issue was not reconciliation; it was, rather, our understanding of it … From experience in the church 
as politics, we knew how the Bible was used in Afrikaner politics, and how the radical message of the Bible 
was made servant to ideology. (p. 9) 
 
 
 
Historically, the biblical message in South Africa had been subjected to ideology to the point 
where it was domesticated for purposes of subjection and control. In this argument, one should 
just recall that the biblical message was used to give theological justification to apartheid. Thus 
Smith (1979) notes that, without theological justification, apartheid would not have been 
successful. It is for this reason that Jennings (2010:9–10) rightly points out that he “… has 
purposefully stayed away from the theological language of reconciliation because of its terrible 
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misuse in Western Christianity and its tormented deployment in so many theological systems and 
projects”. 
 
 
 
In line with Jennings’ point, that the theological language of reconciliation was terribly misused 
in Western Christianity, one should notice how truth commissions come into being especially 
after a stable transition. Stevens mentions that truth commissions come into for the purpose of 
political  reformism  and  are  pervaded  by  socio-political  compromises  (see  Stevens  et  al. 
2006:296). This is mentioned here to point out that these commissions are a product of a political 
process, which in the case of South Africa was the informal and formal negotiations. I here recall 
the argument that the informal and formal negotiations came into being as a result of the 
weakness in the ANC’s bargaining position in the 1980s given the fall of the Soviet Union 
(1989–1990).  The  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  (1989–1990)  left  the  ANC  in  an  ideologically 
confused state, and the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa took advantage of this and 
suggested the transition to democracy. The ANC then accepted everything proposed by the NP 
and the corporate sector in South Africa. Thus, the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa 
got their first prize in the informal negotiations, namely economic power, and the ANC got its 
first prize in the formal negotiations, namely political power. The TRC must be understood 
against this background. 
 
 
 
The addition of the biblical of concept of reconciliation to the South-African truth commission 
was thus not accidental. The South African truth commission, like similar commissions in 
Uganda, Argentina, Chile and Chad, was initially named the truth commission before FW de 
Klerk requested that the biblical concept of reconciliation be added to the name of the truth 
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commission (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). As such, Boesak and DeYoung (2012) rightly argue 
the following: 
Mr De Klerk and his party did not intend to allow reconciliation to confront the country with the demands 
of the gospel, but to blunt the progress of radical change and transformation. (p. 9) 
 
 
 
Following Boesak and DeYoung’s argument that the addition of the biblical concept of 
reconciliation was not intended to confront the country with the demands of the gospel but to 
blunt the progress of radical change and transformation, I argue that the addition of this biblical 
concept was to tame the processes of the TRC and to lead to the inability of the TRC to uncover 
the truth about the systemic exploitation of apartheid (Terreblanche 2002:124). This is because 
Mr De Klerk and his party knew that the biblical message could be subjected to a process where 
the scripture will be ideologised, manipulated or managed to suit their political endeavours, 
processes or desires (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:10). Furthermore, the biblical concept of 
reconciliation was not only added to tame the processes of the TRC, but its addition also entailed 
a process of changing the meaning of the word from the idea of restoring things to their original 
state to one of assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost, and maintaining 
of power with only cosmetic changes (ibid). 
 
 
 
The notions of assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost and maintaining 
power then became the basis on which only cosmetic changes had to be made on the basis of this 
tamed biblical message concerning reconciliation. These notions prove not only Boesak and 
DeYoung’s argument that the addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation was to blunt the 
progress of radical change and transformation. They also prove the contention of this chapter that 
the establishment of the TRC was to ratify the elite compromise reached at the informal and 
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formal negotiations. I claim this because the TRC failed in its mandate of “… establishing a 
complete picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross human rights violations 
…” (Terreblanche 2002). This claim is based on how the truth that the TRC was uncovering 
became a manufactured truth. Terreblanche rightly points out that the TRC intentionally ignored 
the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively and systematically against millions of 
Black people under White political domination and racial capitalism (ibid). As result of this 
failure, reconciliation came to be understood as assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a 
unity without cost, and maintaining of power with only cosmetic changes. 
 
 
 
Following the taming of the biblical message, particularly the biblical concept of reconciliation, 
the question is whether there remains the possibility of liberating this concept from being 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control. In this regard, Lisher (2005) notes the 
following: 
After Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam, Cambodia, Rwanda, all words seem hallow. Lister further asks, 
what does one say after a televised beheading? The proclamation of God’s justice or God’s loves meets a 
wall of resistance first in the throat of the proclaimer, then in the ears of the hearer … when the message of 
Jesus Christ can be Nazified or made a tool of racism, anti-Semitism, apartheid, or capitalism, it is time for 
preachers to shut up and take stock of themselves. (p. 5) 
 
 
 
Following Lisher’s notion, Boesak and DeYoung (2012:10) point out the following about the 
possibility of liberating the biblical concept of reconciliation from being domesticated for 
purposes of subjection and control: “The demands of the Scriptures will always lay a greater 
claim than these processes are willing to concede.” 
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The question, then, is: What did this biblical concept of reconciliation mean in its origin and in 
context. The motivation behind this search is that, if this concept was allowed to confront the 
country with the demands of the gospel, it would have pushed the TRC to demand justice, and it 
would have also pushed the TRC into the terrains that it wanted or had planned or could be 
allowed to go (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:10). As Boesak and DeYoung rightly point out, one 
should start with Paul’s emphasis on reconciliation. The Pauline emphasis on reconciliation 
emerged from his understanding of the life, message, death on a cross and resurrection of a 
Roman colonial subject named Jesus from the town of Nazareth in the occupied territory of 
Galilee  (ibid:11).  Boesak  and  DeYoung  further  note  that  Paul’s  interpretation  of  the  life, 
message, death on a cross and resurrection of a Roman colonial subject was also influenced by 
his  own  status  as  a  colonised  and  oppressed  member  of  an  ethnic  and  religious  minority 
(ibid:10). Thus, the Pauline account of reconciliation must be understood against this background 
and against the background of two familiar and traditional biblical texts in reconciliation 
discourse, namely 2 Corinthians 5:16–26 and Ephesians 2:14–16 (ibid). 
 
 
 
Boesak and DeYoung point out that the word reconciliation appears occasionally in the New 
Testament and, with few exceptions, always in the Pauline literature. One thus has to understand 
this biblical concept against the background of the Roman Empire and Paul. Boesak and 
DeYoung further point out that the word reconciliation is a translation of several Greek words, 
namely the verbs katallasso and apokatallasso and the noun katallage (Boesak & DeYoung 
2012:11–12). These words were utilised by Greek writers to discuss interpersonal relationships, 
but they were also used in peace treaties between nations and groups. Thus Boesak and DeYoung 
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(ibid:12) note that, in the common Greek use, there were clearly political dimensions to the 
meaning of reconciliation. 
 
 
 
When Jewish scholars translated the Hebrew scripture into Greek, they used these words 
(katallasso, apokallasso and katallage) to translate the Hebrew words related to atonement, that 
is, to God being reconciled with humanity (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:12). This is mentioned 
here to point out that the translation of the Hebrew notion of atonement to these Greek words 
(katallasso, apokallasso and katallage) did not retain the political dimension found in the Greek 
understanding of reconciliation. When Greek writers used these words, they never implied a 
spiritual connotation to reconciliation. It is for this reason that Boesak and DeYoung (ibid) point 
out the following: 
… in Paul’s usage of these words, we find both the spiritual and political meanings. His readership, both 
Greeks and Jews, would have understood reconciliation in this way as they discussed his letters in 
gatherings. (p. 12) 
 
 
 
To understand the context of Paul in an attempt to comprehend his usage of reconciliation, 
Boesak and DeYoung note that the life of Paul was shaped by the daily reality of the military 
presence and political domination of the Roman Empire. Thus, Paul’s (as an ethnic Jew) sense of 
history was defined by his people’s experience of subjugation to a series of empires: Egypt, 
Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece and Rome. As a student of Judaism, Paul’s religious instincts 
were influenced by the very origins of the people of Israel as a reaction against imperial regimes. 
The core understanding of faith for Jews was the often-recounted and recited liberation from the 
Egyptian empire in Deuteronomy 6:21: “We were Pharaoh’s slaves in Egypt, but the LORD 
brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand.” (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:13) 
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Paul’s account of reconciliation should be understood against the background of his and his 
people’s experience of subjugation to a series of empires but particularly the Roman Empire. 
This is because, as Boesak and DeYoung rightly note, the Roman Empire enforced and 
maintained domination over subject peoples through military might, economic oppression and 
ideological belief systems. Boesak and DeYoung (2012:13) further note that the influence of an 
empire is pervasive as it “… inextricably interweaves religion (what binds people together) with 
politics (what people do together) and economics (how people produce and exchange goods and 
services together)”. This is evidence of the extent to which the Roman Empire enforced and 
maintained domination over Paul and his people. Furthermore, Paul’s letters were sent to people 
living under the brutal repression of Rome. Thus Boesak and DeYoung (ibid:15) point out that 
“Paul’s social location as a colonised person shaped his perspective on life and on what he meant 
when he used the word reconciliation”. 
 
 
 
Paul’s account of reconciliation in 2 Corinthians 5:16–20, 6:2 and Ephesians 2:14, 15b–16 also 
needs to be seen against his colonial context. Hence Boesak and DeYoung (2012:16–23) argue 
that, in re-reading these texts, the following is seen of reconciliation: reconciliation is real; 
reconciliation is experiential; reconciliation is radical, that is, focussed on social justice; 
reconciliation  is  revolutionary,  that  is,  oriented  to  structural  change.  They  note  that,  in  2 
Corinthians 5, Paul alludes to a life-changing encounter with a resurrected Jesus that occurred on 
the road to Damascus (Ac 9:3–16). Paul encountered the crucified Jesus who became alive. The 
experience on the Damascus road introduced a radically new element into Paul’s symbolic 
universe – that of the crucified Jesus whose had appeared alive. This point to the power of God 
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who reversed the Roman state-sponsored terrorism. Jesus’ death was execution by Rome and 
therefore resurrection against Rome. Thus Boesak and DeYoung (2012) notes the following: 
…  reconciliation  produces  a  decolonized  humanity.  A  damaged,  enslaved,  and  colonized  identity  is 
restored to its original design as human identity created in the image of God. As a result, reconciliation is 
real and available to restore the battered and bruised identities of people who experience oppression. (pp. 
17–18) 
 
Boesak and DeYoung note that reconciliation is also radical. In the reading of 2 Corinthians 5, 
one can observe that reconciliation is real, life changing and healing. Thus Boesak and DeYoung 
note that Paul’s manifesto on reconciliation does not end with 2 Corinthians 5. Paul continued in 
2 Corinthians 6:2: “For God says, at an acceptable time I have listened to you and on a day of 
salvation I have helped you. See now, is the acceptable time; see, now is the day of salvation.” 
Boesak and DeYoung further argue that, in order to claim that reconciliation is the work of social 
justice, Paul quoted Isaiah 49:8, a reference to Israel’s liberation from Egypt. This liberation lies 
at the core of Judaism. This quote by Paul is probably an intentional echo of Jesus’ quote from 
Isaiah to launch his ministry in Nazareth: 
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He Has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent 
me to proclaim freedom to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to 
proclaim the year of the Lord’s favour. (Lk 4:18–19). 
 
 
 
Thus, reconciliation is radical because it reaches to the roots of injustice (Boesak & DeYoung 
 
2012:18). 
 
 
 
 
Boesak and DeYoung further note that reconciliation is also revolutionary. This is because 
reconciliation is a real experience that is radical, going to the roots of injustice. Boesak and 
DeYoung (2012:19) note that, in Ephesians 2, Paul says that Jesus created “… in himself one 
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new humanity in place of the two, thus making peace, and might reconcile both groups to God in 
one body through the Cross” (Ef 2:15b–16). The passage seems to be saying that a qualitatively 
different understanding of humanity was implemented in place of the two categories of humanity 
of Paul’s day, namely powerful Romans and oppressed Jews (along with other colonised people). 
Boesak and DeYoung argues that Ephesians 2 calls for a revolution of human identity. It signals 
to us that apartheid and other systemic forms of classifying humanity for domination are being 
replaced by a new structure of ‘one new humanity’ through Jesus’ death on a cross and 
resurrection (ibid). 
 
 
 
Following a detailed attempt to liberate the biblical concept of reconciliation from being 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control to mention that, in spite of a long attempt to 
ideologies(d) and manipulate the Bible, the demands of the scriptures will always lay a greater 
claim. Thus, the biblical concept of reconciliation has nothing to do with assimilation, 
appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost and maintaining of power with only cosmetic 
changes. 
 
 
 
4.4 TRC: Individualistic and legalistic approach to 
human-rights violations 
 
 
 
In spite of acknowledging that apartheid was a crime against humanity, the TRC employed an 
individualistic and legal approach in its understanding of the notion of gross human-rights 
violations (Terreblanche 2002:129). This point to the inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC 
to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation during apartheid. This inability and/or 
unwillingness was, on the one hand, the result of the historical and ideological influence of the 
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Latin-American truth commissions, particularly the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile, and on the other hand, it came about as a result of the TRC’s thoughtful 
individualistic and legalistic approach to the understanding of human-rights violations. I thus 
contend as follows, with Terreblanche (2002:131), that it is as a result of this approach (i.e. 
individualistic and legalistic approach) that institutions like the corporate sector in South Africa 
could clear themselves and their corporations of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the 
legacy of apartheid. 
 
 
 
I now turn to the notion of the individualistic and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights 
violations. This notion refers to an approach which argues that gross human-rights violations 
would require the active and deliberate participation of individuals and that illegal acts are 
committed by these individuals in the process (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). It argues that a 
collective like the corporate sector in South Africa cannot be regarded in any way as participants 
in the gross human-rights violations (ibid:131). This approach individualises victims and 
perpetrators. This approach would, for instance, regard apartheid as a crime against humanity 
which targeted entire communities for ethnic and racial policing and cleansing, but the TRC 
remained reluctant to go beyond this formal acknowledgement (Mamdani 2002:33-34). 
 
 
 
I now point to some of the contradictions which are seen in the formation and working of the 
TRC. For now, I focus on the contradictions regarding the TRC’s understanding of gross human- 
rights violations. To start off with, the TRC affirmed the declaration of the international human- 
rights community that “apartheid was a crime against humanity” (Terreblanche 2002:124–134). 
However, the TRC contradicted this affirmation when it narrowly defined the gross violation of 
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human rights to include only victims of killing, torture, abduction and severe ill-treatment 
(Terreblanche 2002:127). This, in my view deliberate, contradiction, resulted in the inability 
and/or  unwillingness  of  the  TRC  to  uncover  the  truth  about  systemic  exploitation  by  the 
apartheid system (ibid). 
On the one hand, the TRC acknowledged that apartheid was a crime against humanity, meaning 
that it acknowledged that apartheid was a system of systemic exploitation which was perpetrated 
collectively  and  systematically  against  millions  of  Black  people  under  White  political 
domination and racial capitalism. By acknowledging apartheid as a crime against humanity, the 
TRC acknowledged that apartheid was a system which targeted the entire communities for racial, 
political and ethnic cleansing and policing (Mamdani 2002:33-34). By implication, the TRC 
acknowledged the link between conquest and dispossession and between racialized power and 
racialized privileges (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179). However, contrary to their 
acknowledgement that apartheid was a crime against humanity, the TRC individualised victims 
and perpetrators of gross human-rights violations (Mamdani 2002:33-34). 
 
 
 
The question then remains: What were the consequences of these contradictions? These 
consequences came because the TRC was bound to please two masters at the same time. This 
claim is based on the idea that the TRC, on the one hand, wanted to please the international 
human-rights community by affirming its judgment that apartheid was a crime against humanity 
(Terreblanche 2002:130). On the other hand, the TRC was bound by the elite compromise of the 
negotiated settlement (ibid:124–132). 
 
 
 
Stevens et al. (2006) points to the following as a result of these contradictions: 
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The first is that the consequences of apartheid as a system form of oppression and human rights violations 
were not addressed overtly, but rather, the focus was on violations that would have been consider illegal, 
even under official apartheid law. (p. 302) 
 
 
 
As a result of these contradictions, socio-economic disparities, socio-political marginalisation 
and  the  effects  of  legalised  racism  were  ignored  (Stevens  et  al.  2006:302;  Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
 
Because the TRC found itself in the dilemma of pleasing two masters, namely the international 
human-rights community and the corporate sector in South Africa, in its job of discrediting the 
apartheid regime, the TRC had to identify many individuals who would either take the blame for 
the entire system of apartheid or who would be identified as victims of the apartheid system 
(Mamdani 2002:33-34; Stevens et al. 2006:302; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). In balancing the 
interests of their two masters, the TRC had to locate the blame for apartheid atrocities solely in 
the illegal activities of a minority of individuals (ibid). As a result, Stevens et al. (2006) argues, 
the following came about: 
This process resulted in many foot soldiers of apartheid being identified and questioned, rather than 
interrogating the system of apartheid itself, and the TRC only attempted to highlight those activities those 
activities that were considered illegal under official apartheid law. (p. 302) 
 
 
 
As a result of the individualistic and legalistic approach to gross human-rights violations, the 
TRC managed to please both the international human-rights community and the corporate sector 
in South Africa. In its acknowledgement that apartheid was a crime against humanity and in its 
job  of  discrediting  the  apartheid  regime,  the  TRC  pleased  the  international  human-rights 
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community (Mamdani 2002:54; Stevens et al. 2006:302; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). In its 
utilisation of the individualistic and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights violation, the 
TRC managed to please the corporate sector in South Africa. As a result of this individualistic 
and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights violations, the corporate sector in South 
Africa was offered an undeserved opportunity to clear itself of any guilt or responsibility for the 
legacy of apartheid (ibid). 
 
 
 
Thus,  as  a  result  of  this  individualist  and  legalistic  approach  towards  gross  human-rights 
violation, the TRC wrote the victims of systemic exploitation out of its version of history 
(Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:183). My point is that the TRC, in its attempt to please the 
corporate  sector  by  individualising  the  victims  and  perpetrators  of  the  apartheid  system, 
continued to undermine Black people in South Africa in all spheres of life. Thus Stevens et al. 
(2006) point to this when they make the following argument: 
Such a limited understanding of history further negates the persistent and comprehensive manner in which 
apartheid undermined and continues to undermine black South Africa at the social, political, economic and 
personal levels. (p. 302) 
 
 
 
As a result, the TRC failed in its quest for truth and reconciliation. Therefore, Mamdani (in 
 
Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000) is in the right in his conclusion: 
 
To reflect on the experience of the TRC is to ponder a harsh truth that it may be easier to live with 
yesterday’s perpetrators who have lost power than to live with beneficiaries whose gains remain intact. (p. 
183) 
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As a result of this individualistic and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights violations 
and because of its allegiance to the elite compromise, the TRC lost an opportunity to educate the 
beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct responsibility for the disrupted social structures and 
abject poverty of the majority of Black people in South Africa (Stevens et al. 2006:302; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Thus Terreblanche (2002:131) rightly argues that “[i]f the 
beneficiaries  had  been  educated  about  their  participation  in  racial  capitalism,  they  would 
certainly have been less arrogant, and possibly more compassionate and generous”. I agree with 
Mamdani (in Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:183), who argues that “[t]he unintended outcome has 
been to drive a wedge between the beneficiaries and victims of apartheid”. Terreblanche (2002) 
puts this consequence in no uncertain terms, arguing as follows: 
… if the TRC would have explicitly applied the notion that apartheid was a crime against humanity to the 
corporate sector, business people could not have washed their hands about their participation in gross 
human rights violation. (p. 128) 
 
 
 
In my view, the use of the individualistic and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights 
violations was a direct contravention of the affirmation of the judgement of the international 
human rights community that apartheid was a crime against humanity. This use of the 
individualistic and legalistic approach towards gross human-rights violation can be explained in 
no other way as a deliberate move by the TRC to please and ratify the elite compromise of the 
negotiated settlement (Mamdani 2002; Stevens et al. 2006:302; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
In my view, if the TRC affirmed that apartheid was a crime against humanity, it should have 
followed logically that it acknowledged that apartheid was more than just the denial of few 
human rights but a systemic endeavour that were put in place for the purpose of dispossessing 
184  
people  of  their  livelihood  (Terreblanche  2002:128).  In  this  regard,  Mamdani  (2002:33–34) 
argues that apartheid “… involved a targeting of entire communities for racial and ethnic 
cleansing and policing …” The fact that apartheid was classified as a crime against humanity 
should have meant that the TRC was also mandated to look at the systemic exploitation of Black 
people under White political domination and racial capitalism (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
Thus, the narrow interpretation of the mandate of the TRC was a clear sign that it employed an 
individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations, which means that it was never 
able  to  uncover  the  truth  about  the  systemic  exploitation  (Mamdani  2002;  Stevens  et  al. 
2006:302; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
 
When Terreblanche (2002:130) engages the commission’s affirmation of the judgement of the 
international human-rights community that apartheid was a crime against humanity, he notes that 
the TRC does not explain why it shares the international community’s basic moral and legal 
position on apartheid but does not spell out what aspect of apartheid was a crime against 
humanity. He further asks whether it was racial capitalism and White supremacy that enriched 
White  people  and  impoverished  Black  people during  three  quarters of the  20th  century  or 
whether it was the security institutionalised and applied from the 1960s onwards to counteract 
Black insurrection with deeds of atrocity. He left a third option, namely that the commission 
regarded both parts of the apartheid system as a crime against humanity? Whatever the answer, 
individualising the victims and perpetrators of the gross human-rights violations goes against the 
affirmation of apartheid as a crime against humanity (Mamdani 2002). 
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The  inability  and/or  unwillingness  of  the  TRC  to  uncover  the  truth  about  the  systemic 
exploitation under apartheid can partly be blamed on its individualistic and legalistic approach to 
human-rights violations. In this regard, Terreblanche (2002) makes the following argument: 
By concentrating on the legalistic gross human rights violations by individual perpetrators, one gains the 
impression that the commission believed it was mainly the security system, and the atrocities committed by 
its agents, that was the really criminal part of apartheid. (p. 131) 
 
 
 
Due to the individualistic and legalistic approach of the TRC to human-rights violations, the 
corporate sector in South Africa was given space to clear itself of any guilt of or responsibility 
for the legacy of apartheid. Terreblanche (2002) points out the following when he discusses the 
business hearing of the TRC: 
… during the Business hearing in the TRC, most business representatives argued – in submission and 
during evidence – that gross human rights violations would require active and deliberate participation by 
individual business persons, and illegal acts committed by them. (p. 131) 
 
 
 
During  these  hearings,  two  dominant  positions  emerged:  a  “pro-business”  or  “business-as- 
victim” position and a “systemic-exploitation” or “business-as-beneficiaries-and-Black-people- 
as-victims” position. The first dominant position, pro-business or business as victim, is a position 
which argues that the business sector was the victim of the system. The logic behind this position 
claims that the business sector did business as usual and was never involved in politics. The 
latter, dominant, position argues that business was part and parcel of the systemic exploitation of 
Black people in South Africa. The submissions by the business sector during the hearings 
operated from the incorrect position which claims that the business sector in South Africa was 
neutral (Terreblanche 2002:131). 
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Given the individualistic and legalistic approach which the TRC took towards the human-rights 
violations, the business sector in South Africa could claim that they could not be regarded as 
active participants in gross human-rights violations despite that fact that they, and their 
predecessors, were involved in designing and utilising an immoral and exploitative system. 
Terreblanche (2002:131) argues that “… the commission’s individualistic and legalistic approach 
to human rights violations provided business people with a convenient means of distancing 
themselves from apartheid”. It is for this reason that this chapter contends, concurring with 
Terreblanche, that if the commission had explicitly applied to the business sector the notion that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity, business could not have been able to wash their hands in 
this matter (ibid). 
 
 
 
I now turn to the notion of the individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations. 
As  noted  before,  the  TRC  was  established  by  the  Promotion  of  National  Unity  and 
Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995. Under this act, the TRC was mandated, to promote national 
unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions 
of the past by establishing as complete as possible of the (i) causes, (ii) nature and (iii) extent of 
the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 
10 May 1994 (TRC 1998:48). One has to note that the definition of “gross human-rights 
violations” was stated in terms of the function of the TRC. The definition stated that the TRC 
should facilitate the following (TRC 1998): 
… inquiries into (i) gross violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a systematic 
pattern of abuse … (iii) … identify of all persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in 
such violations.” (p. 56) 
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The deliberate narrowing of the mandate of the TRC is puzzling because the TRC was given a 
wide mandate which included, amongst other things, to facilitate investigations into the identity 
of all (i) persons, (ii) authorities, (iii) institutions and (iv) organisations involved in human-rights 
violations, but it nonetheless decided to use an individualistic and legalistic approach. The only 
conclusion is that the TRC was either incapable or unwilling to uncover the truth about the 
systemic exploitation. Terreblanche (2002:127) draws the right conclusion when he argues that, 
“[b]y concentrating on individual perpetrators and victims, it also chose not to identify 
all…authorities, institutions, and organisations involved in violations [of human rights]”. 
 
 
 
In their approach, the TRC chose to interpret “human rights” as mainly “first generation” or legal 
“human rights” whilst they deliberately ignored the “second generation” or social “rights”. In my 
view, this testifies to the fact that the TRC was unwilling to uncover the truth about systemic 
exploitation. As a result of this choice, the TRC concentrated on “perpetrators and victims” 
whilst  neglecting  the  causal  relationship  between  the  beneficiaries  and  victims  of  racial 
capitalism and effects of White political domination. It seems then that the TRC deliberately put 
in place conditions for institutions like the corporate sector in South Africa to clear themselves 
from responsibility for the legacy of apartheid. In Terreblanche’s (2002:128) view, “[n]ot 
surprisingly, the hearings, were, conducted in a way that obscured the systematic character of 
apartheid ...” This was done by discrediting apartheid as a system and by identifying individual 
victims and perpetrators (Mamdani 1996 & Terreblanche 2002:124). This individualisation of 
victims and perpetrators gave an opportunity for institutions like the corporate sector in South 
Africa  to  clear  themselves.  Terreblanche  (2002:128)  further  argues  that  “…  [the  hearings] 
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offered business people an undeserved opportunity to clear themselves and their corporations of 
any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid”. 
 
 
 
Mamdani (in Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179) observes that, in the process of individualising 
the victims and perpetrators of the apartheid system, “… the TRC enthusiastically embraced the 
analogy of dictatorships in Latin America, when the TRC decided to narrow its investigation to 
perpetrators and victims of (legally defined) gross human rights violation”. Mamdani base his 
argument on the fact that, in the process of individualising victims and perpetrators, the TRC 
agreed that apartheid was no more than a harsh and cruel dictatorship, a gross denial of human 
rights (see Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:177–178). In the end, the TRC then was incapable and 
unwilling to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. Clearly, apartheid was more than a 
harsh and cruel dictatorship, a gross denial of human rights. Rather, Terreblanche (2002:128) 
argues, “… apartheid was also about racial capitalism and the systematic exploitation of blacks”. 
Mamdani (2002:33) argues that “… this commission (i.e. TRC) claimed to be different from its 
predecessors, whether in Latin America or Eastern Europe”. However, in its claim to be different 
from its predecessors, the TRC had actually embraced the ideology of its predecessors, 
specifically Latin America (Terreblanche 2002:128). Therefore, as a result of the influence of 
Latin America, the TRC obscured what was distinctive about apartheid in South Africa, which is 
why Mamdani (in Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:183)argues as follows: “For the violence of 
apartheid was aimed less at individuals than at entire communities and entire population groups. 
And this violence was not just political.” Mamdani (ibid) points out how the Latin American 
analogy, as embraced by the TRC, obscured the colonial nature of the South-African context, in 
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particular the link between conquest and dispossession and between racialized power and 
racialized privileges. 
 
 
 
The Latin-American analogy thus obscured the aim of the TRC to the point that it resulted in the 
inability and unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation. This 
happened despite the fact that the gross human-rights violations in Latin America were not the 
same as in South Africa. In Latin America, the gross human-rights violations were based on a 
harsh and cruel dictatorship and a denial of human rights whilst in South Africa it was about 
conquest, dispossession, defending power and maintaining privileges. As such, the gross human- 
rights violations in South Africa were perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions 
of Black people under White political domination and racial capitalism. Together with 
Terreblanche (2002:128)), I find this conduct of the TRC unacceptable: “… [the] decision [to 
concentrate on perpetrators and victims while neglecting the causal relationship between the 
beneficiaries and victims of racial capitalism and White political domination] was not … in 
accordance with its mandate, and should be deplored”. 
 
 
 
Terreblanche says that the decision by the TRC to go against its own mandate to investigate 
institutions could only have resulted from pressure exerted on it by the corporate sector. In my 
view, the individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations was employed 
deliberately to provide institutions like the corporate sector with an opportunity to clear itself of 
any guilt or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid. Terreblanche (2002), once again, phrases it 
eloquently: 
When the recommendations are closely read, it becomes clear that the TRC went out of its way to ensure 
that it did not present business (or whites) as beneficiaries of the economic system of apartheid, and blacks 
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as victims of the same system. The TRC in its recommendations, appeals to the corporate sector in South 
Africa  to  voluntarily  compensate  black  people  for  being  disadvantaged  under  apartheid,  stating  that 
business could and should play an enormously creative role in the development of new reconstruction and 
development programmes. As such, it must be stated, that this recommendation is problematic, because the 
exploitation of black people in South Africa did not happen voluntarily; it was based on economic and 
political systems embedded in a network of compulsory legislation, and justified by racist ideologies 
propagated as self-evident truths. (p. 130) 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the TRC intentionally employed an individualistic and legalistic approach to gross 
violations of human rights as to spare the corporate sector in South Africa the embarrassment of 
its involvement in the shaping of or benefitting from the apartheid system. The pressure on the 
TRC to narrow its investigations to individuals could only have been exerted by the business 
sector and perhaps also by the new government, who realised that a broader investigation would 
include a systemic analysis of racial capitalism. Such an investigation would have embarrassed 
and even angered the business sector (Terreblanche 2002:128). 
 
 
 
4.5 TRC: A political project with a political solution 
 
 
 
As indicated earlier, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was formed as a 
product of the Convention of the Democratic South Africa (CODESA). To this, I need to add 
that the TRC was the product of a political project with a political solution. Furthermore, I 
argued above that the passing of the Promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 
34 of 1995, which gave birth to the TRC, was not accidental. Though the TRC presented itself as 
a sincere effort at national unity and reconciliation, the end product proves the point that the 
TRC was established to ratify the elite compromise. 
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As  noted,  the  TRC  has  done  an  excellent  job  in  discrediting  apartheid  and  the  atrocities 
committed under its tutelage (Terreblanche 2002:124). However, the TRC deliberately ignored 
the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions of 
Black people under White political domination and racial capitalism. To my mind, it is the 
ignorance of the TRC of the collective and systemic gross human-rights violations perpetrated 
against millions of Black people in apartheid South Africa that led to its failure and as such 
resulted in its ratifying of the elite compromise. 
 
 
 
In this regard, I point out Mamdani’s (1996) avowal that, “[i]n the South African context, 
perpetrators are a small group, as are those victimised by perpetrators”. Mamdani’s (2002:33-34; 
also see Terreblanche 2002:124) assertion points to how the TRC individualised the exploitation 
and gross human-rights violations that were perpetrated against millions of Black people under 
White political domination and racial capitalism. Mamdani (1996) further notes that, “[i]n 
contrast, beneficiaries [of the system of apartheid] are a large group, and victims defined in 
relation to beneficiaries are the vast majority in society”. It is for this reason that I argue in this 
chapter that the failure of the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation resulted 
in the TRC ratifying the elite compromise. I fully agree with Terreblanche (2002:124) when he 
draws the following conclusion: “Its [TRC] inability and/or unwillingness to systematically 
analyse South Africa’s history of unequal power structures are puzzling.” 
 
 
 
In my view, the informal and formal negotiations that lead to the TRC are the factor that can 
explain the puzzle concerning its (TRC) failure. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish 
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between  the informal  negotiations  on  economic  issues  and  formal  negotiations  on  political 
issues. In my view, the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa preyed on the state of 
disarray in which the ANC found itself after the fall of the Soviet Union (1989–1990) (Cronin 
1994:1-8; Terreblanche 2002:95-124). This claim is based on the sudden, coincidental interest of 
the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa in a negotiated transition. As pointed out above, 
all the policies and the liberation strategy of the ANC were influenced by the socialism of the 
Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union left the ANC with no economic policy and thus 
vulnerable to the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa. 
 
 
 
Because of the vulnerable position in which the ANC was left after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the NP and the corporate sector managed to convince them of democratisation. Because 
democratisation was promoted at the same time when capitalism was becoming global in 
character, the ANC was put in a position where it had no choice but to opt for democratic 
capitalism and a constitutional democracy. Apart from the fact that the ANC entered the 
negotiations ideologically and strategically wounded and vulnerable (Cronin 1994; Terreblanche 
2002), it was also stretched to participate in both the informal negotiations on economic issues 
and the formal negotiations on political issues (Terreblanche 2002:125). 
 
 
 
Terreblanche (2002:125) notes that the balance of forces in the formal negotiations favoured the 
democratic  movement,  that  is,  the  ANC,  which  had  assumed  the  position  of  being  the 
mouthpiece of the Black masses in South Africa, whilst the balance of forces in the informal 
negotiations favoured the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa. Thus, the NP and the 
corporate sector had the economy of South Africa as their first price whilst the ANC had political 
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power as their first price. I do need to point out, however, that both these first prizes had 
conditions attached to them: The NP and the corporate sector would receive the economy of 
South Africa with “no state intervention” and the ANC would receive their political power under 
a constitutional democracy (Rosenfeld 2001:1). The point is that the conditions attached to these 
prizes, namely the economy for the NP and the corporate sector and the political power for the 
ANC, limit and/or advance the powers of those involved, namely the NP, the ANC and the 
corporate sector in South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:125). 
 
 
 
Terreblanche notes that the political establishment of the apartheid regime was spectacularly 
defeated during the formal negotiations, and that prepared the way for the election of 1994 and 
the political transition from apartheid to representative democracy. However, this was not a total 
defeat because it was just a political defeat. The NP and the corporate sector managed to secure 
their first prize, namely the economy of South Africa. In the words of Terreblanche (2002), the 
conclusion seems clear: 
In sharp contrast, the white corporate – which formed an integral part of the system of racial capitalism for 
more than a century – was not remotely defeated [in] the informal negotiations. (p. 125) 
 
 
 
Given their wealth, their enormous power and their capacity for propaganda and myth making, 
the NP and the corporate sector managed to convince the leaders of the ANC that they were 
innocent of the apartheid misdeeds (ibid). Terreblanche (ibid) points out that the “… benefits that 
had [been] accumulated (most undeservedly) in the hands of the corporate sector and other 
whites through systematic exploitation would be either be forgotten or condoned”. Due to the 
deliberate commitment of the TRC to conceal the truth about systemic exploitation, the TRC 
ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations (ibid). 
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I now have to take the power play during the informal and formal negotiations a step further. In 
my view, in was in this power play during the two sets of negotiations and the agreements 
reached there that the TRC was conceived. In this way, the NP and the corporate sector managed 
to surety their innocence. This was done in a dramatic manner. The NP and the corporate sector 
in South Africa, through the TRC, managed to shift the attention from the beneficiaries of the 
apartheid system to the apartheid system (as a system) and individuals (Mamdani 2002:33-34). 
Some individuals took the fall for the whole system and its beneficiaries. Through this strategy, 
the corporate sector ensured that it got away with murder. Terreblanche (2002) makes this claim 
in the following way: 
…  because of the new  symbolic relationship between ANC leaders and  the corporate sector,  it was 
expedient  for  the  new  government  not  to  pressurize  the  TRC  into  uncovering  the  truth  about  [the] 
systematic exploitation [and the role of the corporate sector]. (p. 125) 
 
 
 
The TRC’s inability and unwillingness to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation of 
millions of Black people under White political domination and racial domination need to be 
judged  against  the  background  of  the  compromise  reached  at  the  formal  and  informal 
negotiations (ibid). Thus Moosa (2000:116) notes, that “… the truth of the TRC was what the 
parties said it was. The truth was not measured, but manufactured. To be charitable, we can say 
the truth was negotiated”. The TRC thus deliberately failed to uncover the truth about systemic 
exploitation by the apartheid system. As argued above, the TRC deliberately tried to uncover the 
truth about one form of victimisation under apartheid and deliberately ignored another form of 
victimisation. 
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The truth, as constructed by the TRC was often manufactured by the elite in power. Thus, 
Mamdani (in Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000) observes the following: 
… the truth of the TRC makes most sense when understood as institutionally produced truth, as the 
outcome of a process of truth-seeking ... 
By compromising a political compromise with a compromised truth ... the TRC has turned a political 
compromise into a moral one, and obscured the larger truth. While the political compromise is justifiable, 
the moral and intellectual compromise is not. (pp. 177–178) 
 
 
 
It is puzzling that, given the broad mandate of the TRC, it decided to interpret its mandate 
narrowly with the purpose of sparing the corporate sector in South Africa. In spite of a broad 
mandate,  the  TRC  waivered  in  its  commitment,  showing  its  inability  and  unwillingness  to 
uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation which was levelled against millions of Black 
people in South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:124–127). Its inability and unwillingness to uncover 
the whole truth is the reason why it failed to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation by 
institutions like the corporate sector in South Africa. 
 
 
 
In its report, the TRC (1998) argued as follows: 
 
…its governing act limited its investigation to gross violations of human rights defined as the killing, 
abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment and the attempt conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to commit such acts. (p. 29) 
 
 
 
I must, however, observe at this point that the TRC deliberately “individualised” victims and 
perpetrators of the apartheid system and as such committed itself to ignoring the violations of 
human rights which were part of a systemic pattern of abuse. As a result, it failed in its mandate 
to “… identify ... all … authorities, institutions and organisations involved in such violations” 
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(TRC 1998:56). It is for this reason that I maintain that there was a commitment in the TRC to 
conceal the role of authorities, institutions and organisations. Mamdani (2002:33–34) rightly 
argues that “[t]he Commission’s analysis reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state 
and the entire communities to one between the state and individuals”. 
 
 
 
Given the acknowledgment by the TRC that apartheid was a crime against humanity, Mamdani 
(2002:34) is correct in pointing out that “… if the crime against humanity involved a targeting of 
entire communities for racial and ethnic cleansing and policing, individualising the victim 
obliterated this particular … characteristic of apartheid”. It is for this reason that this chapter 
argues that the TRC was established to ratify the elite compromise as Mamdani (ibid) points out: 
“The consequence was to narrow the TRC perspective to a political reconciliation between state 
agents and political activists, individual members of a fractured political elite …” 
 
 
 
In its task of not angering and embarrassing the corporate sector in South Africa, the TRC had to 
find individuals who would take the responsibility for the apartheid system. This was done to 
please both the corporate sector in South Africa who had made a deal with the ANC and the 
international human-rights community who had declared apartheid a crime against humanity. It 
is against this background that this sub-section contends that the TRC was a political project with 
a political solution. 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this chapter, it was argued and demonstrated that the TRC accidentally and/or intentionally 
ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. I arrived at this 
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conclusion by presenting arguments in the following sub-sections: (1) Historical and ideological 
influences on the TRC, (2) TRC: The biblical concept of “reconciliation” within the TRC, (3) 
TRC: Individualistic and legalistic approach to human-rights violations and (4) TRC: a political 
project with a political solution. 
 
 
 
I now recap the arguments of each sub-section to conclude the argument of this chapter, namely 
that the TRC accidentally and/or intentionally ratified the elite compromise reached at the 
informal and formal negotiations. Although a great deal of international attention was focused on 
the South-African TRC and its successes and/or failures, the actual concept of truth commissions 
did not emerge in South Africa. It is for this reason that the first sub-section of this chapter dealt 
with the (1) historical and ideological influences on the TRC. Under this sub-section, I 
demonstrated that the actual concept of truth commissions emerged in the 1970s in Uganda and 
gained prominence in Latin America in the 1980s. The focus of this sub-section was largely on 
the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions, namely the 
National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983, the National Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation in Chile in 1991 and the Commission of Inquiry in Chad in 1992). I 
concluded that the TRC drew on the Latin-American examples to help shape its form and 
processes. 
 
 
 
I further argued, however, that the Latin-American influence on the TRC obscured what was 
distinctive about apartheid in South Africa. The Latin-American situation which gave birth to 
their truth commissions was based on dictatorships and a gross denial of human rights. When the 
TRC enthusiastically embraced the analogy of dictatorships in Latin America, it decided to 
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narrow its investigation to perpetrators and victims (legally defined) of gross human-rights 
violation. As a result of this, the TRC obscured the systemic character of apartheid, and offered 
business people an undeserved opportunity to clear themselves and their corporations of any 
guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid. 
 
 
 
As a result of the historical and ideological influences of the Latin-American truth commissions, 
particularly  the  National  Commission  for  Truth  and  Reconciliation  in  Chile,  the  TRC 
surprisingly accepted the proposed inclusion of the biblical concept of “reconciliation” in its 
name. The second sub-section of this chapter demonstrated how the addition of the biblical 
concept of reconciliation had the purpose of not allowing this concept to confront the country 
with the demands of the gospel and to blunt the progress of radical change and transformation. 
This claim is based on the argument that, for a long time in the history of South Africa, the Bible 
was used particularly in the Afrikaner politics to provide theological justification for apartheid, 
and  it  was  also  subjected  to  a  process  where  it  became  a  servant  to  ideology  and  was 
domesticated for the purpose of subjection and control. 
 
 
 
Thus, the proposed addition of this biblical concept of reconciliation was not unanticipated 
because it was added for the purposes of manipulating the process of uncovering the truth about 
the human-rights violations by the apartheid system. In my view, the biblical perspective on the 
South African truth commission was added so that the religious twist would help tame it, would 
domesticate it and would make it more pliable and appetising for the broader public. As a result 
of  this  domestication  of  the  Bible,  reconciliation  came  to  be  closely  associated  with  the 
following: (1) assimilation, (2) appeasement, (3) a passive peace, (4) a unity without cost, and 
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(5) maintaining power with only cosmetic changes. In spite of this efforts at domestication, this 
sub-section has demonstrated that reconciliation needs to be real, that is, experiential. 
Furthermore, reconciliation has to be radical, that is, focused on social justice, and reconciliation 
needs to be revolutionary, that is, oriented towards structural change. 
 
 
 
Following the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions, 
particularly the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile, and the addition of 
the biblical concept of reconciliation under conditions where the Bible had been domesticated 
and tamed, the TRC further employed an approach which prepared it to fail in its mandate. This 
mandate required the facilitating of inquiries into gross violations of rights, including violations 
which were part of a systemic pattern of abuse and inquiries into the identity of all persons, 
authorities, institutions and organisations involved in such violations. The approach that the TRC 
employed, and which led to its failure, was an individualistic and legalistic approach to human- 
rights violations. 
 
 
 
The TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights community that apartheid 
was a crime against humanity, but in its dealing with this gross violation of human rights, it 
individualised victims of apartheid. The TRC thus found itself in a position that was logically 
contradictory. On the one hand, it acknowledged that apartheid targeted entire communities for 
ethnic and racial policing, but on the other hand, it identified individual victims and perpetrators 
in its dealings. By doing this, the TRC accidentally or intentionally ignored the gross human- 
rights violations perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions of Black people under 
White political domination and racial capitalism. As a result of this, the TRC for all practical 
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purposes chose to ignore the violation of human rights which were part of a systemic pattern of 
abuse. The TRC further chose not to identify all authorities, institutions, and organisations 
involved in the violation of human rights. The TRC also chose to interpret human rights as 
mainly first-generation or legal human rights whilst the violation of second-generation human 
rights or social rights were practically ignored. As a result, the TRC did not only offer the 
corporate sector in South Africa an undeserved opportunity to clear themselves of any guilt in 
respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid, but it also ratified the elite compromise 
reached at the informal and formal negotiations. 
Following the individualistic and legalistic approach which the TRC employed as a result of the 
historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions, it is befitting to 
contend that the TRC was a political project with a political solution. The TRC must thus be 
understood against the background of the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal 
negotiations. 
 
 
 
The claim that the TRC was established, on the one hand, to ratify the elite compromise reached 
at the informal and formal negotiations and, on the other hand, to please the international human- 
rights community is based on how the TRC dramatically narrowed down its mandate, which 
consisted of establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross  human-rights  violations.  Whilst  the  TRC  was  tasked  with  inquiring  into  the  gross 
violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a systemic pattern, it 
intentionally decided to interpret its mandate far more narrowly. In trying to please the NP and 
the corporate sector in South Africa, that is, not going against the elite compromise, and in also 
trying to please the international human-rights community, which had affirmed that apartheid 
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was a crime against humanity, the TRC decided to identify individual victims and perpetrators. 
As  a  result  of  this,  the  TRC  manufactured  the  truth,  which  led  to  its  inability  and/or 
unwillingness to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation by the apartheid system. 
 
 
 
In  conclusion,  this  chapter  argued  and  demonstrated  that  the  TRC  accidentally  and/or 
intentionally ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. 
Consequently, the unwillingness and/or inability of the TRC to analyse the history of gross 
violations of human rights correctly has manufactured a skewed history that says that the systems 
of White political domination and racial capitalism did not undeservedly enrich White people 
and impoverish Black people. It further says that the rich are therefore released from any moral, 
political, and/or systemic obligation to restore social justice towards Black people (Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DE-HISTORICISING THE 
STORY OF APARTHEID THROUGH THE INABILITY 
OR UNWILLINGNESS OF THE TRC TO UNCOVER 
THE TRUTH ABOUT SYSTEMIC EXPLOITATION 
 
 
“…  The  TRC  lost  a  golden  opportunity  to  educate  the  individual[s]  and  corporate  beneficiaries  of 
apartheid about their direct responsibilities for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the 
majority of blacks. If the beneficiaries had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, 
they would certainly have been less arrogant, and possibly more compassionate and generous.” 
(Terreblanche2002:131) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
I have shown in the previous chapter that, as a result of the historical and ideological influence of 
the Latin-American truth commissions, particularly the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile, (Stevens et al. 2006:296), the adoption of the tamed biblical concept of 
reconciliation (Boesak & DeYoung 2012), the employment of the individualistic and legalistic 
approach to human-rights violations and how the TRC was used to ratify the elite compromise 
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reached at the informal and formal negotiations (Terreblanche2002:124–132), this commission 
found itself at a cul-de-sac. This resulted in de-historicising and de-contextualising the story of 
apartheid through the inability and unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the 
systemic exploitation of the apartheid system (which formed an integral part of the mandate 
given to the TRC) (Mamdani 2002; Terreblanche 2002:124–132; TRC 1998).As a result of this 
de-historicising and de-contextualising, the TRC, according to Terreblanche (2002), not only 
failed in its mandate, which was the following (TRC 1998:271, vol.5, chp7): 
… promoting national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts 
and divisions of the past by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent 
of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 
1994. 
 
 
 
 
It also lost a golden opportunity to educate beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct 
responsibility for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority, that is, Black 
people in South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
One of the foremost consequences of the inability and unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the 
truth about the systemic exploitation or the nature of the apartheid system was to de-historicise, 
that is, to separate or remove from history or to deprive of historical context, and de- 
contextualise, that is, to remove a linguistic element, an action, et cetera from a context, the story 
of apartheid. This resulted not only in the TRC’s failure to fulfil its mandate (TRC 1998; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132), but it also led to its failure to establish as complete a picture as 
possible of the nature, causes and extent of the gross violations of human rights as mandated by 
legislature which set it up. 
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The de-historicisation and de-contextualisation of the story of apartheid was the result of a 
number of factors. Firstly, it was the product of an elite compromise reached at the informal and 
formal negotiations. This compromise led to the passing of a compromised act with a 
compromised mandate, the boundaries of which were defined by power (Terreblanche2002:124– 
132; Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:183). Secondly, there was the historical and ideological 
influence of the Latin-American truth commissions, particularly the National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Chile, which obscured the distinctive nature of the story of 
apartheid  in  South  Africa.  This  is  because  the  influence  of  the  Latin-American  truth 
commissions, which came into being as a result of the denial of human rights which were 
perpetrated by dictators, obviously led to the de-historicisation and de-contextualisation of the 
story of apartheid because apartheid was more than the denial of human rights as perpetrated by 
dictators (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179; Stevens et al. 2006:296; Terreblanche 2002:124– 
132).Thirdly, the de-historicisation and de-contextualisation was the result of the understanding 
of the notion of gross violation of human rights, which was defined as the killing, abduction, 
torture or severe ill-treatment and the attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to commit such acts (Mamdani 2002:36–37; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). As a 
result of this de-historicisation and de-contextualisation, the TRC tended to individualise the 
wrongs done by the apartheid system (Mamdani 2002:33–34). 
 
 
 
The consequences of de-historicising and de-contextualising the story of apartheid need to be 
understood against the background of three key limitations of the TRC (Mamdani 2002), which, 
in  turn,  need  to  be  understood  against  the  affirmation  by  the  international  human-rights 
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community that apartheid was a crime against humanity. Firstly, the TRC individualised the 
victims of apartheid. Secondly, by focussing on individuals and obscuring the victimisation of 
communities, the TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of 
power that governed natives differently from non-natives. Finally, the TRC extended impunity to 
most perpetrators of apartheid(Mamdani 2002:34). It is thus with these three key limitations of 
the TRC in mind that Terreblanche’s (2002:124–132) idea must be understood, namely that the 
commission lost a golden opportunity to educate the individuals and corporate beneficiaries of 
apartheid . If the beneficiaries had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, 
for instance, they would certainly have been less arrogant and possibly more compassionate and 
generous (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
Although the TRC had affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights community that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity, it individualised the victims of apartheid. Thus, whilst it 
acknowledged that apartheid was a crime against humanity that targeted entire communities for 
ethnic and racial policing and cleansing, the TRC was reluctant to go beyond this formal 
acknowledgment. The TRC’s affirmation of the judgement of the international human-rights 
community was taken from the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind as proposed by the International Law Commission. This code states that a crime against 
humanity consists of, amongst other things, “institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or 
religious  grounds  involving  the  violation  of  fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms  and 
resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population” when committed in a systemic 
manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or 
group (Mamdani 2002:42; TRC 1998:96). 
206  
 
 
Thus, the TRC’s analysis of the story of apartheid reduced apartheid from a relationship between 
the state and entire communities to one between the state and individuals. Where entire 
communities were victims of gross violations of human rights, the TRC acknowledged only 
individual victims. This can be as a result of both the historical and ideological influence of the 
Latin-American truth commissions and the boundaries of investigations which were narrowly 
defined by the corporate sector in South Africa (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:179; Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). According to Mamdani(2002:33–34), if apartheid was a crime against humanity 
that involved the targeting of entire communities for racial and ethnic policing and cleansing, 
then individualising the victims obliterated the central characteristic of apartheid. In addition, 
limiting the definition of harm and remedy to individuals caused political activists as victims of 
apartheid to take center stage, as seen in the TRC. The TRC’s perspective was then narrowed to 
a political reconciliation between state agents and political activists, individual members of a 
fractured political elite, rather than the national unity and reconciliation as mandated by the 
legislation that set it up (Mamdani 2002:33–34). 
 
 
 
By focussing on individuals and obscuring the victimisation of communities, the TRC was also 
unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives 
differently from non-natives. This refers to the second limitation of the TRC as seen in the report 
of this commission. Whilst the apartheid state spoke the language of rights to the White 
population, it segregated the native population into tribal groups, each to be administered under a 
separate set of laws in the name of enforcing custom. Thus, rights and customs were two 
different and contradictory languages: The former claimed to circumscribe power, the latter to 
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enable it. Rights claimed to be a rule of law whilst customs claimed the legitimacy of custom and 
tradition. Consequently, the TRC’s failure lay in focussing exclusively on the “civil” regime and 
in totally ignoring the customary regime. It is therefore no wonder that the TRC failed even to 
recommend reforms that would put in place a single unitary regime, a rule of law understood as 
formally equal before the law, for all South Africans in a post-apartheid South Africa (Mamdani 
2002:1). 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the TRC extended impunity to most perpetrators of apartheid. This is because, in the 
absence of full acknowledgement of the victims of apartheid, the identification of its perpetrators 
was incomplete to the extent that the TRC did not acknowledge the full truth. The amnesty 
intended for individuals turned into group amnesty for any perpetrator who was not identified as 
such was a perpetrator who enjoyed impunity. Whilst the TRC recognised the system of enforced 
racial discrimination and separation as a crime against humanity, it did not acknowledge any 
victims of this crime. As a consequence, it also recognised no perpetrators. We thus have a crime 
against humanity without victims or perpetrators (Mamdani 2002:54). As a result, this chapter 
contends, in the words of Terreblanche (2002), the following: 
… the TRC lost a golden opportunity to educate the individual and corporate beneficiaries of apartheid 
about their direct responsibilities for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority of 
blacks. If the beneficiaries has been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, they would 
certainly have been less arrogant, and possibly more compassionate and generous. (p. 131) 
 
 
 
This chapter will arrive at the above conclusion by looking at the following sub-sections: 
 
(1)       Obscuring the truth: The obscured and manufactured the truth. This sub-section will 
look into the notion of truth, which was central to the success or failure of this commission, 
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especially working with the assumption or understanding of reconciliation through the truth 
(Asmal, Asmal & Roberts 1997). This is because, on the one hand, the TRC operated with the 
assumption that the truth is one, and if we know it, it will set us free. On the other hand, it 
operated with the understanding that the truth is central for reconciliation (i.e. thorough change) 
(Asmal et al. 1997; Ignatieff 1996:111). The TRC was also formed against the mandate of 
national unity and reconciliation, which, amongst other things, required the commission to 
establish as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of 
human rights which were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 (TRC 
1998:60). In order to do this, the TRC depended on the testimonies of both victims and 
perpetrators as well as those of the beneficiaries of apartheid that were supposed to be included 
during the proceedings of this commission but were not. It is thus against this background that 
this sub-section contends that the truth of this commission was a negotiated truth and as such an 
obscured and manufactured truth. An example of this is the inability and unwillingness of the 
TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation of the apartheid system (Terreblanche 
2002:124–132). This is because, as will be shown in this sub-section, the truth process and 
boundaries of investigation of the TRC were narrowly defined by power, namely the corporate 
Sector  in  South  Africa  (Mamdani  in  Amadiume  &  Abdullahi  2002:1770178;  Terreblanche 
2002:126). Therefore, it is the contention of this sub-section that, as a result of the negotiated 
truth of the TRC which led to the obscuring of the truth of the story of apartheid in South Africa, 
the  TRC  blunted  the  process  of  true  reconciliation,  justice  and  transformation  (Boesak 
2008:636–654; Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
(2)       Obscuring reconciliation: The TRC obscured and manufactured reconciliation. This sub- 
section will look into the biblical notion of reconciliation, which in its original application meant 
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a thorough change and which, if applied in its original meaning, goes to the roots of injustice and 
demands justice. This sub-section contends that, as much as the truth of the TRC was negotiated 
– leading to the obscuring of the story of apartheid – the biblical notion of reconciliation was not 
spared in the process of domestication which was used for subjection and control (Boesak & 
DeYoung 2012:9). This is because, as will be shown in this sub-section, when this commission 
was established, it was supposed to be a truth commission, but FW de Klerk, on behalf of the NP 
and corporate sector in South Africa, proposed that the word reconciliation be added to truth 
commission. It is surprising that this word (reconciliation) was not added for the purpose of 
allowing this biblical notion to confront the country with the demands of the scripture. Rather, it 
was added to blunt the process of transformation and change which is required by this notion. 
This is because, in South Africa, the Bible was subjected to a process which led to it becoming 
the servant of an ideology. For instance, the Bible was used to give a theological justification of 
apartheid. As a result, the addition of this biblical notion of reconciliation distorted the task of 
the TRC, that of establishing as complete a picture as possible of the gross violations of human 
rights which occurred during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994. As a result of this and 
other processes such as a negotiated truth, which is central to reconciliation, this biblical notion 
was stripped of its ability to demand justice. It is against this background that this sub-section 
contends that the TRC failed to link reconciliation with justice in spite of the fact that 
reconciliation in its original meaning presupposes justice (Boesak 2008:636–654; Boesak& 
DeYoung 2012:23; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). If this biblical notion of reconciliation was 
allowed to confront the country with the demands of scripture, it would have addressed the 
critical questions of justice, equality, restoration and dignity that are prominent in the biblical 
understanding  of  reconciliation.  Thus,  this  sub-section  agrees  with  Boesak  and  DeYoung 
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(2012:1) when they point out that they believe that unless we remove injustice at the roots, the 
weeds of alienation and fragmentation will return and choke the hope for (true) reconciliation. 
(3)       Obscuring Justice: The TRC obscured reconciliation that presupposes justice. This sub- 
section will look into the notion of justice, which is understood by Plato to include both the 
attainment of that which is just and the philosophical discussion of that which is just (Negri & 
Pine 2000). This sub-section contends that, as a result of the obscured truth and reconciliation, 
the  TRC  failed  to  link  reconciliation  with  justice  in  spite  of  the  original  meaning  of 
reconciliation presupposing justice. This is because reconciliation addresses the critical questions 
of justice, equality, restoration and dignity (Boesak& DeYoung 2012:1). It is, however, 
imperative that justice here should not be understood within the strict legal terms (particularly of 
criminal justice) that some have applied to the work of the TRC. Rather, it should be understood 
from within the expectations created by the TRC itself through its own insistence that its work 
should be seen as a Christian endeavour (Boesak 2008:636–654; Boesak & DeYoung 2012; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132). However, this should not create the impression as seen with the 
TRC that justice means impunity or blanket amnesty because reconciliation involves people 
being accountable for their actions, showing commitment and doing something to right their 
wrongs. This sub-section will make a distinction between criminal justice, which was applied to 
the Nuremberg trials and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, political justice, which 
was applied in the Convention of Democratic South Africa or CODESA and social or socio- 
economic justice, which the TRC was supposed to achieve (Mamdani 2002:1–10). Criminal 
justice targets individuals, and its objective is punishment. Political justice affects groups, and its 
objective is political reform, and social or socio-economic justice acknowledges the inequalities 
in  a  society  and  pushes  for  the  distribution  or  redistribution  of  wealth,  opportunities  and 
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privileges  et  cetera  (Mamdani  2002:1–10).  However,  as  a  result  of  an  obscured  truth  and 
obscured reconciliation, the victims of apartheid were denied of both criminal and social justice 
and managed to obtain political justice. 
(4)       Obscuring history: The TRC obscured the history of gross human-rights violations in 
South Africa. This sub-section looks into how the TRC wrote the vast majority of apartheid’s 
victims, particularly the victims of systemic exploitation, out of its version of history. The irony 
is that, whilst the TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights community that 
apartheid as a “system of enforced racial discrimination and separation” was a crime against 
humanity,38   it  did  not  acknowledge  any  victims  of  this  crime.  As  a  consequence,  it  also 
 
recognised  no  perpetrators.  Regarding  apartheid,  South  Africa  thus  have  a  crime  against 
humanity with neither victims nor perpetrators (Mamdani 2002:54). Thus, the core victims of the 
crimes against humanity, of this “system of enforced racial discrimination and separation”, could 
not have been individuals. They had to be entire communities marked out on the grounds of race 
and ethnicity. Their injuries included forced removals, forced disruption of community and 
family life, coerced labour through administrative and statutory regulation of movement and 
location, et cetera (Mamdani 2002). 
 
 
 
5.2 Obscuring the truth: The TRC as obscured and manufactured 
truth 
It is necessary to clarify the heading of this sub-section so as to dispel the confusion that might 
be caused by the sequence of its wording (i.e. the adjective, manufactured, the noun, truth and 
 
 
38The TRC made this affirmation based on the 1996 Draft of Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, a code that lists a set of acts, any of which specifically constitute a crime against 
humanity. An example is Article 18(f), which states that crimes against humanity include institutionalised 
discrimination on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population. 
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the concept or process, TRC), given that the process of the TRC has been acknowledged for its 
peace-making and peace-building in South Africa. This is according to Stevens et al. (2006:294) 
who point out that, as one of the outcomes of the negotiated settlement between political powers 
that had reached a stalemate by 1990, the South-African TRC emerged as a peace-making and 
peace-building strategy. The adjective “manufactured” refers to an act of inventing something 
that never existed or to develop anything. The noun “truth” refers to saying or telling what is, or 
saying or telling what corresponds to reality. Thus, it is the contention of this sub-section that the 
truth of the TRC, which was tasked to establish as complete a picture of the gross violations of 
human rights in South Africa from 1960–1994 (TRC 1998), was an invented truth. This is 
because, as will be shown in this sub-section, the TRC intentionally uncovered the truth of one 
form of victimisation while ignoring another. As a result of this, then, the truth uncovered by this 
commission cannot be regarded as corresponding to reality or to what happened (Amadiume & 
Abdullahi 2000:177–178; Terreblanche 2002:124). 
 
 
 
It should, however, be noted that the notion of “truth” in the TRC, as in other truth commissions, 
particularly in Latin America, was understood to be one truth. “One” in this regard means 
dispelling the idea that there are different versions of the truth. This understanding was employed 
for a particular political purpose, namely political accommodation as agreed to in the informal 
and formal negotiations (Boesak & DeYoung 2012; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Nevertheless, 
the idea of truth is important only if it corresponds to what is real or with what happened. I hope 
to demonstrate how one version of the truth was employed in the South African TRC. Ignatieff 
(1996:111) points to the words of the chair of the TRC who said that the aim of this commission 
was “… the promotion of national unity and reconciliation, the healing of a traumatized, divided, 
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wounded, polarized people”. Against this background, Ignatieff notes that the aims are laudable, 
but he asks the question: “But are they coherent?” Then Ignatieff (1996:111)points to the 
following problematic assumptions: that a nation has one psyche, not many; that the truth is one, 
not many; that the truth is certain, not contestable; and that when it is known by all, it has the 
capacity to heal and reconcile. 
 
 
 
Ignatieff (1996:111) notes, regarding Tutu’s words, that these are not so much assumptions of 
epistemology as articles of faith about human nature: “The truth is one, and if we know it, it will 
make us free.” It is because of this postulation that truth commissions like the TRC thought that 
“… if the truth was known, a people made sick by terror and lies would be made well again” 
(ibid). Ignatieff thus states that one should distinguish between (some) factual truth and moral 
truth – narratives that tell what happened and narratives that attempt to explain why things 
happened and who is responsible. Ignatieff further notes that truth commissions like the TRC 
were successful in establishing (some) factual truth but failed to establish the moral truth. As a 
result of this, Ignatieff (1996:111) argues that “[t]he truth commissions closed many individual 
dossiers in the painful history of their nation’s past”. 
 
 
 
The notion of a manufactured truth in the TRC arises as a result of a critical question which 
Stevens poses when he asks: “Whose truth [is it in the TRC]?” In this question, there is an 
interrogative pronoun that asks “Who?”, (i.e. persons or institutions): Whose version of the truth 
becomes the truth (which corresponds to what is). This question (whose truth is it in the TRC?) 
suggests that the truth of one party, the elite in power, became the truth. In this regard, it is the 
corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC who are referred to as the elite in power. Thus, in 
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demonstrating how the truth is often manufactured to suit the elite in power, Fernandez-Armesto 
(1997:2) notes: “We need to test the claim that truth is just a name for opinions – produced and 
reproduced – that suit the demands of society or the convenience of elites.” 
 
 
 
As a result of the truth being narrowed down to a name for opinions which are produced and 
reproduced to suit the demands of society or for the convenience of the elites, people do not only 
lose faith in the reality of the truth or lose interest in the search for the truth, but they start 
believing in anything that comes forth, especially that which is presented by the elite to be the 
truth (Fernandez-Armesto 1997:3). The opinions of those in power shape and influence what 
comes to be regarded as the truth. Therefore, the manufactured truth of the TRC for the purpose 
of peace-making and/or peace-building is problematic. This is because the opinion of the elites 
dictates and rewrites reality. This is seen in how the TRC intentionally uncovered one form of 
truth about the gross violations of human rights and thus intentionally ignored another form. This 
act not only presented itself as a picture that is as complete as possible of the causes, nature and 
extent of the gross violations of human rights that were committed during the period 1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994, but it rewrote the history of what happened in South Africa during this 
period (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, obscuring the truth in line with the inability and unwillingness of the TRC to 
uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation of the apartheid system resulted in the 
obliteration in South Africa of the social order, that is, the stable arrangements of institutions 
whereby human beings in a society interact and live together. This is because the truth is not only 
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fundamental to every society, but it is also closely linked to the idea of being good. Thus, 
Fernandez-Armesto observes (1997) the following: 
… everyone’s attempt to be good – every attempt to construct happy relationships and thriving societies – 
starts with two questions: How do I tell right from wrong? And how do I tell truth from falsehood? The 
first question has more practical applications, but it depends on its apparently more theoretical twin. There 
is no social order without trust and no trust without truth. (p. 3) 
 
 
 
Thus, following Fernandez-Armesto’s demonstration about the truth, the result of the TRC 
manufacturing the truth was the exclusion of the victims of the apartheid system from its history. 
This is because the inability and unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the 
systemic exploitation not only twisted the gross human-rights violations which were perpetrated 
collectively and systemically against the millions of Black people under White political 
domination and racial capitalism, but it also wrote the victims of the systemic exploitation of 
apartheid out of its version of history. Thus, Mamdani (2000:183) states, in line with Fernandez- 
Armesto’s observation that obscuring the truth obliterates social order, that “[t]he unintended 
outcome [of the TRC] has been to drive a wedge between the beneficiaries and the victims of 
apartheid”. 
 
 
 
Following Fernandez-Armesto’s observation that obscuring the truth obliterates social order, and 
following Mamdani’s observation that the unintended outcome of the TRC, after obscuring the 
truth, has been to drive a wedge between the beneficiaries and the victims of apartheid, I want to 
contend that the wedge between the victims and beneficiaries came as a result of the power of 
memory (i.e. remembering). This claim is based on the notion that memory has the following 
stages: encoding, storage and retrieval. 
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Thus, every act involves encoding (the process whereby information is registered or a process 
whereby the experience of an act is registered), storage (the maintenance of information over 
time or a process whereby the experience of an act is stored) and retrieval (a process which refers 
to accessing the information by recognition, recall or implicitly by demonstrating that a relevant 
task is performed more efficiently as a result of prior experience) (Baddeley et al. 2004:7). 
Memory  or  the  art  of  remembering  is  powerful,  especially  if  it  entailed  a  life-changing 
experience for those involved. Thus, the manufacturing of truths or the act of replacing the truth 
will lies would, in Mamdani’s (2002:183) opinion, drive a wedge between victims and 
beneficiaries of the apartheid system. 
 
 
 
Following the question, “Whose truth [is it in the TRC]?” Stevens et al. (2006:294) observe that 
one  of  the  outcomes  of  the  negotiated  settlement  between  political  powers  (and  economic 
powers) that had reached a stalemate by 1990 was that the South African TRC emerged as a 
peace-making and peace-building strategy. It is interesting to note that Stevens et al. comment 
that the notions of a truth commission, peace-making and peace-building arise as an outcome of 
a negotiated settlement. The legislation, mandate and eventually the outcome, that is, the 
establishment of a complete picture of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of 
human rights that were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994, of truth the 
commission were institutionally produced. The question, “Whose truth [is it in the TRC]?” must 
be understood against this background. 
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This question must also be understood against the backdrop of the elite compromise reached at 
the informal and formal negotiations. This is because the question has to do with the victims and 
beneficiaries of the apartheid system. The history of the gross violations of human rights that 
gave rise to the TRC involved victims of the system. The idea of victim, in this regard, relates to 
the affirmation that apartheid was a crime against humanity that targeted entire communities. 
This history also involved beneficiaries of the system. The idea of beneficiaries, in this regard, 
refers to the fact that, as a result of the apartheid system, some people in institutions and 
organisations  benefited.  As  a  result,  the  question  arises,  given  the  distinction  between  the 
victims, the beneficiaries and the negotiated settlement, of whose truth was involved in the TRC. 
Thus, Terreblanche (2002:124–132) points out that “… the truth is often manufactured by the 
elite in power”. Therefore, the answer to the question, “Whose truth [is it in the TRC]?” is: It is 
the truth of the elite in power. 
 
 
 
The  truth  in  this  case  is  understood  as  that  which  is  factual  and  accurate  or  that  which 
corresponds with the accuracy of what is. Thus according to Aristotle (see Ross 1924), the truth 
is seen as follows: 
To say what is that is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what 
that it is not, is true. (p. 57) 
 
 
 
Therefore, the truth or falsity of a statement is determined by how it relates to the world and 
whether it accurately describes or corresponds with that world. Consequently, any statement will 
remain a claim until it is proven to correspond with reality or what is. Therefore, the notion of 
“truth” in the TRC needs to be subjected to a process of checking whether the truth of the TRC 
corresponds with reality, that is, the reality of the conditions that led to the establishment of the 
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TRC. As a result, the truth of the TRC will be checked against the backdrop of the gross 
violations of human rights. 
 
 
 
As a result of the inability and unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic 
exploitation of the apartheid system, which must be understood against the backdrop of the elite 
compromise  reached  at  the  informal  and  formal  negotiations,  this  commission  had  to 
manufacture the truth, that is, what is factual, real, accurate and legitimate. As a result of the elite 
compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations (Terreblanche 2002:125), the ANC 
and the corporate sector in South Africa had come to an agreement “… that the benefits that had 
been accumulated (mostly undeservedly) in the hands of the corporate sector and other whites 
through systemic exploitation would either be forgotten or condoned” (Terreblanche 2002:125). 
Because of this, the TRC could not include in its investigation a systemic analysis of racial 
capitalism. This is because such an investigation would have embarrassed and even angered the 
corporate sector in South Africa. As a result, this commission had to manufacture the truth 
(Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
It is thus in this context that Moosa states that the TRC must be not only be judged against the 
background of the compromises reached at the informal and formal negotiations, but its truth 
must also be seen against the background of the power of the corporate sector in South Africa. 
Moosa’s (2000:116) observation is based on the idea that the truth of this commission was not 
measured but manufactured. This is because, as much as the inability and unwillingness of the 
TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation of the apartheid system was negotiated, 
the truth of this commission was also negotiated in the informal and formal negotiations. This 
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claim  is  based  on  how  the  TRC  deliberately  uncovered  the  “truth”  about  one  form  of 
victimisation or exploitation under apartheid but ignored another form of victimisation which 
was even more important (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Thus, Terreblanche (2002:124) notes 
that the inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to analyse South Africa’s history of unequal 
power structures are puzzling. This is because the TRC deliberately ignored the gross human- 
rights violations perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions of Black people under 
White political domination and racial capitalism (Terreblanche 2002:124). 
 
 
 
For Mamdani (2000:177–178), the truth of the TRC makes sense when understood as 
institutionally produced truth. It must be recalled that this commission was ordered to inquire 
into (i) gross violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a systemic 
pattern of abuse (ii) and into the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and organisations 
involved in such violations (TRC 1998:65). Its attempt to uncover the truth was supposed to be 
in line with this mandate. Thus, the logic of individualising the perpetrators and victims of the 
gross human-rights violations would not only be going against the mandate of the TRC, but it 
would also be inaccurate and thus untruthful. This is because the TRC was mandated to promote 
national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and 
extent of the gross violations of human rights that were committed during the period 1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994 (TRC 1998:60). As such, the idea of individualizing the perpetrators and 
victims would result in a skewed truth. 
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It is for this reason that, following his observation that the truth of the TRC makes most sense 
when understood as institutionally produced truth, Mamdani (2000:177–178) notes that the truth 
of  the  TRC,  which  came  about  as  a  result  of  a  process  of  truth-seeking,  was  one  whose 
boundaries were narrowly defined by power and whose search was so committed to reinforce the 
new power that it turned the political boundaries of a compromise into analytical boundaries of 
truth seeking. Mamdani’s observation about the truth of the TRC needs to be understood against 
the backdrop of the power play during and after the two sets of negotiations. This is because the 
informal negotiations on economic issues favoured the corporate sector in South Africa, and the 
formal negotiations on political issues favoured the ANC. On the one hand, the corporate sector, 
given its wealth, power, capacity for propaganda and myth making, succeeded in convincing the 
ANC that it depended on the corporate sector for the growth of the economy of South Africa. On 
the other hand, the ANC, given its political power without economic power, depended on the 
corporate sector in South Africa. Thus, any attempt at a broader investigation would include a 
systemic  analysis  of  racial  capitalism,  and  this  would  have  embarrassed  and  angered  the 
corporate sector in South Africa. As such, this would have ruined the symbiotic relationship 
between the ANC and the corporate sector (Terreblanche 2002:125). It is for this reason that 
Terreblanche (ibid) points out that, after a political transition had been negotiated, the ANC 
deemed  it  necessary  to  consolidate  its  precarious  political  power  by  using  the  TRC  to 
delegitimise the apartheid regime and its security forces. 
 
 
 
5.3 Obscuring reconciliation: The TRC obscured and 
manufactured reconciliation 
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The previous section on obscuring and manufacturing the truth in the South African TRC has 
pointed to a number of assumptions with which the TRC worked, namely that a nation has one 
psyche, not many; that the truth is one, not many; that the truth is not contestable; and that when 
it is known by all, it has the capacity to heal and reconcile (Ignatieff 1999:111). These 
assumptions  are  presumptuous  but  inaccurate  because  a  nation  with  different  people  with 
different psyches, in this case, including victims and beneficiaries of the apartheid system of 
White political domination and racial capitalism, cannot have one psyche, and the truth of 
different people with different psyches, including victims and beneficiaries of the apartheid 
system, cannot be one. But although the TRC worked with inaccurate assumptions, one of their 
assumptions of the truth, namely that it has the capacity to heal and reconcile, was accurate 
(Ignatieff 1999:111; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
It is thus against this background of the assumptions of the TRC that the truth of the TRC are 
considered dogmatic. The rationale behind it was to domesticate the truth for the purpose of 
subjection and control. When the truth of the gross of violations of human rights in South Africa 
can be domesticated for subjection and control, there is a possibility that all the unfolding 
processes of the TRC were domesticated. When the truth, which is critical for the start of the 
process of reconciliation in the original sense of a thorough change, is compromised, it means 
that reconciliation, which addresses the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity, is 
compromised (Boesak 2012:1). Thus, Mamdani (2000:177–178) points out the following: “By 
compromising  a  political  with  a  compromised  truth  …  the  TRC  has  turned  a  political 
compromise into a moral compromise, and obscured the larger truth.” 
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In dealing with the biblical notion of reconciliation, the question about the truth of the TRC 
should be addressed. Thus, Stevens et al. (2006:294) is correct in asking, “Whose truth [is it in 
the TRC]?” (Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000:183; Fernandez-Armesto 1997; Moosa 2000:116; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132). As a result, it is important to recall that this question probes who, 
that is, the identity of the victims who were represented by the ANC and the beneficiaries who 
were represented by both the NP and the corporate sector. The corporate sector, the victor during 
the informal negotiations on economic issues, represented the beneficiaries of the apartheid 
system (mostly White people). In the same way, the ANC, the victor during the formal 
negotiations on political issues, represented the victims of the apartheid system (mostly Black 
people). Consequently, this question pushes one to acknowledge that the truth of the TRC was 
not only the truth of the elites but a negotiated truth. This is because the truth of the TRC needs 
to be understood as institutionally produced truth (Mamdani 2000:177–178). This is because the 
outcome and the boundaries of the process of truth seeking were narrowly defined by power, 
namely the corporate sector in South Africa (ibid). 
 
 
 
The inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to uncover another form of victimisation under 
apartheid benefitted the corporate sector. This is because, in the informal negotiations, the 
corporate sector managed to convince the ANC not only of its innocence but also of its 
commitment to the inclusive economy of South Africa. Thus, any broader investigation by the 
TRC in its search or the truth in order to establish as complete a picture as possible of what 
happened in South Africa would have embarrassed and angered the corporate sector in South 
Africa (TRC 1998). Thus, the decision by the TRC to uncover one form of victimisation under 
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apartheid and to deliberately ignore systemic victimisation leads to the question, “Whose truth?” 
Thus, the truth of the TRC was a negotiated truth (Moosa 2000:116). 
 
 
 
As much as the truth of the TRC can be negotiated or obscured, the notion of reconciliation can 
also be negotiated or obscured merely to reach some political accommodation. The notion of 
reconciliation is a biblical notion which only appears occasionally in the New Testament and, 
with a few exceptions, always in the Pauline literature (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:11–12). This 
biblical notion translates several Greek words: the verbs katallasso and apokatallasso and the 
noun katallage (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:11–12). The noun katallage is derived from the Greek 
verb katallasso and means “a thorough change”. The Greek preposition kata means “down”, and 
the noun allage means “change”. Regarding the idea of “to change, or exchange; to effect 
change”, De Gruchy (2005:51) notes that, when we are reconciled, we exchange places with the 
other and are in solidarity with rather than against the other. De Gruchy further points out that 
reconciliation is a process that causes us to overcome alienation through identification and 
solidarity with the other, thus making peace and restoring relationships (De Gruchy 2002:51). 
 
 
 
De Gruchy’s assertion is thus that reconciliation in its original Greek use invokes the idea of 
thorough change(s). As a result, the problem is not the biblical notion of reconciliation but the 
interpretation thereof (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:11–12). This is because the Scripture is often 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control. Hence, Boesak and DeYoung (2012:11–12) 
point out that, when Jewish scholars translated the Hebrew scriptures into Greek, they used these 
words (i.e. the verbs katallasso and apokatallasso and the noun katallage) to translate the 
Hebrew words related to atonement, that is, to God being reconciled with humanity. As a result, 
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in this usage of katallasso, they did not retain the political dimension found in the Greek 
understanding of reconciliation. 
 
 
 
In an attempt to point out how scripture is often used to merely reach some political 
accommodation, it is necessary to probe why the Jewish scholars who translated the Hebrew 
scriptures into Greek translated the Hebrew word of atonement to the Greek word of 
reconciliation.  This  is  important  because  the  Greek  usage  of  these  words  (i.e.  the  verbs 
katallasso and apokatallasso and the noun katallage) did not have a spiritual connotation, but the 
Hebrew words for atonement implied both the spiritual and the political. These Greek words 
were used in peace treaties between nations and groups. Thus, the idea of change or effecting 
change would have been understood against the background of peace treaties between nations 
and groups. Hence, it is the contention of this sub-section that the interpretation of these Greek 
words in the New Testament obscures the political dimension of their usage in the Greek context. 
In an attempt not to allow reconciliation (as katallasso which means “a thorough change”) to 
confront the country with the demands of the gospel, translators, often people in power, often 
intentionally confuse the verb katallasso with another Greek verb, hilaskomai, meaning, “to be 
propitious” or “to be merciful”. This is done in an attempt to promote the spiritual connotation of 
reconciliation  over  the  political  dimension,  which  emphasises  the  idea  of  “to  change  or 
exchange; to effect a change”. The Greek verb hilaskomai is often translated with reconciliation 
in the King James Version. At the time of the King James  Version, the English verb “to 
reconcile” was understood to mean “to appease, to be propitious”, and the theology of the 
translators  of  the  King  James  Version  with  regard  to  the  death  of  Christ  was  the  penal 
substitutary  theory  of  the  atonement.  These  translators  believed  that  the  death  of  Christ 
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reconciled  God  or  satisfied  the  justice  of  God.  It  is  thus  against  this  background  that  the 
following assertion by Boesak and DeYoung (2012:11–12) makes sense: “In our work and 
engagement with reconciliation, we have discovered how often reconciliation is used merely to 
reach some political accommodation.” 
 
 
 
It is, however, vital to dispel the confusion that might arise with the notion of re-invoking the 
idea of a manufactured or obscured truth in the TRC, given that this is what this sub-section 
deals with. Thus, as much as the truth of the TRC was a negotiated truth, it is the contention of 
this sub-section that the notion of reconciliation was also negotiated. As a result of the negotiated 
truth, specifically the idea that the TRC did not broaden its investigation that would have resulted 
in the analysis of the systemic exploitation of the apartheid system as a result of racial capitalism 
under White political domination, the notion of reconciliation, which, if correctly applied, does 
not only restore but goes to the roots of a problem, was subjected to a process which twisted the 
interpretation thereof. The problem is not reconciliation but the interpretation thereof. Thus, 
Boesak and DeYoung (2012:12) state: “We believe that unless we remove injustice at the roots, 
the weeds of alienation and fragmentation will return and choke the hope for reconciliation.” 
 
 
 
The idea of manufacturing, which entails a creative action of developing, making and building 
up, is invoked in light of the creative twisting of the interpretation of the notion of reconciliation. 
This act is referred to as a creative act (i.e. an artistic and inventive act). This is not because the 
act of twisting the interpretation of the notion of reconciliation is positive but because the 
reconciliation of the TRC was taken through an artistic and inventive process that made it a 
servant of ideology, domesticating it for the purposes of subjection and control. Throughout the 
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artistic and inventive process, the notion of reconciliation was tamed to blunt the process of 
radical change and transformation (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the process of twisting the interpretation of the notion of reconciliation was artistic 
and inventive because, although the truth can be manufactured (especially by telling one version 
thereof, the version of the elite in this case) (Fernandez-Armesto 1997), the scriptures 
(specifically, the notion of reconciliation) cannot be controlled. Only the interpretation thereof 
can be controlled. Thus, Boesak and DeYoung (2012:10) note that “[t]he Scriptures will not be 
ideologised, manipulated or managed to suit our political endeavours, processes or desires”. 
Boesak bases this on the idea that the demands of the scriptures will always lay a greater claim 
(ibid.). But Boesak and DeYoung (ibid:9) are also quick to point out the history of how the Bible 
was used in Afrikaner politics. They do this in an attempt to show how the Bible tends to be 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control. Here they remind us of how the Bible was 
used not only to give theological justification to apartheid, but it was also used to shape and 
maintain a system whose aim it was to dispossess people of their means of livelihood (ibid:1; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132). The point that Boesak and DeYoung (ibid) try to make is that 
reconciliation is often used merely to reach some political accommodation that do not address 
the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity that are so prominent in the biblical 
understanding of reconciliation. 
 
 
 
For the purpose of this sub-section, it is necessary to further investigate the idea of the 
domestication of the interpretation of reconciliation against the background of the processes 
leading to the establishment of the TRC. The purpose of this is to demonstrate how the notion of 
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reconciliation was obscured and manufactured for political reasons. It is important to understand 
the  domestication  of  reconciliation  against  the  following  series  of  events  and/or  processes: 
firstly, the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations; secondly, the 
historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions, particularly the 
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile; thirdly, the individualistic and 
legalistic approach to human-rights violations. It is through these events and processes that the 
notion of reconciliation has come to be understood today as assimilation, appeasement, a passive 
peace, a unity without cost, and maintaining power with only cosmetic changes (Boesak & 
DeYoung 2012:10; Mamdani 2002; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
During the informal negotiations on economic issues, the corporate sector in South Africa 
emerged as victors, and during the formal negotiations on political issues, the ANC emerged as 
victors. As a result of the economic power of the corporate sector and the political power of the 
ANC, these two stakeholders had to forge a working relationship under the elite compromise 
(Terreblanche 2002:107). Thus, these two parties agreed that the benefits that had accumulated 
in the hands of the corporate sector in South Africa and other White people through systemic 
exploitation would either be forgotten or condoned. If the notion of reconciliation was allowed to 
confront the country with the demands of the gospel, it would have meant that, in the TRC’s 
attempt to go to the roots of injustice as is demanded by the notion of reconciliation, the notion 
of reconciliation would have pushed the commission to broaden its investigation in order to 
arrive at the root of the problem concerning apartheid (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:1; Mamdani 
2002; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
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If this notion of reconciliation was allowed to go to the archetype, it would have shown the 
systemic exploitation position of the corporate sector in South Africa (Terreblanche 2002:124– 
132). It would have shown with no doubt that the apartheid system or the system of racial 
capitalism was deliberately constructed and maintained on behalf of White business. This was 
achieved through close and continuous collaboration between almost all White corporations and 
business organisations, on the one hand, and White political and bureaucratic establishments, on 
the other hand (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). The notion of reconciliation would also have 
shown that, for 150 years, racial capitalism was built and maintained on successive phases of 
Black labour repression. Thus Boesak and DeYoung (2012:1) rightly point out that reconciliation 
is used to reach political accommodation, and such political arrangements favour the rich and 
powerful but deprive the powerless of justice and dignity. 
 
 
 
It was against this background, especially that of preventing the notion of reconciliation of going 
to the roots of injustice, that the TRC decided to draw on Latin-American examples to help shape 
its form and processes, specifically the emphasis on the individualistic and legalistic approach it 
placed on gross human-rights violation (Stevens et al. 2006:296; Terreblanche2002:124–132). 
This was done intentionally to obscure what was distinctive about apartheid in South Africa. One 
cannot uncover the truth about the gross human-rights violations under the auspices of the 
apartheid system without looking into the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively 
and systemically against millions of Black people under White political domination and racial 
capitalism (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Apartheid was constructed and maintained in South 
Africa on behalf of almost all White business. Thus, in order to avoid the notion of reconciliation 
uprooting this history, the TRC decided to embrace the Latin-American analogy of dictatorship. 
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This was done by narrowing its investigation to perpetrators and victims of (legally defined) 
gross human-rights violations. In doing this, the TRC agreed that apartheid was no more than a 
harsh and cruel dictatorship, a gross denial of human rights. The purpose of this was to blunt the 
notion of reconciliation in order to point out the colonial nature of the South African context: the 
link between conquest and dispossession, between racialized power and racialized privileges 
(Mamdani 2000:179; Boesak & DeYoung 2012; Mamdani 2002; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
5.4 Obscuring justice: The TRC obscured reconciliation that 
presupposes justice 
 
 
 
It is necessary to start this sub-section on reconciliation and justice with the idea that biblical 
reconciliation presupposes justice. The deeper and more critical meaning of the word 
reconciliation goes beyond its simplistic understanding (Mamdani 1996). This is because 
reconciliation involves people being accountable for their actions and showing commitment to 
right their wrongs (ibid). This is mentioned to dispel the idea that it is because of this biblical 
notion of reconciliation that justice was not achieved for victims. The biblical notion of 
reconciliation always presupposes (social) justice. However, as Boesak and DeYoung (2012:1) 
note, reconciliation is often used merely to reach some political accommodation that do not 
address the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity that are so prominent in the biblical 
understanding of reconciliation. Hence, the following, which has come to be closely associated 
with reconciliation, came about as a result of the domestication of the Bible for purposes of 
subjection and control: assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost and 
maintaining power with only cosmetic changes (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:10). 
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It is also vital to deal with the question of (criminal) justice within the TRC. This question 
surfaces because one of the expectations of genuine reconciliation, seeing that apartheid was 
declared  a  crime  against  humanity,  was  transformation,  restoration  and  justice  (Boesak 
2008:636–654. However, this justice is a criminal justice as opposed to the social justice of 
reconciliation. Thus, the idea of this justice needs to be mentioned with regard of some 
transitional justices, namely the type of justice at the Nuremberg trial (criminal justice), the type 
of justice at CODESA (political justice) (Mamdani 2010:1–10) and the type of Nuremberg 
justice in Rwanda (criminal justice without reconciliation). This is important because, given 
different contexts, circumstances and desired outcomes, different justices are manifested – 
criminal justice in the German context, political justice in negotiations in South Africa and 
criminal justice without reconciliation in Rwanda. In Rwanda, both victims and perpetrators 
were expected to live together, unlike in Germany, and that is why this justice is referred to as 
criminal justice without reconciliation (Mamdani 2010; 1996). 
 
 
 
Nuremberg was one of two trials at the conclusion of the Second World War. The second was 
the Tokyo trial. Nuremberg was an innovation for two reasons: Firstly, the judges at the 
Nuremberg trial rejected the claim that state orders absolved an official of individual 
responsibility (contrary to the TRC in South Africa). Secondly, besides establishing individual 
responsibility for the violation of human rights, Nuremberg also defined that responsibility as 
criminal (Mamdani 2010:1–10; Tutu 1999:10–36). One has to note that the trials at Nuremberg 
could not have been held except as an aftermath of military victory (contrary to South Africa 
with a negotiated transition). As a result, the victorious power established a rule of law under 
which they tried alleged perpetrators. This trial targeted only the defeated, the perpetrators of the 
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Holocaust. It targeted neither the perpetrators of the atom bomb nor the perpetrators of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians on both sides (ibid). Thus, Tutu notes that, following 
this victor’s justice of Nuremberg, those accused had no say whatsoever in the matter because 
some of those who sat in judgement of the accused were themselves guilty of gross violations of 
human rights (Tutu 1999:24). According to Mamdani (2010:1–10; Tutu 1999:10–36), after the 
Nuremberg trial, there would be no need for winners and losers to live together after victory – 
yesterday’s perpetrators and yesterday’s victims will not have to live together, for there will be a 
separate state, Israel, for survivors. 
 
 
 
The next type of justice is the political justice of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA), which is linked to the work of the TRC. To understand the specific role played by 
the TRC, one needs to come to terms with its key features, namely that the TRC held individual 
state officials criminally responsible but only for actions that would have been defined as crimes 
under the apartheid law, contrary to Nuremberg. The TRC did not hold them accountable for 
political violence, meaning the violence they perpetrated outside of the law. The point is that 
they were not held responsible for acting as institutional implements but only for acting as the 
individual authors of violence (Mamdani 2010:6). Mamdani (ibid) also notes that, by setting out 
to identify only criminal violence, violence that exceeded political order, the TRC ended up 
excusing political violence, the violence authorised by apartheid law. Rather than questioning the 
rule of law identified with apartheid, the TRC upheld it. The most interesting thing about the 
TRC was that it functioned within the paradigm associated with Nuremberg. Even though the 
TRC called for forgiveness, this was within a broader focus defined by the notion of crime and 
punishment (ibid:7). 
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CODESA came as a response to a different context which was marked by different conditions 
than those obtained at Nuremberg although Mamdani (2010:7) notes that CODESA also needs to 
be understood as a statement of the limitations of Nuremberg. Furthermore, CODESA was born 
of the realisation that, contrary to Nuremberg, there was no victor in the struggle against 
apartheid. As such, the following questions need to be asked: How does one stop an ongoing 
conflict in which there was neither a winner nor a loser? How does one convince the adversaries 
that it is in their interest to stop the conflict? As a result of this, Mamdani (ibid) states that it was 
obvious that this could not be done by prioritising criminal justice and threatening to take the 
political  leadership,  of  either  the  apartheid  state  or  the  anti-apartheid  movement,  to  court, 
because the people one would take to court are the very people who would need to stop the 
conflict. In addition, perpetrators and victims of the past conflict would have to live together 
after apartheid. There was no Israel for victims of apartheid. Victims and perpetrators, Black 
people and White people, would have to live in the same country after apartheid (ibid; Tutu 
1999:10–36). However, CODESA did not come into being as a result of the personal convictions 
of the NP, the corporate sector and the ANC. As noted in previous chapters, the idea of a 
negotiated transition came into being as a result of circumstances, which included the idea that 
there was a growing resistance in Third-World countries against authoritarian regimes. As a 
result, the only way in which an authoritarian regime like the NP in South Africa could continue 
to hold on to the country’s economy was through a transition to democracy. The idea of a 
transition to democracy was promoted at the same time as capitalism was becoming global in 
character. Democracy under capitalism would result in authoritarian regimes like the NP to be 
economic victors thanks to the corporate sector in South Africa, while the liberation movements 
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like the ANC would be political victors (Cronin 1994; Fiss 1992:908; Mkhondo 1993; Rosenfeld 
 
2001; Terreblanche 2002). 
 
 
 
 
However, CODESA did not ignore justice. Instead, it provided a radically new way of thinking 
about justice. This thinking of CODESA represents a double breakthrough. Firstly, it 
distinguished between criminal, political and social justice so as to prioritise political justice, the 
reform of the political system, over the other two (Mamdani 2010:7). It is thus necessary to 
distinguish between criminal and political justice. This is because criminal justice targets 
individuals and its objective is punishment whilst political justice affects groups and its objective 
is political reform. Secondly, CODESA decriminalised the opposition so as to treat it as a 
political adversary. The result was the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and the Communist 
Party, on one side, and the dismantling of the apartheid regime and the highly secretive 
Broederbond, on the other. Thus, according to Mamdani (2010:8), the goal was not to punish 
individual criminals but to change the rules of political life so as to reform the political 
community. Finally, unlike criminal justice, political justice prioritised the claims of the living 
over those of the dead. 
 
 
 
There is also the justice without reconciliation of Rwanda, which exemplifies an alternative 
trajectory to the process of CODESA and the TRC (of social justice with reconciliation). This is 
because Rwanda illuminates the dilemmas involved in the pursuit of reconciliation. In this 
regard, Mamdani (1996) frames the major turning points in the Rwandan tragedy, the 1959 
Revolution and the 1994 Genocide, within a broader dialectic, one between reconciliation and 
justice rather than between reconciliation and truth. This is because, as he (ibid) notes that, if 
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South Africa exemplifies the dilemma involved in the pursuit of reconciliation without justice, 
then Rwanda exemplifies the opposite – that is the pursuit of justice without reconciliation. 
 
Following the 1959 Rwandan Revolution39 and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994,40 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in order to judge the people 
responsible for the Rwandan Genocide and other serious violations of international law in 
Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The 
notion of competition is important in this regard because, according to Mamdani (1996), it points 
to the fact that those in power (Tutsi) tried those who are not in power (Hutu). This leads to the 
idea that those who are not in power must also do the same when they obtain the power some 
times in future. Mamdani calls this the cycle of revenge. Thus, Mamdani (ibid) argues that 
Nuremberg-style tribunals cannot lead to a process of reconciliation between former perpetrators 
and victims, especially if the political prerequisite for triggering a process of reconciliation is 
 
power-sharing between the two parties involved. Mamdani (ibid) further asks if there is a reason 
to have done away with Nuremberg-type tribunals in the case of a crime against humanity 
(apartheid) and to persist with such a tribunal in the case of another crime against humanity. 
 
 
 
In relation to the criminal, political and social justice(s) of the Nuremberg trial, CODESA and 
the Rwandan ICTR trial, which employed the Nuremberg trial style, Mamdani (2010:8) states 
 
 
39This was also known as the Social Revolution or Wind of Destruction. This period of revolution was a period of 
ethnic violence which occurred in Rwanda from 1959 to 1961, preceding Rwanda’s independence from Belgian 
control on 1 July 1962. It was the culmination of years of tension between the Hutu and Tutsi groups. The violence 
began in November 1959, following the beating up of a Hutu politician by Tutsi forces. The Hutu believed he had 
been killed, and they began systemic assaults on the Tutsi. 
40The Rwandan Genocide was a mass slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda by members of the Hutu 
majority. The genocide took place in the context of the Rwandan civil war, an ongoing conflict beginning in 1990, 
between the Hutu-led government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was largely composed of Tutsi 
refugees whose families had fled to Uganda following the earlier waves of Hutu violence against the Tutsi. 
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that, whereas Nuremberg was looking at the past and was preoccupied with justice as punishment, 
CODESA sought a balance between the past and the future, between redress for the past and 
reform for the future. Thus, Mamdani (ibid) notes that CODESA offers us a paradigm shift 
where the meaning of survivors changes to include all those who survived yesterday’s 
catastrophe,  apartheid:  yesterday’s  victims,  yesterday’s  perpetrators  and  yesterday’s 
beneficiaries, those described as bystanders by human rights. The paradigm shift is from victims’ 
justice to survivors’ justice. 
 
 
 
It is the contention of this sub-section that the TRC failed to link reconciliation with justice 
(Boesak 2008:636–654). This is because the TRC, in an attempt to come to terms with the legacy 
of apartheid, has described its concerns as truth and reconciliation and not justice and 
reconciliation. This biblical notion, reconciliation, translates several Greek words: the verbs 
katallasso and apokatallasso and the noun katallage (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:11–12). The 
noun katallage is derived from the verb katallasso, which means “a thorough change”. Through 
the process of truth seeking, which is imperative for the implementation of reconciliation, this 
notion would not only have pushed the TRC to remove injustices perpetrated by the apartheid 
system at the roots, but it would also have pushed this commission to address the critical 
questions of justice, equality and dignity. The idea here is that justice, that is, social justice, is 
embedded in the biblical concept of reconciliation. Yet, justice in this context must not be 
understood within the strict legal terms that some have applied to the work of the TRC but rather 
from within the expectations created by the TRC itself through its own insistence that its work 
should be seen as a Christian endeavour (Boesak 2008:636–654). 
236  
Thus, the failure of the TRC to link reconciliation with justice has a direct bearing on the 
situation in which South Africa finds itself today, and therefore, the return to an understanding of 
reconciliation that presupposes justice will help address one of the most critical issues in our 
social, political and theological discourse today (Boesak 2008:636–654). This is because the 
South-African TRC was initially supposed to be called the truth commission until a complaint 
was received from then President FW de Klerk that the NP and the corporate sector were not 
happy with the term “truth commission”. The NP and the corporate sector strongly felt that South 
Africa would be better served if the commission was the “truth and reconciliation commission”. 
The biblical notion of reconciliation, which presupposes justice, was added to this commission in 
order not to allow it to confront the country with the demands of the gospel but to blunt the 
progress of radical change and transformation (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). Thus, the failure of 
the TRC to link reconciliation with justice must be understood against the background of the 
elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. This is because of a number of 
compromises, namely the compromised legislation which led to the establishment of the TRC; 
drawing from the Latin-American examples, particularly the National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Chile; and the obscured understanding of gross violations of human rights 
(Stevens et al. 2006:296; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Thus, according to Boesak and DeYoung 
(2012:9), “… the issue was not reconciliation, it was, rather, the understanding and interpretation 
of it”. 
 
 
 
The TRC, in its attempt to promote national unity and reconciliation, drew largely from the 
sacramental process of penance and reconciliation. Penance or the Sacrament of Penance is 
regarded as the New Law instituted by Christ in which forgiveness of sins committed after 
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baptism is granted through a priest’s absolution to those who confess with true sorrow their sins 
and promise to satisfy for the same (Catholic Encyclopaedia n.d.). This sacramental process of 
penance and reconciliation has four elements that are similar to the process of the TRC. Three of 
the four elements are expected of the penitent (confession, admission of guilt and satisfaction) 
and  one  of  the  minister  of  the  sacrament  (absolution  or  forgiveness).  Thus,  according  to 
Mamdani (1996), ideally, South Africa needs voluntary disclosure. He uses the notion of 
voluntary disclosure instead of confession. Mamdani (ibid) further notes that, from the religious 
point of view, the recognition of truth is akin to confession, which must lead to repentance and 
then to conversion. Only such a trajectory merits forgiveness. 
 
 
 
This sub-section contends that the failure of the TRC to link reconciliation with justice, which 
resulted in reconciliation without justice, came not as a result of this biblical notion but because 
of the understanding and interpretation thereof. Thus, the notion of truth seeking was applied 
alongside  reconciliation  with  the  understanding  that  the  process  will  involve  the  following 
phases: confessing, converting, justice and forgiveness (Mamdani 1996). There was an 
understanding  that  the  process  of  reconciliation,  which  presupposes  justice,  starts  with 
confessing, which involves the process of admitting guilt or that one has committed a crime. This 
process also involves the idea of full disclosure. In this regard, Gonzalez and Verney (2013:3) 
note that victims of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international law 
and their families have the right to an effective remedy. This includes the right to know the truth 
about the abuses they have suffered, including the identity of perpetrators, the causes that gave 
rise to the violations and, if appropriate, the ultimate fate or whereabouts of the forcibly 
disappeared. Furthermore, the process of reconciliation entails going through the process of 
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conversion (which involves a Damascus kind of conversion), justice (which involves the act of 
restoring or thorough change after admitting to guilt or acknowledging that one has committed a 
crime and after converting) and then forgiveness (which comes from the victim). However, the 
truth-seeking process of the TRC was obscured. This is because, on the one hand, it operated 
under the assumption that a nation has one psyche, not many, that the truth is one, not many, that 
the truth is certain, not contestable and when the truth is known by all, it has the capacity to heal 
and reconcile. On the other hand, the boundaries of the process of truth seeking of the TRC were 
narrowly defined by power, namely the corporate sector in South Africa (Ignatieff 1996:111; 
Terreblanche2002:124–132). Thus, Boesak (2008:636–654) asks: “Just how wise was the link 
between the legal and political process of truth seeking and the demand for reconciliation?” 
 
 
 
The TRC’s process of truth seeking must be understood in terms of the link between the legal 
and political processes of truth seeking. This is because the legal process of truth seeking deals 
with facts, that which can be proven. Yet this process has limits for a process like the truth 
commission which serves transitional purposes: The judiciary may be temporarily unable to hold 
effective trials if a state is failing or enduring civil unrest. Trials may be limited to notorious 
cases or to the most easily identifiable perpetrators, thus neglecting many victims and trials, and 
the facts are established using judicial techniques that may be inadequate for acknowledging the 
personal, cultural, or psychological experiences of victims. Contrary to this, the political truth- 
seeking process involves an informal process of seeking the truth and involves the following: the 
identity of perpetrators, the causes that led to abuses, the circumstances and facts of violations 
and the ultimate fate and whereabouts of victims in the event of enforced disappearances 
(Gonzalez &Verney 2013:3–4). 
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As a result, truth commissions like the TRC tried to balance the legal and political processes of 
truth seeking. In the process of balancing these processes, however, truth seeking was subjected 
to  political  scrutiny  until  it  became  a  negotiated  truth  (Mamdani  2000:177–178;  Moosa 
2000:116).  It  became  a  truth  which  must  be  understood  as  institutionally  produced,  the 
boundaries of which were narrowly defined by power, that of the corporate sector, and the search 
for which was so committed to reinforcing the new power, that of the ANC government), that it 
turned the political boundaries of a compromise into analytical boundaries of truth-seeking 
(Amadiume & Abdullahi 2000; Moosa 2000:116). 
 
 
 
As a result of compromising the truth, the TRC not only turned a political compromise into a 
moral compromise that obscured the larger truth, but it also obscured the history of which it was 
supposed to establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights (TRC 1998). Obscuring the truth had an effect on justice for 
victims. This is because the TRC, in an attempt to uncover the truth about the apartheid system, 
wrote off some victims. For instance, by trying not to expose the corporate sector in South 
Africa, the TRC decided not to broaden its investigation to include the systemic analysis of racial 
capitalism, and as a result, it ignored the gross human-rights violations perpetrated collectively 
and systemically against millions of Black people under White political domination and racial 
capitalism (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Because of this, the definition of injustice, of which 
reconciliation goes to the roots, was affected. Thus Mamdani (1996) states the following: 
… that injustice is no longer the injustice of apartheid: forced removals, pass laws, broken families. 
Instead, the definition of injustice has come to be limited to abuse within the legal framework of apartheid: 
detention, torture, murder. (n.p.) 
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The process of truth seeking is necessary for the process of reconciliation, which presupposes 
justice. This is because reconciliation is radical in that it goes to the roots of injustice and 
removes it along with the weeds of alienation and fragmentation. However, reconciliation does 
not end there. It also calls for structural changes and restoration. Thus reconciliation becomes 
real  (experiential),  radical  (focused  on  social  justice)  and  revolutionary  (oriented  toward 
structural changes). It becomes real because it demands the restoration of the battered and 
bruised identity of people who experienced oppression. It becomes radical when it demands 
structural changes and fights for social justice. It becomes revolutionary when it goes to the roots 
of injustice and abolishes the status quo and attempts to replace it with a qualitatively different 
one (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:12–23). 
 
 
 
According to Mamdani (1996), Chikane is of the opinion that the concept of reconciliation was 
equated with negotiations, political settlements and so on. This, Chikane believes, robbed the 
word reconciliation of its deeper meaning, one which includes the concept of healing. For 
Chikane, negotiations can result from political pressures or from a mutual decision by parties to 
avoid a war because the costs are too great (ibid). Chikane (ibid) is of the opinion that this does 
not necessarily mean that the parties have had a change of heart; they are simply relocating the 
battleground to the negotiation table or to parliament. Following this, Mamdani (ibid) notes that 
the deeper and more critical meaning of the word reconciliation goes beyond its simplistic 
understanding. It involves people being accountable for their actions and showing a commitment 
to right their wrongs. 
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5.5 Obscuring history: The TRC obscured a history of gross 
human rights violations in SA 
 
 
 
The claim that the TRC obscured and thus wrote the vast majority of apartheid’s victims, 
particularly the victims of systemic exploitation, out of its version of history as Mamdani 
(2000:183) points out will be investigated against the TRC’s acknowledgement that apartheid 
was a crime against humanity and the definition of gross violations of human rights. This needs 
to be understood against the background that the legislation that set up the TRC did not define 
who the victims and the perpetrators were. Consequently, the task of defining victim and 
perpetrator was left to the TRC, and this task was the single most important decision that 
determined the scope and depth of the commission’s work (ibid:33). Hence, without a 
comprehensive acknowledgement of the victims of apartheid, there would be only a limited 
identification of perpetrators and only a partial understanding of the legal regime that made 
possible the “crime against humanity” (Mamdani 2002; Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
 
 
 
The abovementioned claim that the TRC obscured history needs to be understood according to 
Mamdani (2002:33–34; see also Terreblanche 2002:124–132) against the background of three 
key limitations in the report of the TRC. Firstly, the TRC individualised the victims of apartheid. 
Secondly, by focussing on individuals and obscuring the victimisation of communities, the TRC 
was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed 
natives differently from non-natives. Finally, the TRC extended impunity to most perpetrators of 
apartheid. With regard to the first point, that the TRC individualised the victims of apartheid 
(Terreblanche 2002:124–132), the TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights 
community that apartheid was a crime against humanity. However, it did not explain why it 
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shared the international community’s basic moral and legal position on apartheid, and it did not 
spell out what aspect(s) of apartheid was a crime against humanity, which targeted entire 
communities for ethnic and racial policing. The TRC was reluctant to go beyond this formal 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
As a result, in spite of the TRC acknowledging that apartheid was a crime against humanity, its 
final analysis reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire communities to 
one between the state and individuals (Mamdani 2002:33–34). The final analysis of this 
commission not only obscured the mandate given to it, that it should promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding that transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past 
by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations  of  human  rights  (TRC  1998),  but  it  also  went  against  its  acknowledgment  that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity (Terreblanche2002:124–132). Thus, Mamdani (2002:33–
34) states that, whereas entire communities were victims of gross violations of human rights,  the  
TRC  acknowledged  only  individual  victims.  Hence,  the  individualisation  of  the victims of 
apartheid not only obliterated the central characteristic of apartheid as a crime against humanity, 
which involved targeting entire communities for racial and ethnic cleansing and policing, but it 
also led to political activists being defined as victims (Mamdani 2002:33–34; 
Terreblanche2002:124–132). The consequence was that the TRC’s perspective was narrowed to 
political reconciliation between state agents and political activists, that is, between individual 
members  of  a  fractured  political  elite,  rather  than  the  “national  unity  and  reconciliation” 
mandated by the legislation that set it up (Mamdani 2002:33–34). 
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The second key limitation in the TRC’s report is that, by focusing on individuals and obscuring 
the victimisation of communities, the TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of 
apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non-natives. At this point, 
Mamdani (2002:34) points out that, whilst the apartheid state spoke the language of rights to the 
White population, it disaggregated the native population into tribal groups, each to be 
administered under a separate set of laws in the name of enforcing custom. Rights and customs 
were two different and contradictory languages: The former claimed to circumscribe power, the 
latter to enable it. Whereas the former claimed to be a rule of law, the latter claimed the 
legitimacy of custom and tradition.41 Apartheid produced dual identities, that is, racial solidarity 
 
amongst its beneficiaries and an ethnic particularism amongst its victims, and each of these 
identities was reproduced by a set of institutions (Mamdani 1996). Thus, whilst racial identity 
was anchored in a racial electorate, racially exclusive civil laws and a race-bound civil society 
and privileges defined as so many rights protected by a racialized power, ethnic identity was 
anchored in an ethnically defined customary law, enforced by an ethnically defined native 
authority (ibid). Thus, the TRC’s failure lay in focussing exclusively on the civil regime and 
totally ignoring the customary regime (Mamdani 2002:34). He (ibid) further argues that it is no 
wonder that the TRC failed even to recommend reforms that would put in place a single unitary 
regime, a rule of law understood as formal equality before the law, for all South Africans in a 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
41Mamdani (1996:34) also notes that coming to grips with the legacy of apartheid requires that we first underline the 
identities  institutionalised  and  thereby  reproduced  under  apartheid.  Apartheid  was  much  more  an  attempt  to 
fragment and contain the colonised majority by detribalising it (through forced removals if necessary) than it was an 
attempt to erase and annihilate a ghettoised minority. He (ibid) further notes that apartheid followed in the wake of a 
trail blazed by British indirect rule, French association and Belgian customary rule. They all confronted the dilemma 
that the institutions of racial supremacy inevitably generated a racial identity not only amongst its beneficiaries but 
also among its victims. Their solution was to link racial exclusion to ethnic inclusion: The majority that has been 
excluded on racial grounds would now appear as a series of ethnic minorities, each included in an ethnically defined 
political process. The point was to render racial supremacy secure by eroding the racial identity of the oppressed, by 
fracturing it into so many ethnic identities. 
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The third and final key limitation in the TRC’s report is that the TRC extended impunity to most 
perpetrators of apartheid. In the absence of the full acknowledgment of victims of apartheid, 
there could not be a complete identification of its perpetrators to the extent that the TRC did not 
acknowledge the full truth, and the amnesty that was intended to be individual turned into group 
amnesty (Mamdani 2002:34). Any perpetrator who was not identified as such was a perpetrator 
who enjoyed impunity (ibid). In Terreblanche’s (2002:124–132) opinion, the TRC has done an 
excellent job of discrediting the apartheid regime and the atrocities committed under its aegis. In 
doing so, it has identified many of the individual perpetrators of gross human-rights violations 
and also many of the individual victims of these violations. However, Mamdani (1996) points 
out that, in the South African context, the perpetrators are a small group as are those victimised 
by perpetrators. In contrast, the beneficiaries of the system of apartheid are a large group, and 
victims defined in relationship to beneficiaries are the vast majority. By individualising the 
victims and perpetrators of the apartheid system, the TRC ignored the gross human-rights 
violations perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions of Black people under White 
political domination and racial capitalism. 
 
 
 
The next important point is the affirmation by the TRC of the judgement of the international 
human-rights community that apartheid was a crime against humanity. Although the TRC 
acknowledged that apartheid was a crime against humanity, its reluctance to go beyond this 
acknowledgement led to the fact that the TRC wrote the vast majority of apartheid’s victims, that 
is, the victims of systemic exploitation, out of its version of history (Mamdani 2000:183; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132). Mamdani (2002; see also Terreblanche 2002:124–132) states that 
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the  TRC  acknowledged  the  judgement  of  the  international  human-rights  community  that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity, and to explain why apartheid was a crime against 
humanity, the TRC (1998) cited the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind proposed by the International Law Commission. This codes says the following: 
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systemic manner or a 
large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or group: … (f) 
institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of a population. (p.6 ) 
 
 
 
From this, it is possible to deduce that the grounds of declaring apartheid a crime against 
humanity were not the individual violations such as killings and arson (Mamdani 2002:33–34). 
Apartheid, as a crime against humanity that was built on racial and ethnic policing, cleansing and 
institutionalised discrimination, constituted a crime against humanity in terms of the 1996 Draft 
Codes of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Thus, the human-rights violations 
that had been caused by the denial of freedom of movement through pass laws, by forced 
removal of people from their land, by disenfranchising citizens, by the ill treatment of farm 
workers and other labour disputes and by discrimination in such areas as education and work 
opportunities were not only in accordance with its mandate (TRC 1998:65–66; Terreblanche 
2002:124–132) but were also not in accordance with the understanding of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity (Mamdani 2002:42). 
 
 
 
The second key limitation in the TRC’s report, namely that it was unable to highlight the 
bifurcated nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non- 
natives, is also of importance in this regard. Apartheid was declared a crime against humanity 
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that  included,  amongst  other  things,  racial  and  ethnic  policing  and  cleansing  which  were 
enforced through a number of laws (e.g. the Group Areas Act, the Pass Laws Act and the 
Coerced Labour Law Act) and racialized and ethnicised legal structures (Mamdani 2002:42–53; 
Terreblanche 2002:124–132; TRC 1998:11). The legal basis of apartheid was a system of law 
that distinguished between natives, that is, those who are indigenous to the land, and non-natives 
or immigrants, including those alleged to be non-natives (Coloured people were defined as non- 
natives)  (Mamdani  2002:42–53).  The  law  ethnicised  natives  and  racialized  non-natives. 
Mamdani (ibid) also mentions that, with non-natives, a distinction was further drawn between 
the master race (White people) and subject races (Indian people, Coloured people), all governed 
through civil law, whilst the natives were divided into so many tribes, each to be governed by its 
own customary law.42  Mamdani points to the 1927 Native Administration Act, which gave the 
 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development power to forcibly remove natives from one 
location to another, as an example that the TRC acknowledged but only when it came to the 
banishment of individual natives. The TRC notes that up to 97 persons, mostly chiefs and 
headmen who had opposed government policy, had been banished up to 1960, and that over 40 
remained banished in 1986 (ibid). 
 
 
 
The 1927 Native Administration Act, which Mamdani points out as an example of how laws 
were put in place to racially and ethnically police and cleanse communities of Black people in 
South Africa, is acknowledged in the report of the TRC, but what this report does not do is to 
link  the  provisions  of  the  Native  Administration  Act  to  the  forced  removals  of  entire 
42Mamdani notes that the earliest tribe to be subjected to colonial customary law was the Zulu in colonial Natal. 
(Mamdani does this to show how the individualisation of victims of apartheid obscured the real basis of the 
apartheid system.) He also states that the 1891 Natal Native Code conferred on the British governor the title of 
Supreme Chief of the Zulus. His powers included the power to move natives from one location to another. The 1927 
Native Administration Act transferred that power to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, who 
was then in charge of all natives in South Africa (Mamdani 2002). 
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communities, defined ethnically and removed on those grounds, a practice that reached truly 
inhuman proportions in the period specified in the TRC’s mandate, 1960 to 1994. Thus, 
Terreblanche states that another reason why the TRC failed to do justice to systemic exploitation 
under the apartheid system may have been that the period of history it was instructed to 
investigate was too short to allow it to deal with South Africa’s past in a credible manner. By 
focusing on only 34 years of South Africa’s modern history of 350 years, the commission not 
only interpreted this history in a one-sided way but also distorted and compromised the truth 
(Terreblanche 2002:124–132). In 1959, the apartheid government passed the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act. This Act was to provide the legal umbrella for a far-reaching ethnic and 
racial cleansing of 87% of the country that was defined as “White” South Africa. The racial 
cleansing of areas declared White was followed by the re-organisation of the Black (majority) 
population into fragmented ethnic homelands, the result of subsidiary ethnic cleansing(Mamdani 
2002:42–53). These acts (the 1927 Native Administration Act and the Promotion of Bantu Self- 
Government Act of 1959) were at the heart of apartheid and as such were a crime against 
humanity as declared by the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind as proposed by the International Law Commission (United Nations 2005). 
 
 
 
It is also necessary to note a number of forced evictions as examples of the racial and ethnic 
cleansing of the apartheid system, namely the Transkei and Pondoland revolt, Ciskei and 
Opposition to Home Rule, Bophuthatswana and Opposition to Home Rule, Western Cape and 
Transvaal. Transkei was the homeland to be granted independence in 1963. This declaration was 
preceded by the Pondoland revolt, a peasant revolt against homeland authorities, a development 
that took place in the Pondoland region of the Transkei in 1960–1961 (a date which falls under 
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the mandate of the TRC). The revolt was followed by the first phase of forced removals, 
involving hundreds and thousands of people being removed from their homes, which were 
acknowledged by the TRC. These removals generated a climate of fear that resulted in a period 
of relative acquiescence in political resistance until the 1970s (Mamdani 2002:43–53; TRC 
1998:55). In this regard, the TRC (1998) stated the following in its report: 
 
The commission finds that the state used several chiefs in the Transkei region to silence political opposition 
to the policy of apartheid, using methods including banishment, forced removal of political opponents and 
destruction of their property. (p. 55) 
 
 
 
It is interesting to note that, in spite of these acts of forced removal which were part of the ethnic 
cleansing of hundreds and thousands of people, the TRC acknowledged only a paltry 324 cases 
of severe ill-treatment (Mamdani 2002:44; TRC 1998:332–333). 
 
 
 
Ciskei became self-governing in 1972, but the TRC recorded in its report several occasions 
during the 1980s when the government of Ciskei targeted entire communities opposed to 
homeland rule. The punishment was forced removals or incorporation into the homeland. For 
example, in the mid-1980s, the Kuni community was evicted from Ciskei en masse and dumped 
at the roadside in South Africa where they later found a home at Needs Camp outside East 
London. Another example is that of a community that received even harsher treatment when it 
was tossed back and forth throughout the 1980s. At first forcibly removed across the border into 
Ciskei  in  the  early  1980s,  this  large  group  of  residents  fled  twice  from  Potsdam  outside 
Mdantsne following assaults by police and vigilantes. It is surprising that the TRC’s report 
provides neither figures of how large or small this community was, nor of gross violations of 
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human rights for that period. The TRC only acknowledged this community as a victim of “severe 
ill-treatment” by the apartheid state (Mamdani 2002:33; TRC 1998:332–333). 
 
 
 
A number of people, when they refused to accept the citizenship of the newly created 
Bophuthatswana homeland, were forcibly removed. An example is the non-Tswana people who 
were staying in the Kromdraai squatter area. The children of these people were barred from 
attending schools in Bophuthatswana. The TRC acknowledges an estimated fifteen to twenty 
thousand non-Tswanas who were resettled. The commission reports that comparatively few 
statements were received from the Orange Free State (where some of these non-Tswanas where 
staying), and thus it acknowledges less than 20 cases of severe ill-treatment for 1979 to 1980 for 
the whole of the Orange Free State (Mamdani 2002:44; TRC 1998:333). 
 
 
 
The region known as the Western Cape initially comprised the provinces of the Western Cape 
and the Northern Cape. This region was marked by the physical elimination or genocide of the 
indigenous Khoisan population, the large-scale kidnapping of Khoisan children and using them 
for forced labour and the importation of thousands of Indonesian, Indian and East-African slaves. 
The peculiar pre-apartheid history of this region was exaggerated by declaring it a preferred area 
for Coloured people, and it gradually turned into a region with a majority of inhabitants branded 
as Coloured. In its report, the TRC acknowledges that the Northern Cape has a long history of 
land dispossession and forced removals. But it is surprising that the report does not specify the 
number of people who were forcibly removed from communities. When it comes to identifying 
victims of gross human-rights violations in this region, the TRC records that 52% were victims 
of severe ill-treatment and that “… the most common form of severe ill-treatment was beating, 
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followed  closely  by  incarceration  and  shooting  injuries”  (TRC  1998:391).  The  commission 
makes no mention of forced removals (Mamdani 2002:45). 
 
 
 
Finally, the Transvaal was the industrial hub of South Africa, but at the heart of the Transvaal is 
Soweto. During the 1960s, the apartheid government worked systematically to reverse the flow 
of Africans to the urban areas and to restructure the industrial workforce into one composed 
primarily of migrant labour. The TRC noted that over a million labour tenants and farm squatters 
and 400 000 city dwellers were resettled in the homelands, the population of which increased by 
70% in the 1960s. However, there is a single resettlement which sums up a series of actions that 
occurred when people were resettled. This includes the bulldozing of homes, the destruction of 
fixed properties as well as the relocation of movable property and persons, and all these involved 
the direct use of force and brutality. It is surprising that the TRC’s report recorded the lowest 
number of gross violations of human rights, ascribing these low figures to factors such as the 
events having been overshadowed by more recent political conflict, the death of potential 
deponents and the fading memory of deponents (Mamdani 2002:45; TRC 1998:531–532). Thus 
Mamdani (2002) notes that the one thing the TRC did not consider was its own responsibility: 
Could it be that the knowledge that the commission did not consider forced removals as gross 
violations of human rights kept deponents from filing grievances with the TRC – rather than the 
fading memory of deponents? Could it be that the TRC’s decision to interpret its own terms 
narrowly blotted from the official record the most repressive practices affecting large numbers of 
ordinary people in South Africa? 
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It is surprising that, in its report, the TRC also noted that many organisations lobbied the 
commission to insist that it should investigate many of the human-rights violations that had been 
caused by (1) the denial of freedom through the pass laws, (2) forced removals of the people 
from their land, (3) the disfranchisement of citizens, (4) the ill treatment of farm workers and 
other labour disputes and (5) discrimination in such areas as education and work opportunities. 
Commission members felt that these issues were important areas that could not be ignored. 
Nevertheless, the TRC decided that these issues could not be interpreted as falling directly within 
its mandate (TRC 1998:11–12). According to Terreblanche (2002:128), this decision not to 
investigate these issues within the parameters of gross violations of human rights was not in 
accordance with the mandate given to the TRC, and the decision not to include these issues in the 
TRC’s investigation should be deplored. 
 
 
 
Against this background, Mamdani notes that not only were Black homeland residents who 
resisted independence (e.g. by refusing homeland citizenship) forcibly removed, but Black 
residents in White South Africa, who were defined as Black spots, were also targeted for forced 
removals. A widely distributed and cited investigation by the Surplus People Project estimated 
that 3.5 million people were forcibly moved by the South African state between 1960 and 1982 
in support of the program of developing ethnic homelands (Mamdani 2002:45; Terreblanche 
2002:128). 
 
 
 
 
In its report, the TRC acknowledges the above-mentioned Surplus People Project estimation, and 
it also acknowledges that the process of forcibly moving people involved collective expulsions, 
forced migration, bulldozing, gutting or seizure of homes, the mandatory carrying of passes, 
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forced removals into rural ghettos and increased poverty and depression (Mamdani 2002:45). 
However, according to Mamdani, both the surviving victims and their advocates amongst 
community organisers and activists had assumed that forced removals would be the core focus of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Yet the commission was not obliging: After noting that 
forced removals were an assault on the rights and dignity of millions of South Africans, the TRC 
claimed that it could not acknowledge them as gross violations of human rights as defined by the 
Act (ibid). The phenomenon of forced removals illustrates all three binaries around which the 
TRC had constructed its extremely narrow interpretation of what constituted a gross violation of 
human rights: the distinction between bodily integrity rights and subsistence rights, between 
individual and group rights and between political and non-political motives. Forced removals 
violated both the person and the property of those targeted. They violated the rights of both 
groups and individuals, in that order, because those targeted were first and foremost defined as 
groups (racialized in White South Africa as “Black spots” and ethnicized in demarcated 
homelands as ethnic strangers) and only then as individual members of these groups. Finally, 
though some were removed from homelands for direct opposition to the project of apartheid, all 
forced removals were a direct result of state implementation of the political project that was 
grand apartheid, a project whose sum and substance was to racialize spaces and communities in 
White South Africa and to ethnicise space and communities in Black South Africa (ibid:46). 
 
 
 
It is also necessary to look into the pass laws and forced labour, which formed an integral part of 
the apartheid system. The pass laws involved the racial and ethnic monitoring of the Black 
population  and  the  racial  targeting  of  suspected  political  opponents.  This  illustrates  how 
apartheid as a crime against humanity targeted entire communities for ethnic and racial policing 
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and cleansing. Thus, the year in which the mandate of the TRC began, 1960, was the year in 
which the National-Party government extended pass laws to native women. The Sharpeville 
demonstrations  of  21  March  1960  were  the  culmination  of  mass  protests  against  this 
development. After 1960, every native adult in South Africa, male or female, was required to 
carry a passbook. Consequently, the movement of every native in South Africa was monitored 
through administrative regulations enforced by the police (Mamdani 2002:46; Pheko 1984; 
Terreblanche 2002; TRC 1998:528). Not only did the pass laws monitor the native population, 
but they also served as primary instruments for the state to arrest and charge its political 
opponents. Thus, Mamdani mentions that the pass-law offenders formed a large proportion of the 
prison population for as long as pass laws were enforced, which they were for most of the period 
specified in the TRC’s mandate. In its report, the TRC finds that the proportion of pass-law 
offenders was as high as one in every four inmates during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, pass- 
law offenders were sent to prison for only one reason: They did not meet the administrative 
requirement that the racialized and ethnicised Black majority of the population carry a passbook 
and conform to administrative restrictions on their day-to-day movement (Mamdani 2002:46; 
TRC 1998:200). 
 
 
 
Although the TRC accepted that the treatment of pass-law offenders could well be interpreted as 
a human-rights violation, it still refused to include the category of pass-law prisoners in the 
institutional  hearings  on  prisons  (Mamdani  2002:46;  TRC  1998:200).  Although  a  strong 
argument was made for the inclusion of this category of common-law prisoners in the hearings, 
the commission refused on the grounds that these were common-law prisoners and not political 
prisoners. Thus, Mamdani (ibid) notes that, although the only common law that these prisoners 
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had violated was the pass law, this law criminalised the exercise of a basic human right: the right 
of free movement. He (ibid) further states that, to consider those imprisoned for the transgression 
of only the pass law as common-law prisoners (and explicitly to deny them the status of political 
prisoners), was to uphold the legal framework of apartheid. Thus, it is surprising that the TRC 
(1998:200; Mamdani 2002:46), in its report, states that “… it was decided that the pass laws and 
their effects fell outside the Commission’s mandate, especially given the requirement that every 
violation had to originate within a political context”. Hence, Mamdani (2002) correctly poses the 
question: When a state brands its entire population racially, then tags every member of the 
racialized majority with documents that allow administrative officials to monitor their every 
movement  (and  utilises  the  plethora  of  racially  focused  administrative  regulations  at  its 
command to target suspected political opponents), from which point of view can it be said that 
the motive behind this set of practices was not political? 
 
 
 
It is thus also important to look into forced labour, which formed an integral part of the apartheid 
system and which is closely linked to the pass laws. Besides a category of pass-law offenders or 
prisoners, there was also another category, namely that of farm prisoners. The system of farm 
prisoners was directly connected to the pass law system. This is because failure by a Black 
person to produce a pass resulted in an arrest and as the number of arrests grew, so did the 
financial burden on the state. Thus, the Department of Native Affairs proposed a solution to this 
problem in a General Circular 23 of 195443 (TRC 1998:202), which stated that, due to the 
financial burden of a number of pass-law offenders, this department, along with others, had taken 
 
43This document stated: ‘It is common knowledge that large numbers of natives are daily being arrested for 
contraventions of a purely technical nature. These arrests cost the state large sums of money and serve no useful 
purpose. The Department of Justice, the South African Police and the Department of Native Affairs have therefore 
held consultations on the problem and have evolved a scheme, the object of which is to induce unemployed natives 
roaming about the streets in the various urban areas to accept employment outside urban areas.’ 
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a resolution that would also have helped the natives, that is, offering them employment. When 
natives failed to produce a pass, they were not taken to court but to labour bureaux where they 
were induced or forced to volunteer as farm prisoners. The TRC took note of this, but the 
category of farm prisoners did not feature in the prison hearings. The TRC gave the reason that 
nobody came forward to give evidence (ibid). According to Mamdani (2002:47), “nobody” in 
this instance presumably refers to the victims of the farm-labour system. It could not possibly 
refer to its institutional managers since the commission had the legal right to subpoena reluctant 
or even unwilling witnesses and had done so in other instances but obviously not in this. 
 
 
 
Another category of prisoners who were excluded from prison hearings was that of prisoners 
detained without trial. The number detained in this way between 1960 and 1990 was estimated 
by the Human Rights Committee, whose reports were made available to the TRC, at some 80 
000 South Africans. The TRC pointed out that detention was frequently accompanied by torture 
and, at times, by death. In addition, some were often detained so that they could be interrogated 
and intimidated with impunity (Mamdani 2002:48). The most notorious instance of a prisoner 
detained without trial and who died in detention is the death in detention of Steve Biko. In its 
report, the TRC cited without comment the estimates of the Human Rights Committee that some 
80 000 had been detained between 1960 and 1990 and that up to 80% of them were eventually 
released without charge whilst barely 4% were even convicted of any crime (TRC 1998:201). 
Although the TRC cited the estimate of the Human Rights Committee without comment, it (TRC 
1998:201) provided an estimate (without citing a source) of those tortured: “As many as 20 000 
detainees are thought to have been tortured in detention.” With regard to death in detention, the 
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TRC noted 73 deaths of detainees held under security legislation but could not give estimates of 
how many held under common law may have died in detention(ibid:201–202). 
 
 
 
Thus, according to Mamdani (2002:48), the TRC gave no legal reasons for excluding a category 
of detainees from prison hearings. It said that its reasons were practical rather than legal. It 
simply did not have time (TRC 1998): 
There were practical rather than legal reasons for excluding detention from the prison hearings. The 
working group had to take into account the fact that only two days could be allocated to the hearing, putting 
immerse strain on an already overloaded program. (p. 201) 
 
 
 
Mamdani (2002:48) is of the opinion that, to consider the consequence for a commission charged 
with “establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations of human rights” from 1960 to 1994, one should simply keep in mind the numbers 
involved: an estimated 80 000 detained, of whom 20 000 were said to have been tortured in 
detention against some 20 000 or more acknowledged by the commission as victims of gross 
violations of human rights (TRC 1998:201). This raises the question: If the commission could 
acknowledge the detention, torture and death of Steve Biko as a gross violations of human rights, 
why could it not extend the same acknowledgement to others who met a similar fate (Mamdani 
2002:48)? 
 
 
 
 
Thus, in conclusion, although the TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights 
community that apartheid was a crime against humanity, the irony is that, whilst the TRC 
recognised this system of enforced racial discrimination and separation as a crime against 
humanity, it did not acknowledge any victims of this crime. As a consequence, it also recognised 
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no perpetrators. It is thus a crime against humanity without either victims or perpetrators 
(Mamdani 2002:54). The TRC thus missed the point that the victims of this crime against 
humanity, of this system of enforced racial discrimination and separation, could not have been 
individuals. They had to be entire communities marked out on grounds of race and ethnicity 
(ibid). Their injuries included forced removals, forced disruption of community and family life, 
coerced labour through administrative and statutory regulation of movement and location, et 
cetera. 
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I argued and demonstrated that, as a result of the inability and unwillingness of 
the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation or systemic nature of the apartheid 
system, it not only de-historicised and de-contextualised the story of apartheid, but this de- 
historization and de-contextualisation led to the failure of this commission to establish as 
complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human 
rights in South Africa which were perpetrated during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994. 
It  is  the  contention  of  this  chapter  that  the  TRC  lost  a  golden  opportunity  to  educate  the 
individual and corporate beneficiaries of apartheid about their direct responsibility for the 
disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority of Black people. If the beneficiaries 
had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, they would certainly have been 
less arrogant, and possibly more compassionate and generous (Terreblanche 2002:131). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study has argued and demonstrated that it is impossible to reconcile the dispossessor and the 
dispossessed or the oppressor and oppressed in the way in which the South African TRC 
attempted. This is because reconciliation as a Christian concept addresses the vital questions of 
justice, equality and dignity (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:1). However, reconciliation in South 
Africa was not allowed to address these issues although it must be mentioned that the problem is 
not reconciliation but the interpretation and understanding thereof. This is because experience of 
the church and politics in South Africa has shown how the Bible was used in Afrikaner politics, 
how the radical message of the Bible was made a servant of ideology,44 and how it was 
domesticated for purposes of subjection and control (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). The inclusion 
of reconciliation in the ambit of the truth commission was thus not to allow reconciliation to 
confront the country with the demands of the gospel but to blunt the progress of radical change 
and transformation (Boesak & DeYoung 2012:9). 
 
 
 
 
However,  I  must  agree  with  Boesak  (2008:636–654)  when  he  says  that  South  Africans  in 
general, including the victims and beneficiaries of the apartheid system, had expected more from 
the (TRC) process of reconciliation. On the one hand, it was expected that, because of the TRC, 
44It is probably necessary to mention that the idea behind the notion of the ‘Bible being made servant to ideology’ 
was that the gospel message was de-radicalised and made, for instance, to provide theological justification for 
apartheid. It must also be mentioned, as Boesak and DeYoung (2012:10) note, that ‘… the scriptures will not be 
ideologized, manipulated or managed to suit our political endeavours, processes or desires’. 
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reconciliation as a Biblical concept would be allowed to confront the country with the demands 
of the gospel, thus addressing the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity (and systemic 
change)  that  are  so  prominent  in  the  biblical  understanding  of  reconciliation  (Boesak  & 
DeYoung 2012). This expectation was raised by the symbolical Christianisation of the process of 
the TRC through the addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation and the appointment of a 
Christian priest, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. However, this move was made merely to reach 
some political accommodation, as Boesak and DeYoung (2012) point out. On the other hand, as 
Mamdani (2002) notes, since TRC claimed to be different from its predecessors – the National 
Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983, the National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Chile in 1991 and the Commission of Inquiry in Chad in 1992 (see Stevens et 
al. 2006:296) – it was expected that the TRC would practice neither impunity nor vengeance. It 
was therefore determined to avoid two pitfalls: reconciliation becoming an unprincipled embrace 
of political evil or a pursuit of justice so relentless as to turn into revenge (Mamdani 2002). 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is imperative to recall that the commitment of this commission to avoid the two 
abovementioned pitfalls must be understood against the background of the elite compromise 
reached at both the informal and formal negotiations as well as an exceptional move from a 
normal truth commission run by judges, lawyers and politicians to an extraordinary Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Although the issue of the elite compromise has been discussed at 
length in previous chapters, the TRC unfortunately cannot be understood apart from it. Hence, 
the focus here will be on the extraordinary nature and acts of this commission, which is normally 
formed as a transitional commission (from one regime to another) and is run by judges, lawyers 
and politicians as a court-like commission. In contrast, the South-African TRC was formed, on 
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the one hand, to bring forth the beneficiaries or perpetrators of apartheid to confess in order to 
form, as completely as possible, a picture of the gross crimes against humanity that occurred 
during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994. On the other hand, this commission was 
formed for the purpose of national unity. In its attempt to avoid two the pitfalls, that of allowing 
reconciliation to become an unprincipled embrace of political evil and that of a pursuit of justice 
so relentless as to turn into revenge, the TRC appointed a Christian priest, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, who in turn Christianised the whole process of this commission. On the one hand, this 
move had the possibility of pushing the TRC to go to the roots of injustice(s) by addressing the 
issues of justice, equality and dignity, which are prominent in the biblical understanding of 
reconciliation. On the other hand, it had the possibility of pushing the TRC to re-integrate the 
beneficiaries or perpetrators of apartheid into the community, particularly the community they 
have wronged. 
 
 
 
The addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation and the chairmanship of a Christian priest 
Christianised the whole process of the TRC and thus created a large set of expectations, 
particularly  from  Christians  (Boesak  2008:636–654).  On  the  one  hand,  Christians  who 
understand the gospel expected on the basis of their understanding of reconciliation, namely 
confronting the country with the demands of the gospel, that it would uproot injustices. On the 
other hand, it was expected that, with the addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation, the 
TRC would address the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity that are so prominent in 
the biblical understanding of reconciliation (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). In addition, the TRC 
was initially supposed to be a truth commission, but, as has been discussed in the previous 
chapters, the preparations for the TRC were disturbed by a request by FW de Klerk. He indicated 
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that his constituency was not happy with the idea of a truth commission, normally organized by 
judges, lawyers and politicians. They would, however, feel comfortable with the addition of the 
notion of reconciliation. This move turned this commission into the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission,  which  was  extraordinarily  chaired  by  a  Christian  priest.  Thus  Boesak  and 
DeYoung (2012) observed that, in their work and engagement with reconciliation, they have 
discovered that reconciliation is often used merely to reach some political accommodation which 
does not address the critical questions of justice, equality and dignity that are prominent in the 
biblical understanding of reconciliation. 
 
 
 
With regard to the claim that South Africans in general had expected more of the process of 
reconciliation (Boesak 2008:636–654), given that the TRC was determined to avoid the two 
pitfalls discussed above, the double determination of practising neither impunity nor vengeance 
was written into the interim constitution that paved the way for the legislation that set up the 
TRC (Mamdani 2002) .This legislation is the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, No. 34 of 1995, which mandated the TRC to promote national unity and reconciliation in a 
spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past by establishing as 
complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human 
rights which were committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 (TRC 1998; 
Terreblanche 2002:126). This is mentioned here to point out that, firstly, the TRC promised that 
there would be no blanket amnesty and that amnesty would be conditional. There would be no 
group amnesty. Every perpetrator would have to be identified individually and would have to 
own up to his or her guilt and the truth before receiving amnesty from legal prosecution. 
Secondly, any victim who is so acknowledged would give up the right to prosecute perpetrators 
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in courts of law. Justice for the victim would thus not be criminal but restorative (Mamdani 
 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
Based on the observation that the TRC was determined to practice neither impunity nor 
vengeance, it follows that the TRC process was dependent upon perpetrators telling the truth. 
This is because, given that the TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights 
community that apartheid was a crime against humanity (TRC 1998; Terreblanche 2002:126), it 
was expected that the TRC would facilitate inquiries into (i) gross violations of human rights, 
including violations which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse and (ii) into the identity of 
all persons, authorities, institutions and organisations involved in such violations of human 
rights. It was also expected that all persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in 
such violations of human rights would come forward to make a full disclosure of all the relevant 
facts relating to the violation(s) of human rights (Tutu 1999). Thus, although the TRC 
acknowledged that apartheid was a crime against humanity and given its mandate (see TRC 
1998; Terreblanche 2002:126), it failed in its tasks due to the following three key limitations: 
Firstly, the TRC individualized the victims of apartheid. Secondly, by focussing on individuals 
and obscuring the victimisation of communities, the TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated 
nature of apartheid as a form of power that governed natives differently from non-natives. 
Finally, the TRC extended impunity to most perpetrators of apartheid (Mamdani 2002). 
 
 
 
The three key limitations of the TRC are mentioned here to point out that, although the TRC 
promised to avoid the pitfalls of reconciliation becoming an unprincipled embrace of political 
evil and a pursuit of justice so relentless as to turn into revenge, it did, in fact, turn reconciliation 
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into  an  unprincipled  embrace  of  political  evil.  This  is  because,  firstly,  the  TRC  provided 
(blanket) amnesty to the perpetrators, and secondly, it gave no reparation (i.e. socio-economic 
justice) to victims. As Mamdani (2002:54) notes, this led to the identification of a crime against 
humanity with neither victims nor perpetrators. This is claim is based on the following: Firstly, 
to locate the specific way in which apartheid constituted a crime against humanity, the TRC cited 
the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, a code that lists a set of 
acts, any of which may specifically constitute a crime against humanity. According to Article 
18(f),  these  include  institutionalised  discrimination  on  racial,  ethnic  or  religious  grounds 
involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously 
disadvantaging a part of a population (Mamdani 2002:54). The irony was that, although the TRC 
recognised this system of enforced racial discrimination and separation as a crime against 
humanity, it did not acknowledge any victims of this crime (Mamdani 2002:54). Secondly, the 
TRC failed the principles upon which it was established. These principles not only ruled out a 
blanket amnesty, but they also involved an exchange: amnesty for perpetrators, truth for society 
(and not just for victims) and reparation for victims (Mamdani 2002:54). Thirdly, the core 
victims of these crimes against humanity by this system of enforced racial discrimination and 
separation could not have been individuals. They had to be entire communities marked out on the 
grounds of race and ethnicity. Their injuries included forced removals, forced disruption of 
community and family life, coerced labour through administrative and statutory regulation of 
movement and location, et cetera. Thus to address these grievances required reparation for 
communities, not for individuals (Mamdani 2002). All these are mentioned here to illustrate how 
not allowing reconciliation to confront the country with the demands of the gospel has led to 
cheap reconciliation. According to Boesak & DeYoung (2002:10), this cheap reconciliation has 
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come to be understood as assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without cost and 
maintaining power with only cosmetic changes. 
 
 
 
In Chapter One, I argued and demonstrated that the “scramble for Africa”, that is, the invasion, 
occupation, colonisation and annexation of African territories by European powers, needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of the adage that “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign” 
(Ramose 2003) and the ontology of domination. This is because, as has been shown through the 
engagement of the Dusselian geopolitics of space, the world has been divided into two, namely 
between the center, which is occupied by the Europeans and Beings (with a capital B), and the 
periphery, which is occupied by Non-Europeans and non-beings (Dussel 1985:3). For a long 
time, the center has imposed itself through the influence of the ontology of domination on the 
periphery. As a result of the adage “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign”, the center felt 
justified in imposing itself on the periphery. In addition, the center, which is occupied by 
Europeans and Beings, has become a space for rational Beings and beings whose souls have been 
ordained by God. As a result, the Beings of this space, that is, Europeans, felt justified to impose 
themselves as guardians on the non-beings of the periphery. Furthermore, I argued and 
demonstrated in Chapter One that, as a result of the ontology of domination and the rise of civil 
religion in South Africa, White people in South Africa, particularly Afrikaners who are 
descendants of Europeans, developed the notion of themselves as a chosen nation and South 
Africa as a promised land. Afrikaners, who are descendants of Europeans and as a result belong 
to the center, further felt justified to conceive the apartheid policy. Therefore, the anatomy of 
apartheid in South Africa needs to be understood against this background. 
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The passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of 1995), which 
led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, was the 
final step in the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations (Terreblanche 
2002). This is based on the following occurrences: (1) the sudden promotion of the notion of 
democratisation and the transition to democracy, (2) the sudden ideological shifts in the thinking 
of the NP, the corporate sector in South Africa and the ANC and (3) the sudden passing of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of 1995) (Terreblanche 2002). 
These are discussed in detail below. 
 
 
 
The sudden promotion of the notion of democratisation and the transition to democracy was not 
accidental. This is because the notion of democratisation was promoted as strategic shifts in the 
approach of imperialist governments to the Third World. Cronin (1994) notes that these shifts 
have gone through two major steps after the strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam at 
the beginning of the 1970s. The first shift was to Vietnamise the Third World’s struggles. This 
meant massive political and military support for regional authoritarian regimes (e.g. the NP in 
South Africa). By the end of the 1970s, these regional authoritarian regimes were proving to be 
increasingly unstable. They were the targets and often the direct cause of growing mass and 
guerrilla movements. As a result, the imperial governments strategically shifted their strategy 
because their politico-military strategy was not working and posed threats to their continued 
control over these countries. Hence, these imperial governments started promoting the notion of 
democratisation. Yet it must be noted that this took place at the same time as capitalism was 
becoming global in character. 
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The notion of a transition to democracy or democratisation was promoted strategically at the 
same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991). Democratisation was upheld as the 
only option available for Third-World countries. This is because many liberation movements 
were supported by the Soviet Union and were promoting the idea of overthrowing authoritarian 
regimes (e.g. the NP in South Africa) by means of military power. Thus, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union provided imperial governments, with their authoritarian regimes, with a reason to 
promote democratisation. The collapse of the Soviet Union left liberation movements (e.g. the 
ANC in South Africa) in disarray. As a result, a transition to democracy was the only option 
available to Third-World countries. 
 
 
 
It must be noted that the sudden promotion of democratisation and the transition to democracy 
was not accidental. This is because, interestingly, democratisation was promoted at the same 
time when capitalism was becoming global in character. Whilst democracy sounds good in 
theory, in practice, especially under the capitalist system, it becomes a nightmare. On the one 
hand, democracy is based on the equality of rights and privileges maintained and supplied by 
state power whilst capitalism, on the other hand, is based on the unequal distribution of property 
and assets and on the state-guaranteed freedom of individuals to own assets and property as they 
please, within the prescriptions of the law. This means that that the sudden promotion of the 
notion of democratisation under the capitalist system results in unequal freedom and unequal 
rights. 
 
 
 
The sudden ideological shift in the thinking of the NP, the corporate sector in South Africa and 
the ANC were not accidental. It is the contention of this study that, given the internal and 
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external pressures on the apartheid government (specifically the South African economy ), the 
NP and the corporate sector had to make a strategic move to guarantee their continued grip on 
the country’s economy. During that time, the economy of South Africa was under pressure. As a 
result, the NP and the corporate sector in particular were looking for a new accumulation 
strategy. As a result, the transition to democracy was the only option for both the NP and the 
corporate sector. 
 
 
 
At that stage, the ANC was in disarray. This is because their point of reference (the Soviet 
Union) had collapsed. The ANC was linked to the Soviet Union because its alternative to the 
authoritarian system of apartheid was socialism or communism. With the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the ANC was not prepared for democracy. Their policies (e.g. the Freedom Charter) were 
based on the influences of the ideas of socialism and communism. Consequently, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum in the ANC, and the NP and the corporate sector 
seized the opportunity and convinced the ANC to opt for democracy. It should be repeated here 
that democratisation was promoted when capitalism was becoming global in character. The 
significance of this is that the ANC was not only unprepared for democracy, but they were also 
unprepared for democracy under the capitalist system. It is for this reason that the ANC accepted 
all the policies proposed by the corporate sector and other international financial bodies. These 
policies were part of the strategy of imperialist governments and their authoritarian regimes to 
increasingly exert domination through financial mechanisms imposed by bodies like the IMF, the 
World Bank and GATT. 
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The sudden passing of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of 1995) 
was not accidental. It is the contention of this chapter that this act, which eventually established 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, was passed to finalise the elite 
compromise reached in the informal and formal negotiations. The TRC was tasked with the 
promotion of national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the 
conflicts and divisions of the past by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the 
period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994. 
 
 
 
However, the idea of “gross violation of human rights” was left vague. It was stated that the 
commission should facilitate inquiries into gross violations of human rights, including violations 
which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse. They should also facilitate inquiries into the 
identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in such violations. The 
mandate given to the TRC was thus vague, but the commission decided to interpret its mandate 
narrowly because the TRC was a result of a political compromise reached at the negotiations 
(both informal and formal). 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the TRC did an excellent job of discrediting the apartheid regime and the 
atrocities  committed  under  its  aegis  but  failed  to  hold  institutions  (e.g.  the  South  African 
corporate sector) responsible. Thus, this chapter contends that the TRC was established to seal 
the elite compromise reached at the negotiations. The TRC identified many of the individual 
perpetrators of gross human-rights violations and also many of the individual victims of these 
violations. In other words, the commission focused on individual perpetrators and victims and 
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ignored institutions. Consequently, it ignored the gross human-rights violations perpetrated 
collectively  and  systematically  against  millions  of  Black  people  under  White  political 
domination and racial capitalism. As a result, the inability and/or unwillingness of the TRC to 
systematically analyse South Africa’s history of unequal power structures is puzzling. By trying 
to uncover the truth about only one form of victimisation under apartheid and ignoring another, 
the TRC failed dismally in its quest for truth and reconciliation. 
 
 
 
Therefore, in Chapter Four, I have argued and demonstrated that the TRC accidentally and/or 
intentionally ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. This 
conclusion is the result of looking at the arguments in a number of sub-sections: (1) historical 
and ideological influences on the TRC, (2) TRC: The biblical concept of “reconciliation” within 
the TRC, (3) TRC: Individualistic and legalistic approach to human rights violation and (4) TRC: 
A political project with a political solution. 
 
 
 
Below is a summary of the arguments of each sub-section for the purpose of re-validating the 
argument of this chapter, namely that the TRC accidentally and/or intentionally ratified the elite 
compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. Although a great deal of 
international attention has focused on the South-African TRC and its successes and failures, the 
actual concept of a truth commission did not emerge in South Africa. It is for this reason that the 
first sub-section of Chapter Four dealt with the historical and ideological influences on the TRC. 
In this sub-section, I have demonstrated that the actual concept of a truth commission emerged in 
the 1970s in Uganda and gained prominence in Latin America in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(specifically 1983, 1991 and 1992). The focus of this sub-section was largely on the historical 
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and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth commissions (the National Commission on 
the Disappeared in Argentina in 1983, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in 
Chile in 1991 but also the Commission of Inquiry in Chad in 1992). This is because the TRC 
drew on the Latin-American examples to help shape its form and processes. 
 
 
 
However, it must be mentioned that the Latin-American influence on the TRC obscured what 
was distinctive about apartheid in South Africa. The Latin-American situation that gave birth to 
their truth commissions was based on dictatorship and a gross denial of human rights. As a 
result, the TRC enthusiastically embraced this analogy of dictatorship in Latin America when it 
decided to narrow its investigation to perpetrators’ and victims’ (legally defined) gross human- 
rights  violations.  Consequently,  the  TRC  obscured  the  systemic  character  of  apartheid  and 
offered business people an undeserved opportunity to clear themselves and their corporations of 
any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid (Terreblanche 2002:124–127). 
Furthermore, because of the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth 
commissions, particularly the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile, the 
TRC surprisingly accepted the proposed inclusion of the biblical concept of reconciliation in its 
name. This, then, leads to the second sub-section of Chapter Four, namely The TRC: The biblical 
concept of “reconciliation” within the TRC. This sub-section demonstrated how, despite the 
addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation, this concept was not allowed to confront the 
country with the demands of the gospel, and it blunted the progress of radical change and 
transformation. This claim, which has in my view been proven to be correct, is based on the 
argument that, for a long time in the history of South Africa, the Bible was used, particularly in 
Afrikaner politics, to provide theological justification for apartheid. It was also subjected to a 
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process that turned it into a servant of ideology, and it was domesticated for the purpose of 
subjection and control. 
 
 
 
Thus, the proposed addition of this biblical concept of reconciliation was not unanticipated 
because it was added for the purposes of manipulating the process of uncovering the truth about 
the human-rights violations of the apartheid system. This sub-section argued that the addition of 
the biblical concept to the South-African truth commission was in order for the religious twist to 
help tame it, to domesticate it and to make it more understandable and appetising for the broader 
public (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). As a result of this domestication of the Bible, reconciliation 
came to be closely associated with assimilation, appeasement, a passive peace, a unity without 
cost and maintaining power with only cosmetic changes. It must mentioned that, in spite of this 
domestication, this sub-section has demonstrated that, in actual fact, reconciliation is real, that is, 
experiential. Reconciliation is radical, that is, focused on social justice, and reconciliation is 
revolutionary, that is, oriented towards structural change(s) (Boesak & DeYoung 2012). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, following the historical and ideological influence of the Latin-American truth 
commissions and the proposed addition of the biblical concept of reconciliation under conditions 
in which the Bible had been domesticated and tamed, the TRC employed an approach which 
prepared it to fail in its mandate of facilitating inquiries into gross violations of human rights and 
the identity of those involved in them. This approached entailed an individualistic and legalistic 
approach to human-rights violations. 
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The TRC affirmed the judgement of the international human-rights community that apartheid 
was a crime against humanity, but in its dealing with this gross violation of human rights, it 
individualised victims of apartheid. This is significant because it points out the contradiction in 
which the TRC found itself. Whilst the TRC acknowledged that apartheid targeted entire 
communities for ethnic and racial policing, in its dealings, it identified individual victims and 
perpetrators. By doing this, the TRC accidentally or intentionally ignored the gross human-rights 
violations perpetrated collectively and systemically against millions of Black people under White 
political domination and racial capitalism. As a result, the TRC for all practical purposes chose 
to  ignore  violations  of  human  rights  that  were  part  of  a  systemic  pattern  of  abuse.  The 
commission further chose not to identify all of the authorities, institutions, and organizations 
involved in violations of human-rights violations, as they were supposed to do. The TRC also 
chose to interpret human rights as mainly first-generation or legal human rights whilst the 
violation of second-generation human rights or social rights were practically ignored. As a result 
of this, the TRC not only offered the corporate sector in South Africa an undeserved opportunity 
to clear themselves of any guilt in respect of or responsibility for the legacy of apartheid, but it 
also ratified the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal negotiations. 
 
 
 
Following the individualistic and legalistic approach that the TRC employed as a result of the 
historical and ideological influences of the Latin-American truth commissions, it is befitting to 
contend that the TRC was a political project with a political solution. It is the contention of the 
sub-section entitled “The TRC: A political project with a political solution?” that the TRC must 
be understood against the background of the elite compromise reached at the informal and formal 
negotiations. Therefore, the notions of informal and formal negotiations were invoked for the 
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purpose of contending that the TRC was established, on the one hand, to ratify the elite 
compromise and, on the other hand, to please the international human-rights community. 
 
 
 
The abovementioned claim is based, as demonstrated in the sub-section concerned, on how the 
TRC dramatically narrowed down its mandate of establishing as complete a picture as possible 
of the causes, nature and extent of the gross human-rights violations. The TRC was tasked with 
inquiring into the gross violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a 
systemic pattern, but the commission intentionally interpreted its mandate far more narrowly. 
Thus, in pleasing the NP and the corporate sector in South Africa by not opposing the elite 
compromise and also in pleasing the international human-rights community, which had affirmed 
that apartheid was a crime against humanity, the TRC decided to identify individual victims and 
perpetrators. As a result, this commission manufactured the truth, which led to its inability and/or 
unwillingness to uncover the truth about systemic exploitation by the apartheid system. 
 
 
 
It is against the background of the arguments of these sub-sections that Chapter Four has argued 
and demonstrated that the TRC accidentally and/or intentionally ratified the elite compromise 
reached at the informal and formal negotiations. This unwillingness and/or inability of the TRC 
to correctly analyse the history of gross violations of human rights has manufactured a skewed 
history that says that the systems of White political domination and racial capitalism did not 
undeservedly enrich White people and impoverish Black people. This has the implication that the 
rich are therefore released from any moral, political and/or systemic obligation to restore social 
justice towards Black people (Terreblanche 2002:124–132). 
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In  Chapter  Five,  I  have  argued  and  demonstrated  that,  as  a  result  of  the  inability  and 
unwillingness of the TRC to uncover the truth about the systemic exploitation or systematic 
nature of the apartheid system, the TRC not only de-historicised and de-contextualised the story 
of  apartheid.  This  de-historicising  and  de-contextualising  also  led  to  the  TRC’s  failure  to 
establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations 
of human rights in South Africa that were perpetrated during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 
1994. Consequently, Chapter Five reaches the same conclusion as Terreblanche (2002), who 
concluded as follows concerning the TRC: 
The TRC lost a golden opportunity to educate the individual[s] and corporate beneficiaries of apartheid 
about their direct responsibilities for the disrupted social structures and abject poverty of the majority of 
blacks. If the beneficiaries had been educated about their participation in racial capitalism, they would 
certainly have been less arrogant, and possibly more compassionate and generous. (p. 131) 
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